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THIS survey is an interpretive study of the Little En- 
tente system, the defensive alliance set up in 1920 by 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia for the ex- 
press purpose of maintaining and defending the new 
status quo in the Danubian basin. Just how effective 
a factor the Little Entente has been in preserving the 
peace in Central Europe can be suggested by recalling 
the outward circumstances which gave birth to this 
unique system of diplomatic collaboration. East of the 
Rhine, two great Empires (Austria-Hungary and Tur- 
key) had been swept off the map, and two other mighty 
Monarchies (Germany and Russia) had crashed to the 

These epochal upheavals left the entire area of Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans in smouldering ruins. The 
summer of 1920 saw the newly formed armies of Polonia 
Restitute*, under the command of Marshal Pilsudski, 
beat the world-crusading legions of Russian Bolshevism 
back from the very gates of Warsaw. Rumania was 
able to hold on to her generous acquisitions from Bes- 
sarabia to Transylvania only by dint of a reign of terror. 
The sway of the new regime at Belgrade was from 
time to time challenged by violent outbursts in Mace- 


donia and deliberate acts of non-cooperation in Croatia. 
Ambitious Greece under the helm of Premier Venizelos 
had pushed the whipped, yet unbeaten, Turk back 
into the heart of Anatolia. International disturbances 
loomed large on every horizon. Upper Silesia, Danzig, 
Vilna, Teschen, Burgenland, Fiume, Albania, Bes- 
sarabia to mention only a few at random. 

Central Europe in 1920 was in scarcely happier cir- 
cumstances. The Hapsburg Empire, having passed off 
the world stage for good and all, left a sorry heritage for 
the new states to build on. Lack of basic provisions, 
shattered communications, bitter disputes over "occupied 
territories" all these manifestations of post-war hysteria 
and disorganization held in check the process of im- 
proving the tone of interstate relations. The year before, 
Vienna, impoverished and blockaded, came perilously 
near following the suit of Budapest and Munich in 
clutching the gospel of Bolshevism as the easiest way out 
of her plight. 

Suddenly, ex-King Charles of Hapsburg escaped from 
his Swiss exile in a plane. Setting foot on Hungarian 
soil during Easter Week of 1921, he gave new proof of 
his resolve to regain the Crown of St. Stephen and to 
take up the lost cause of restoring integral Magyarland 
to her place in the sun. Not alone did this ill-advised 
adventure of the last Hapsburg Monarch cost Hungary 
dearly; it was a thrust aimed at the heart of all Succession 
States, including the new Republic of Austria* In 
short, Central Europe was in dire need of some organ- 


ized force to defend the peace settlement from, subversive 
attacks on all sides and to pave the way towards mutual 
reconciliation and cooperation. Such was the primary 
reason for setting up the Little Entente system. 

Other factors were at work elsewhere in Europe which 
favored and even sponsored the establishment of some 
such vehicle of diplomatic coordination as the Little 
Entente. The downfall of the German and Austro- 
Hungarian Monarchies heralded the military triumph 
of the Allies, and this event in turn sealed with success 
the efforts of the smaller Allies to enlarge their terri- 
tories, or to hoist the banner of statehood and freedom, 
as was the case with Poland and Czechoslovakia. One 
and all, they had been duly recognized as falling within 
the category of "Allied and Associated Powers" that 
is, as active belligerents struggling against the Central 
Empires. Before the Peace Conference came to a close, 
there became manifest a fundamental harmony of in- 
terests between France and the smaller Allies. 

The eclipse of Russia in the summer of 1917 left the 
Allies without a military support on Germany's eastern 
flank. The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk be- 
tween Soviet Russia and the Central Powers, followed, 
perhaps not unnaturally, by Allied intervention in the 
Russian civil war, turned an exhausted friend into a dan- 
gerous foe. Out of the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20 
grew the Franco-Polish alliance which gave France a 
new guarantee of security in case of trouble with either 
Soviet Russia or Germany. Likewise, France promoted 


the rise of the Little Entente with a view of extending 
her influence in the Danubian basin and as acting as a 
healthy check to the German Drang nach Qstcn. With 
Austria and Hungary out of the picture, the Little 
Entente was destined to become the diplomatic heir 
to the former Dual Monarchy, with this fundamental 
difference that it threw its weight on the French side 
of the scales. 

The smaller allies stood in sore need of support and 
encouragement from some Great Power, and they were 
only too willing to show their special gratitude to France 
for helping them realize their national liberation. Yet 
these nations had manifestly not thrown off the Haps- 
burg yoke merely to fall into any trap of diplomatic 
domination. Their plea of "Central Europe for the 
Central Europeans" was at bottom an ambition to prove 
themselves worthy of the rank of full-blown statehood 
and independence. From the very outset, the Little 
Entente sought to collaborate with the Allies on the 
basis of full equality. 

It is no deep mystery that the political calculations of 
European countries at that period were still largely 
dominated by the ancient doctrine of the balance of 
power. Little courage was then manifest in putting 
the principles of the New World to a decisive test, 
America had turned her back upon the peace settlement 
when the sceptre of famine and confusion stalked across 
war-torn Europe. The forces making for peace and 
security were desperately slow in overtaking the cohorts 


of war and disorder. Just how close the League of Na- 
tions came to being still-born in that fateful winter of 
1920 can be better imagined than stated: it was out of 
sheer desperation as much as a stroke of conscious states- 
manship that the Allies called the first meeting of the 
League Council. 

Six months later, in the summer of 1920, the first step 
leading to the formation of the Little Entente was taken 
by Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. Its enemies natu- 
rally proclaimed that it, too, was still-born. True, dur- 
ing the early years of its functions, the Little Entente 
bore, perhaps inevitably, a defensive, even negative, 
character; at times its acts and pronounciamentos took 
on a bellicose tone. As conditions settled down in the 
Danubian basin, however, the alliance gradually de- 
veloped into a system of diplomatic coordination with 
a constructive program aiming to bring about a regime 
of healthy collaboration with neighboring states. The 
capacity of the Little Entente to push forward along 
these lines was primarily the result of its statesmen being 
able to function as a diplomatic unit upon all occasions. 
In large measure, the efforts of the Little Entente group 
have fallen into line with the work of economic re- 
construction and political consolidation accomplished 
by the League of Nations* 

There would appear to be good reasons why this 
short book might be of interest to American readers. 
For it is in reality the story of the attempts of the Little 
Entente leaders to provide the basis of lasting peace in 


just that part o Europe where the fatal spark of world 
conflagration was struck some sixteen years ago. We 
can now say one thing with all certainty about the 
catyclisrn which befell Europe in the years following 
the royal assassination at Sarajevo. It was not caused 
by the frenzied act of mistaken patriotism: the powder 
magazines along the Danube were charged to the ex- 
ploding point by the Hapsburg policy of repressing and 
perverting profound economic and social forces. Two 
recent works bring out this point with convincing clarity 
Professor Seton-Watson's "Sarajevo" and Professor 
Jaszi's "The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy." 

This book is an interpretation of the position and 
utility of the Little Entente today. It is based on the 
relevant documents and on personal talks with various 
leaders in the Danubian States during the seven years 
that the author has lived and worked in those countries* 
To list the names of those who have helped him form 
his conclusions would perhaps be beside the point. 
They know well his gratitude, and the author only 
hopes that they will in some small degree feel rewarded 
for the generous assistance rendered him through this 
candid survey of the European situation as viewed from 
the angle of the Little Entente. 

The author is especially grateful to Mr. Leo Pasvolsky, 
Dr. Rudolf Ullrich and Mr. William Vogel for their 
helpful collaboration in preparing this study. 


PRAGOE, July 1, 1930. 








Origins of alliance. Benes puts through 
Czechoslovak proposal. First treaty against 
Hungary signed (1920). Ex-King Charles un- 
dertakes to regain Hungarian throne. Little 
Entente wins diplomatic recognition of Great 
Powers* Evolves technique of functioning as 
diplomatic unit. 


Little Entente frustrates Charles' second res- 
toration coup. Bethlen policy seeks diplomatic 
liberation of Hungary. Reconstruction scheme 
leads to improved relations with Litde Entente 
(1924-27). After abandoning negotiations with 
Jugoslavia, Hungary reaches understanding with 
Italy. St. Gotthard incident. Protracted Op- 
tants dispute with Rumania. 


Analysis of Hapsburg restoration question. 
Legitimists hold to illegality of 1921 Dethrone- 
ment Act. "Patriotic" attitude of Free Electors. 
Official neutrality of Government maintained. 



Anti-Trianon sentiment organized in Hungary. 
Revisionist campaign of Rothemcre press. Buda- 
pest sees Little Entente headed for disruption, 



TION 45 

Importance of internal stability of member 
states. Constitutional and administrative organ- 
ization in Czechoslovakia. Currency and bud- 
getary equilibrium reached. Formation of political 
groupings. Rule of National Coalition (1919-26), 
After critical year, Germans enter Cabinet. All- 
party Coalitions formed (1929). Social and 
agrarian reforms. Status of German minority. 
Magyar discontent. Slovakia and Carpathian 
Ruthenia. Notable leadership of President Ma- 
saryk. Country in fundamentally sound condi- 


Greater Rumania passes under control of Regat 
officials. Resulting abuses. Centralist constitu- 
tion passed (1923). Currency stabilization de- 
layed. Corrupt elections establish ascendency o 
Liberal party (1922)* Succession Law bars Carol 
from throne (1926'), Political chaos follows death 
of King Ferdinand and Bratianu. National Peas- 
ant party drives Liberals from office ( 1928) . Free 
elections held. Reforms undertaken by Maniu 
party. Two-party system reached. Carol's sud- 
den return (1930). Issues facing new Monarch. 
Dissatisfaction among racial minorities, especially 
Magyar. Rumania gradually gaining stability. 




Greater Serbia vs. federated Jugoslavia. Ser- 
bian officials put in early control. Centralist con- 
stitution passed (1921). Currency gradually sta- 
bilized. Sectional basis of parties. Supremacy 
of Pashich. His death deprives country of leader- 
ship (1926). Assassination of Radich. King 
Alexander proclaims dictatorship to break Serbo- 
Croat impasse (1929), New administrative re- 
form violates provincial boundaries. Croat trea- 
son trial. Status of racial minorities. Macedonian 
situation unhealthy. Imro campaign of violence. 
Unifying forces at work in Jugoslavia. Little En- 
tente policy coincides with domestic requirements 
of member states. 





Big neighbors are a source of preoccupation. 
Polish alliance protects Rumania on Soviet fron- 
tier (1921). Poland needs Little Entente sup- 
port, Bessarabian annexation causes deadlock 
between Bucharest and Moscow. France under- 
writes Rurnano-Polish alliance. Rumanian se- 
curity not threatened by diplomatic breach with 


Rumano-Jugoslav treaty guarantees both Hun- 
garian and Bulgarian frontiers. Fascist policy of 
Italianizing Adriatic provokes crisis with Jugo- 
slavia, Breaking-point approached after conclu- 
sion of Tirana treaty (1926). Frontier clashes 
growing out of Macedonian unrest. Jugoslavia 



and Bulgaria reach frontier accords (1929), 
Greece improves foreign position upon return o 
Venizelos (1928). Conditions not yet ripe for 
Balkan Locarno. 


PECTS ....... , 128 

Czechoslovakia struggles against encroaching 
German influence. Locarno treaties mark im- 
proved relations. Anschluss originally vetoed by 
Peace Conference (1919). Reconstruction scheme 
tests Austrian viability. Proposed Austro-Czecho- 
slovak tariff regime blocked by Italy (1925), Po- 
litical implications of renewed Anschluss agita- 
tion. Opposition of Little Entente, backed by 
France and Italy. Hungary neutral. Germany 
and Czechoslovakia disposed to peaceful settle- 


Little Entente relies on French backing. 
Franco-Czechoslovak treaty puts relations be- 
tween France and smaller Allies on more equal 
footing (1924), Conventions with Rumania and 
Jugoslavia* French preoccupation with Germany 
and Italy fosters self-reliance of Little Entente* 
Military aspects of alliance* Agrees with France 
on disarmament policy. Big Neighbor pressure 
does not threaten Little Entente with disruption. 




Importance of regional combinations for Eu- 
ropean Federation. Little Entente program of 
economic consolidation. Obstacles to tariff agree*- 
meats. Austria and Hungary refuse intimate 



economic cooperation. Farm Cartel proposals 
and agrarian conferences (1930). Trade barriers 
in Europe. Eastern reparations settled at The 
Hague (1930). Optants dispute also resolved. 
Benes and Bethlen report on Hague conference. 

TION 171 

Political strength of Little Entente. Italo- 
Jugoslav tension still acute. Improved interna- 
tional position of Austria and Anschluss con- 
tingency. Serbo-Bulgar relations somewhat bet- 
ter. Prerequisites to Balkan Locarno. Hungary 
still demands frontier rectification and minority 
protection. Difficulties blocking settlement ex- 
amined. New factors in King question. Hun- 
garian Government and Little Entente oppose 
overt restoration. Typical conference of Little 
Entente reviewed. Immediate objectives less im- 
portant than its help in organizing United States 
of Europe. 



1922) 189 






INDEX 217 





THE LITTLE ENTENTE system grew out of the political 
and diplomatic circumstances under which the leaders 
of the three nations worked together during the war.^ 
Associated with the Allied Powers in a common cause, 
these men of vision, especially President Masaryk and 
Dr. Benes of Czechoslovakia, the late Nicholas Pashich 
of Jugoslavia, and the late Take lonescu of Rumania, 
were quick to grasp the necessity of coordinating politi- 
cal action with a view to preserving the fruits of victory 
which the triumphant states were all preparing to ar- 
rogate to themselves. The momentum of forces making 
for the formation of the Little Entente was checked only 
momentarily by the territorial squabbling which took 
place at Paris, Indeed the Peace Conference provided 
the representatives of the smaller countries with an ex- 
cellent object lesson of the advantages of acting together 
in the handling of questions of mutual interest. 
/The more immediate causes for creating the Little 
Entente were rooted in the situation which resulted in 
Central Europe from the collapse of the Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. Following the formal separation of 
Hungary from Austria came the territorial dispositions 


of the Peace Treaties which deprived both of these; coun- 
tries of roughly three-quarters of their area. ;f Erected 
on the ruins of the Dual Monarchy were three countries 
which may be classified as victors and two as vanquished. 
The defeated countries, that is, the new Austria and the 
new Hungary, accepted their humiliating situation only 
under protest. Consequently, the victorious countries, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia felt the urgent 
necessity of protecting their new status, owing to the un- 
disguised moral repudiation of the peace settlement 
shown by their former enemies. \ 

The new governments in both Vienna and Budapest 
flatly disclaimed responsibility for bringing on the Great 
War, but popular feeling against the peace treaties was 
more violent in Hungary than in Austria. There were 
several reasons for this fact which were inherent in the 
organization of the two countries before the war and in 
the manner in which the last Hapsburg Monarch abdi- 
cated his throne. 

Both Austria and Hungary before the war had a 
population which was far from being racially homo- 
geneous. In Austria, besides the dominant German 
race, there were large Slav minorities in Bohemia, 
Moravia, Galicia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and elsewhere, an 
Italian population in South Tyrol and Istria, and a solid 
bloc of Rumanians in the Bukovina. Hungary, in addi- 
tion to the ruling Magyar group, contained Slav minori- 
ties in northern Hungary, Croatia, and elsewhere, and a 
Rumanian minority in Transylvania and the neighbor- 


Ing Banat. Now whereas Austria possessed a more or 
less decentralized administrative system, with several 
local Diets, Hungary was a unitary state with a highly 
centralized administrative apparatus, under which only 
the province of Croatia and the Free City of Fiume en- 
joyed any degree of autonomy. Thus, the breaking away 
of the already more or less self-governing, non-German 
territories from the Austrian Crown was much less of 
a shock than the surgical dismemberment of Hungary. 
The administrative centralization of Hungary was in 
itself due in some degree to the strongly developed 
policy of denationalization which Austria herself had 
given up as a bad job more than half a century ago. 

The spirit of bitter protest exhibited by Hungary was 
also due to certain technical aspects of the abdication of 
King Charles of Hapsburg and to his later adventures. 
Charles, who was both Emperor of Austria and King of 
Hungary, had in either case refrained from making a 
formal abdication, having merely issued a public decla- 
ration suspending his reign and renouncing all share in 
the government 1 This act did not constitute a legal ab- 
dication in Hungary, for, under the law of the land, the 
Act of Abdication must be countersigned by the Prime 
Minister and ratified by both Houses of Parliament. 
Neither of these steps having taken place, several leaders 
at Budapest seized upon the alleged invalidity of the 
abdication as a pretext for their claim that the Treaty of 

1 This technical point was of no great moment in Austria, where a 
republican regime had been set up. 


Trianon itself was not valid, since Charles, still held to 
be the legal King of Hungary, had neither signed it nor 
was he bound by it. 

The political chaos prevailing in Hungary during 
1919 was due in large part to the inability of successive 
Governments to obtain better peace terms. The weak 
republican Government headed by Count Karolyi, 
which had forced Charles off the throne, fell under the 
pressure of popular discontent and incompetent leader- 
ship. The Communist regime under Bela Kun, who 
succeeded in jockeying Karolyi out of office, was fol- 
lowed in a few months by a Nationalist Government, 
headed first by Archduke Joseph and then by Admiral 
Horthy, who was duly elected State Administrator (Re- 
gent) on March i, 1920. Law I of 1920 formally 
reestablished the Monarchy in Hungary. The Horthy 
Government finally signed the Treaty of Trianon, but, 
while this treaty was formally ratified by the National 
Assembly, the ratification was accompanied by open 
protests against the "flagrant injustice" of the terms im- 
posed upon a humiliated foe. This spirit of resentment 
against the peace settlement is a guiding political force 
of Hungary to this day. 

The principal stipulations of the treaty to which Hun- 
gary took violent exception regulated the territorial al- 
lotments whereby large blocs of Magyars found them- 
selves within the frontiers of neighboring states. While 
Hungary herself was left with a population of about 
eight millions, there were some 1,600,000 Magyars living 


in Rumania, 750,000 in eastern Czechoslovakia and about 
500,000 in Jugoslavia. 2 Never for a moment has Hungary 
concealed her resolution to seek a revision of the treaty, 
at least to the extent of restoring to her the territories 
populated mainly by these expatriated brethren. 
* Here, then, was a tangible and all-important interest 
which was common to all three of the victor states profit- 
ing from the dismemberment of the territories once 
belonging to Austria-Hungary. Wanting back some- 
thing which they had taken away from her, Hungary 
was flatly outspoken in her determination to achieve this 
restoration. A path of coordinated policy directed 
toward frustrating this design was indicated to the vic- 
torious countries. Already drawn together by the col- 
laboration of their leaders during the war, they now 
put their heads together to work out ways and means of 
insuring joint action in a common cause.| 

The early proposition, sponsored by the late Take 
lonescu of Rumania, envisaged a binding alliance to be 
created among all the victor states between the Aegean 
and the Baltic Sea. 8 The plan actually put into force 
was the Czechoslovak proposal for a regional agreement 
with sharply defined aims. Moreover, Czechoslovakia 
contemplated in such an alliance something more 
than an organization for insuring the maintenance of 
the peace settlement. Looking ahead, Prague statesmen 
foresaw that the small newly created states would in- 
evitably find themselves, were each of them to act inde- 

2 See page 176, 8 See page 105. 


pendently, playijj^ the role of mere satellites of the 
Great Powers. ^ Only by careful planning and acting 
in unison could the three victor states of the Danubian 
basin exert any decisive influence in the affairs of Europe, 
As Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Benes was 
faced with the task of transforming this conception into 
a living and working reality. His tactical skill and his 
shrewd evaluation of things seen and unseen in the art 
of politics were perhaps the principal reasons why the 
Little Entente was set up without delay on a solid foun- 
dation. Dr. Bfenes soon earned, the honorary title of 
"Father of the Little Entente,"/Under his unique guid- 
ance, the Little Entente has upon occasion exerted the 
influence of what can perhaps be called a diplomatic 
Great Power. / 

To return to the main current of events leading 
the formation of the Little Entente; Ex-King 
sent from his place of exile in Switzerland a 
against the assumption of power at Budapest of Arch- 
duke Joseph of Hapsburg. While it was not Charles 1 
protest which unseated the Archduke, the incident was 
sufficient to put the statesmen of the victor countries on 
their guard. Moreover, the whole trend of develop- 
ments in Hungary which brought Admiral Horthy and 
his White Guards to power with the backing of the Al- 
lies was pointing to the probable necessity of united 
action on their part at no distant date. Rumania, after 


advancing her forces to the banks of the Tisza, even went 
to the extremity of occupying Budapest in the late sum- 
mer of 1919, before the arrival of the Counter-Revolu- 
tionary Government under Admiral Horthy. 

The attitude of the Great Powers was also pushing 
these countries in the same direction. They resented 
the fact, for example, of being classified by the Supreme 
Council as "Powers with limited interests." They were 
rather taken aback by an incident in the summer of 
1920 when the Supreme Council contemplated accepting 
an offer from Budapest to send troops to assist Poland 
in her war against Red Russia. Largely as a result of 
the Czechoslovak protest, this offer was ultimately re- 
jected, but the incident was another proof of the necessity 
for the Danubian countries to reinforce their position 
in the handling of questions of direct and vital concern 
to thcniy^ 

The*rst fruit of the Prague policy was the conclusion, 
on August 14, 1920, of a treaty of alliance between 
Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. The central aim of this 
compact was to assure the full maintenance of the Treaty 
of Trianon. This treaty was supplanted in 1922 by a 
broader convention envising a policy of constructive 
political action. The two texts, given in Appendix A, 
are well worth careful comparison. 

It was on March 27, 1921 that Charles returned to 
Hungary to. make good his claim to the Crown of St. 
Stephen. /The existing alliance between Czechoslovakia 
and Jugoslavia enabled these countries to act jointly 


to frustrate the restoration coup at Budapest. Rumania 
also seized the occasion to cooperate with them, and 
less than three weeks after Charles had to quit Hun- 
gary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania signed a convention 
of alliance whose terms were identical with the first 
treaty of the Little Entente system. 4 "Thus, with the de- 
cisive backing of Prague, the late Take lonescu, as Ru- 
manian Foreign Minister, was able to persuade the 
Bucharest Government to abandon its policy of hap- 
hazard individualism in dealing with problems of com- 
mon interest. 

Less than two months later, after Rumania and Jugo- 
slavia had finally come to an agreement over frontier 
delimitation in the rich province of the Banat, these 
two countries concluded a similar convention s of defen- 
sive alliance. The scope of this pact went farther afield 
than that of the two proceeding conventions in that it 
had reference to the Treaty of Neuilly as well as to the 
Treaty of Trianon, both Rumania and Jugoslavia hav- 
ing received territorial concessions at the expense of 
Bulgaria. The convention therefore provided for com- 
mon action in the event that either Bulgaria or Hungary 
should attempt to upset the new status quo. Later in 
1921, these three political conventions were duly sup- 
plemented by corresponding secret military agreements, 

With the signing of these three sets of political and 
military conventions, the formal groundwork of the 
Little Entente was laid. The final step in the diplo- 

* See Appendix A. 5 See also Appendix A. 


matic encirclement of recalcitrant Hungary took place 
through the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and 
Arbitration between Czechoslovakia and Austria on 
December 16, 1921, According to the terms of this 
convention, by which Austria became a sort of asso- 
ciate member of the Little Entente, the two countries 
guaranteed the territories respectively assigned to them, 
promised neutrality in the event of an attack by a third 
party, and agreed to cooperate to prevent a restoration 
of the ancien regime. As a result of these guarantees, 
Austria breathed easier over her position in the newly ac- 
quired province of Burgenland which, though ceded 
to her by Hungary under the Treaty of Trianon, was 
turned over to her only in part after a stormy plebiscite 
in the summer of 1921. 

During the first return of Charles to Budapest, 
Czechoslovakia and her associates found themselves 
playing a decidedly secondary r61e in the handling of 
an incident which concerned them intimately. The di- 
rect and decisive negotiations with the Hungarian Gov- 
ernment were carried on by the Conference of Ambas- 
sadors that is, by the Great Powers. During his second 
adventure in October 1921, when the Little Entente 
group acted energetically and as a unit, their Govern- 
ments drew upon themselves a reproof from the Confer- 
ence of Ambassadors which was worded in a note an- 
nouncing the decision of the Conference, as follows : 


"I have the honour in the name and on behalf of the Con- 
ference to tell you that the Allied Powers firmly count that in a 
situation so serious the Czechoslovak Government and the 
other Governments of the Little Entente will reach no decision 
and will undertake no action before reaching an agreement 
with the Allied Powers represented in the Conference.*' 

The dictatorial tone of this communication left no 
illusion with the Little Entente statesmen as to the at- 
titude of the Great Powers towards them. True, in the 
liquidation of the Hapsburg affair they ultimately won 
for themselves the recognition of their special interest 
and a position of collaboration with the Great Powers. 
Yet it was abundantly clear to them that they must 
develop their technique of working together as a diplo- 
matic unit in the general field of international policy* 

This conviction was further strengthened by an inci- 
dent which grew out of the restoration affair. The 
Little Entente powers demanded that Hungary reim- 
burse them for the expenses incurred in the mobiliza- 
tion of their forces, the claim applying exclusively to 
Czechoslovakia which was the only country to mobilize. 
The Conference of Ambassadors refused this petition. 
Yet four months later, when France put forward a simi- 
lar claim arising out of a mobilization against Ger- 
many, the demand was acceded to by a conference of 
Allied Finance Ministers. 

* * * 

Not long after the liquidation of the restoration crisis, 
an occasion arose which served as an opportunity for 


the Little Entente powers to test the efficacy of con- 
certed diplomatic action on their part. This opportunity 
came in connection with the Genoa Conference of 1922. 
The official announcement of the engagement of 
King Alexander of Jugoslavia to Princess Marie of 
Rumania brought together the heads of the Govern- 
ments of the Little Entente in Bucharest. This occasion 
was used for an informal conference, in which Poland 
'also took part. At the end of these conversations, the 
following communique was issued: 

"The Governments of Rumania, Poland, Jugoslavia, and 
Czechoslovakia have agreed on a common policy at the Genoa 
Conference. Preoccupied with assuring to Europe a normal 
Apolitical and economic life, they have recognized the necessity 
... of a meeting at Belgrade of experts who will determine the 
common point of view to be placed before the Conference." 

After several sessions at Belgrade in March 1922, the 
experts worked out a program which was referred back 
to the respective Governments. The Premiers and For- 
eign Ministers of the four countries then met at Genoa 
for the consideration and acceptance of these proposals 
during the first days of the international conference. 
As a result of acting together as a solid bloc, the Little 
Entente and Poland won for themselves full representa- 
tion on all the commissions and played an important 
role throughout the Genoa Conference. 

Soon after the Genoa Conference, the marriage of 
Alexander and Marie on June 8th brought together in 
Belgrade the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente 


countries. This served as an occasion for a further ex- 
change of views, Poland again participating, and this 
time a decision was taken to repeat the Genoa tactics at 
the Hague Conference which was to deal solely with 
the Russian question. A far-reaching decision was also 
taken in Belgrade to hold periodic meetings of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente for the pur- 
pose of coodinaling policy. Eleven such conferences 
have been held to date. 

Finally, the Little Entente states have succeeded in 
carrying the principle of acting as a diplomatic bloc 
to Geneva where they enjoy full representation on the 
permanent commissions. Czechoslovakia was elected 
to the League Council in 1922 where her Foreign 
Minister, Dr. Benes, played a useful and prominent r61e 
for the next four years. When the rules governing 
membership on the Council were revised in 1926, the 
precedent was established for the Little Entente Govern- 
ments to be elected in rotation on the basis of the three- 
year period for non-permanent members. By virtue of 
this decision, Rumania was duly elected as a member 
of the Council to sit until September 1929, when the 
Assembly chose Jugoslavia to fill her place. 

To sum up: the Little Entente system was set up to 
preserve the territorial and other provisions of the peace 
settlements. Its efficacy in protecting the common inter- 
est of its member states against hostile attacks and un~ 


friendly movements has been maintained through its 
ability to function as a diplomatic unit. Later on, as oc- 
casion arose, the mechanism thus set going has been 
turned into more constructive channels of international 
policy. Before this phase of its work could really get 
under way, however, the Little Entente powers were 
called upon to take strong measures against Hungary 
upon the two occasions in 1921 when ex-King Charles 
of Hapsburg returned to Budapest to regain his lost 

We now turn our attention to the problem of Hungary 
and her relations with neighboring states. 



"The aims, pursued by the three countries of the Entente, are 
threatened by two things: first, by the Magyar theory of the 
integrity of Hungary; secondly, by the attempts of the Haps- 
burgs to regain their throne. The need of offsetting these op- 
posing elements led the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the Kingdom 
of Rumania and the Republic of Czechoslovakia to unite even 
more closely, and these closer relations were given formal ex- 
pression in the defensive alliances." 

Czechoslovak Whits Boo^ on the Little Entente. 

As events turned out, it became necessary for the Little 
Entente powers to deal specifically with the second of 
these menaces before the first. The Hapsburg restora- 
tion plans from the very beginning were held to be a 
vital threat to their own independence. Former King 
Charles and his supporters in Hungary maintained that 
he was still bound, under the terms of the Coronation 
Oath, 1 to preserve the territorial integrity and the invio- 
lability of Hungary as it existed when he ascended the 
throne in 1917. This pledge constituted a direct threat 
against those countries which had acquired portions of 
Hungarian territory. The Czechoslovak Declaration of 
Independence, for example, was typical of the attitude 

1 For full text, see Appendix C. 


towards the dynastic question of those groups which 
had separated themselves from the Hapsburg domain. 

"We cannot and will not continue to live under the direct 
domination of the violators of Belgium, France and Serbia. 
. . . Our nation had of its own free will [1526] called by election 
Hapsburgs to the throne of Bohemia, and in virtue of the same 
right it deposes them today." 

When Charles set foot on Hungarian soil at the end 
of March 1921, the Governments of Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania, and Jugoslavia were violently agitated by his 
action. Dr. Benes promptly informed the Budapest 
Government through the Czechoslovak Minister there, 
that the weapon of blockade and military demonstration 
would be employed against Hungary if Charles did not 
quit the country. A few days later, Dr. Benes communi- 
cated to his Minister there the decision of Czecho- 
slovakia and Jugoslavia to intervene with their full mili- 
tary forces, should the Hungarian National Assembly 
declare itself in any manner favorable to a restoration. 
Together with Rumania, the two countries were on the 
point of delivering an ultimatum to Budapest to the 
effect that, if Charles had not left the country by April 
7th, a joint military demonstration would be made 
against Hungary. This ultimatum, however, was never 
presented, for the Great Powers intervened in the mean- 
time, and under this double pressure Charles withdrew 
across the frontier. 

When Charles came back to Hungary on his second 


adventure late in October 1921, the Governments of 
the Little Entente were ready on this occasion to act 
with greater energy and dispatch. Following his second 
political demise, the last Hapsburg Monarch was re- 
moved to his final place of exile in the Azores where 
he died a few years later. 

Yet the powers of the now fully functioning Little 
Entente were not satisfied with the mere removal of 
Charles from Hungary in 1921. Acting through the 
Conference of Ambassadors, they proceeded to take 
steps for the definitive liquidation of the Hapsburg 
question. Yielding to this overwhelming combination 
of forces, the Hungarian National Assembly passed the 
famous Dethronement Act 2 by virtue of which the na- 
tion regained the historic right of Free Election* This 
law specifically abrogated the rights of Charles as King, 
and voided of all juridical value the Pragmatic Sanction 
of 1723 which had arrogated the rights of hereditary 
succession to the Hapsburg dynasty. The law further 
stated that Hungary, though maintaining her ancient 
monarchical form of government, would postpone the 
election of King to a later date. 

Even the terms of the Dethronement Act did not en- 
tirely allay the apprehensions of the Little Entente, and 
at its insistence the Conference of Ambassadors de- 
manded from the Hungarian Government a specific 
clause rendering all members of the House of Hapsburg 
ineligible to the throne. In reply to this demand, the 

2 For full text, see Appendix D. 


Hungarian Government made a solemn declaration 
whereby it undertook to consult the Conference o Am- 
bassadors before proceeding to the election of King. It 
was only after this declaration that the Czechoslovak 
Government ordered a demobilization, and the first and 
last military demonstration of the Little Entente against 
Hungary came to an end. 

At the same time, the Little Entente powers requested 
the Conference of Ambassadors that they should be rep- 
resented on the Inter-Allied Commission of Military 
Control at Budapest and that they should be systemati- 
cally informed of the progress of disarmament in that 
country. With the acceptance of this demand, the Gov- 
ernments of the Little Entente became definitely asso- 
ciated with the Great Powers in the handling of the 
Hungarian question. 

The resulting diplomatic isolation of Budapest was 
a deep humiliation to Hungary. Count Bethlen, who 
became Prime Minister a few days after the first raid of 
Charles in 1921, was called to power at a dangerously 
critical moment in the history of his country. Moreover, 
his conciliatory foreign policy, inaugurated during the 
hopeful summer of 1921, went to smash upon the sec- 
ond return of ex-King Charles. Seeing his country on 
the brink of irreparable disaster, it was Count Bethlen 
who, against bitter opposition at home, engineered the 
passing of the Dethronement Act, The astute Magyar 


Premier tad to fight and win yet another desperate 
battle against the truculent forces of chauvinism and re- 
venge inside Hungary before he could take the first 
positive step toward freeing his country "from the diplo- 
matic tutelage of the Little Entente namely, to secure 
membership in the League of Nations (1922). 

At first, the Little Entente opposed favorable action 
on the Hungarian application for membership in the 
League. They demanded from the Hungarian Govern- 
ment a formal declaration of her intention to fulfil "all 
her international obligations in accordance with the 
treaties or acts subsequent to their signature," Only after 
Hungary had made such a pledge was she duly elected 
as a member of the League. It was more than a year 
later, however, before the relations between Hungary 
and her neighbors underwent a substantial change for 
the better. This improvement came about as a result 
of the negotiations leading up to the international assist- 
ance which Hungary received for her financial recon- 

By the beginning of 1923, it became clear that Hungary 
could not stabilize her finances without foreign aid. 
The budgetary and currency situation had grown so 
disorganized that her own means were obviously insuf- 
ficient to salvage state finances out of the wreckage. 
Foreign loans thus became an imperative necessity to 
the Bethlen Government/ and such loans could not be 

3 Opposition leaders at Budapest maintain to this day that foreign 
loans help keep the "Bethlen Dictatorship" in the saddk. 


negotiated without the permission of the Reparation 
Commission which held what amounted to a blanket 
mortgage on her budgetary resources. 

In April 1923, the Hungarian Government formally 
requested the Reparation Commission to take the neces- 
sary steps to permit the negotiation of foreign loans. 
Such an action on the part of the Reparation Commission 
involved the releasing of certain fiscal resources which 
could be earmarked as pledges for the proposed loan as 
well as the fixing of the Hungarian reparation liability 
and the mode of payments. The consent of the Little 
Entente being indispensable to any such action on the 
part of the Reparation Commission, the annual meeting 
of the three Foreign Ministers, held at Sinaia, Rumania, 
about that time, was devoted largely to this question. 
The resulting decision of the conference was a declara- 
tion in favor of international assistance for the recon- 
struction 'of Hungary similar to the scheme worked out 
for Austria the previous year. 

The League Assembly, held in September 1923, pro- 
vided an opportunity for ironing out the remaining dif- 
ferences between Hungary and the Little Entente on this 
score. Several meetings were held between Count Beth- 
len on the one hand and Dr. Benes, M. Ninchich (Jugo- 
slavia) and M. Titulescu (Rumania) on the other hand. 
The success of these negotiations in turn enabled the 
League Council to announce its willingness to accept 
responsibility for a scheme of financial reconstruction in 
Hungary. After negotiations lasting several months, in 


which the Governments of the Little Entente enjoyed 
a full share of collaboration, the reconstruction program 
was finally worked out and launched. Protocol One 
of the Geneva scheme was a formal declaration on the 
part of the signatory powers that is, Hungary and the 
Allies to the effect that all parties would respect 
the territorial integrity and independence of Hungary. 

During the period from 1924 to 1927, relations between 
Hungary and the Little Entente states underwent a 
process of gradual improvement. There was indeed only 
one protracted incident which succeeded in stirring up 
any great amount of bad blood, and that was the franc 
forgery scandal which broke loose early in 1926.* The 
ensuing comic opera trial at Budapest was striking evi- 
dence of the inability,, or perhaps even the unwillingness, 
of the Government to deal severely with a band of ir- 
responsible chauvinists led by Police Chief Nadossy and 
Prince Windischgraetz, whom Charles had tentatively 
selected as his Prime Minister in 1921. 

During these years, Hungary, though no longer in 
the clutches of diplomatic encirclement, did not yet 
enjoy the full advantages of a sovereign State. As a 
result of the marked success of the reconstruction scheme 
under the direction of Mr. Jeremiah Smith, financial 
control was lifted at the end of June 1926. The next 
step of restoring to Hungary her freedom of action was 
the withdrawal of the Military Control Commission 

4 See the excellent dispatches of Mr. Clarence K, Streit In the then 
current numbers of the New York Times t on this amazing affair. 


early in 1927. This action was taken following the de- 
cision of the Allies in the case of Germany, and the task 
of watching over the regime of disarmament in Hun- 
gary was likewise entrusted to the League Council. 
Though the Little Entente was not fully persuaded that 
Hungary was living up to the last letter of her military 
obligations, no major objection was raised against this 

Having thus regained economic stability and full 
diplomatic freedom, Hungary was now faced with a 
fundamental decision whether she should not try to 
come to terms with her neighbors. At the outset, there 
were good grounds for believing that such would be the 
line of her immediate policy. Upon the occasion of the 
four-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Mohacs 
(1526), Admiral Horthy uttered a warm plea for an 
understanding with Jugoslavia whose people, he pointed 
out, had fought side by side with Magyar, soldiery to 
save Europe from the Turkish peril. Response from Bel- 
grade being favorable, negotiations were promptly em- 
barked upon, and soon treaties of friendship and of 
commerce were drawn up in final form. 

From one point of view, it was natural for Hungary 
to come to terms first with Jugoslavia. To begin with, 
she harbors less in the way of territorial grievances 
against her southern neighbor than against either Ru- 
mania or Czechoslovakia. Secondly, Hungary seeks a 


commercial outlet through Croatia to her former port 
of Fiume. Lastly, the treaties awaiting her signature 
had the approval of both Czechoslovakia and Rumania. 

Just why Hungary stopped short of signing those 
treaties remains somewhat of a mystery. Outwardly 
what happened was that Hungary threw over Jugo- 
slavia in favor of coming to an understanding with a 
Great Power. At home, the Government was first 
threatened by, and then apparently succumbed to, the 
argument that the time was not ripe to reach a full- 
fledged agreement with the Little Entente. 8 A still 
more decisive factor was the necessity, arising out of 
the parlous relations between the two countries on the 
opposite sides of the Adriatic, for Budapest to throw in 
her lot with either Belgrade or Rome. In his bid for 
the friendship of Hungary, Signor Mussolini had at 
least the implicit support of certain financial circles 
in London. 

Consequently, Count Bethlen set out on a political 
pilgrimage to Rome to conclude a treaty of friendship 
and arbitration with Italy which he signed with Signor 
Mussolini on April 5, 1927, If the Hungarian Premier 
ever entertained any serious misgivings as to the popu- 
larity of his decision, they were doubtless dispelled by 
the thunderous acclaim, from populace and press alike, 
which greeted him upon his return to Budapest. The 

"Hungary at that juncture seemed willing enough to make a 
"separate peace" with Jugoslavia, and therefore Budapest is always 
dismayed to find that she can only deal with the Little Entente aa a 


distinguished Count Apponyi maintains that, since the 
conclusion of the Italian accord and the entrance of 
Germany into the League, the international prestige of 
Hungary is worth taking into account. Yet in other 
circles at Budapest it is an open question whether these 
and other advantages reaped in recent years by Hun- 
garian diplomacy outweigh the potential benefits to 
be gained by coming to a sound understanding with 
her neighbors. 

Since the signing of the Italo-Hungarian treaty, rela- 
tions between Hungary and the Little Entente have in- 
deed taken a distinct turn for the worse. There are 
two underlying causes which have contributed to this 
unfortunate state of affairs in Central Europe namely, 
the prolonged diplomatic strain between Rome and 
Belgrade, and the flaring up of anti-Trianon agitation. 
These two interdependent factors have played a decisive 
r61e in the outcome of the principal diplomatic clashes 
which have taken place recently in the Danubian basin. 

An incident revealing the renewed diplomatic cour- 
age of Budapest grew out of the discovery on January 
i, 1928, of machine-gun parts filling five freight cars 
which were passing through St. Gotthard, a railroad sta- 
tion on the Austro-Hungarian frontier. The cars were 
actually on Hungarian territory, standing before a joint 
customs house, when they were opened by the Austrian 
officials who discovered that the cases marked "agricul- 


tural implements" really contained parts of machine 
guns. The authorities demanded the immediate return 
of the five cars across the frontier. The Hungarians, 
however, turned down this demand by invoking the so- 
called lex loci. 

These cars bore the following directions: "Verona to 
Warsaw with reshipment at Nove Mesto by the Broth- 
ers Berkovics." The Hungarian officials decided to 
act in accordance with rules of shipment as fixed by the 
Berne Convention. The shipper of the goods, duly 
notified through the newspapers, could not be located 
in Italy, and the Brothers Berkovics disclaimed any 
knowledge of the order. Thereupon, the authorities 
announced their intention to destroy the materials of 
war and to auction off as junk everything that was left 
over, so as to defray the railroad charges. 

Upon hearing of this shipment of arms through Hun- 
gary, the Governments of the Little Entente appealed 
to the League Council to investigate the matter. The 
Council first requested the Hungarian Government to 
leave the cars intact, pending the arrival of a commission 
of experts to be sent to the spot. In spite of this request, 
however, the authorities proceeded with the destruction 
of the machine guns, and by the time the experts ar- 
rived nothing remained, save the debris. From the 
wreckage, the experts determined that all the parts neces- 
sary to compose complete machine gun units were not 
present. They also discovered that the debris weighed 
four tons less than the original shipment. At the next 


meeting of the Council, a resolution was passed, accept- 
ing the findings of the commission and expressing regret 
that the Hungarian authorities, having been unable to 
find the shipper, had not followed the Council's in- 

A far more vital aF air was the protracted dispute be- 
tween Hungary and Rumania in the so-called Optants 
question, which had to do with expropriations of prop- 
erty of Hungarians owing land in Transylvania who co- 
opted in favor of retaining their Hungarian citizen- 
ship after the war. Back in 1923, the Hungarian Gov- 
ernment appealed to the League Council, stating that 
the expropriation of the lands of Hungarian Optants in 
Transylvania "constitutes a flagrant violation of the 
Treaties." This formal appeal requested that Rumania 
should be forced to act in conformity with the Treaties 
and that "full compensation for damages should be given 
to the injured parties." 

Through the person of ML Titulescu, the Rumanian 
Government countered by stating that the provisions 
regarding absentee owners were applied with strict 
impartiality. The reply charged that the "Hungar- 
ian Government was not pleading for equality of 
right, but for a privilege in Transylvania to the profit of 
Hungarian nationals and to the detriment of Rumanian 
landowners." Moreover, the Rumanian Government 
considered that "the Optants' property was subject to 


the national laws of a sovereign state," especially in 
view of the fact that the laws were in force prior to the 
signing of the peace treaties. 

The Rumanian Government therefore rejected the 
proposal of the Council, suggested by Hungary, that the 
dispute, being a question of legal interpretation, should 
be referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. The basic attitude of the Rumanian Govern- 
ment remained to the end that "the political and social 
transformation of a nation" was at stake. Hungary ar- 
gued that the whole principle of arbitration was threat- 
ened by the Rumanian stand. Faced by a deadlock, 
M. Adatci, acting as President of the Council, in- 
vited the representatives of both Governments to Brus- 
sels where he was stationed as Japanese Ambassador. 
The net result of this conference was that, after both 
parties signed a compromise on May 26, 1923, the 
Hungarian Government disavowed the act of its pleni- 
potentiary. 6 

During the next two years, a number of applications 
from Hungarian Optants were lodged with the Mixed 
Rumano-Hungarian Tribunal. These actions in turn 
led the Rumanian Government to deny the competence 
of the Arbitral Tribunal on agrarian (i.e. internal) 
questions, and after the Tribunal declared itself in the 

8 The Hungarian Government denies having repudiated the signa- 
ture of its representative simply because he was powerless to commit 
it without the agreement having been duly submitted for ratification. 
Whatever the real reason was behind the decision, Hungary got a 
substantially less favorable settlement at The Hague seven years 


contrary sense, the Rumanian arbitrator was formally 

The long-drawn-out case took a new turn when, 
on March % 1927, the Hungarian Government re- 
quested the League Council to abide by its obligation 
in such an emergency and appoint substitute arbitrators 
to the Tribunal to enable it to proceed with the consider- 
ation of the claims of the Optants. Apparently, the 
Council felt it unwise to press the issue in this sense, and 
so a Sub-Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir 
Austin Chamberlain, was then appointed by the Coun- 
cil for the purpose of bringing the warring parties to 
terms. The resulting report maintained ttie competence 
of the Arbitral Tribunal, "under certain stated condi- 
tions," to entertain claims arising out of the application 
of the Rumanian Agrarian Law to Hungarian Optants. 

There followed on the heels of this report what has 
been characterized as the most brilliant skirmish of 
intellect and cunning which the League Council has 
heard in the ten years of its functions. This battle of 
argument was waged between the venerable Count Ap- 
ponyi and the adroit M. Titulescu. Standing at the 
opposite poles of the earth, they in turn proceeded to 
shoot holes through the body of the recommendations of 
the Sub-Committee. From that time onward, the efforts 
of the Council at mediation consisted principally in 
putting constant pressure on the contesting parties to 
come to an understanding. 

The deadlock seemed more complete than ever when 


M. Maniu, leader of the National Peasant party, came 
to power at Bucharest in the autumn of 1928. Soon 
thereafter, the two Governments resumed direct diplo- 
matic conversations, an increasing degree of modera- 
tion being shown on both sides. It was in the fall of 
1929 that further negotiations took place at Paris with 
a view of working out a basis of settlement before the 
second Hague Conference opened its doors. Here the 
parties clashed over two points of fundamental im- 
portance the figure of the indemnity to be paid the 
Optants, and the modality of payment. The Rumanian 
Government proposed that such compensation should be 
automatically deducted from Hungarian reparation pay- 
ments, while Hungary held that Bucharest should in- 
demnify the Optants directly. As we shall see in Chap- 
ter XI, a compromise in principle was drawn up and 
signed at The Hague early in 1930 which heralded the 
definitive liquidation of the Optants question as be- 
tween Hungary and all Little Entente countries. 


JUST as Rumania was seeking to preserve the fruits of 
her Agrarian Revolution, so were there certain factors 
in the present balance of political power in Hungary 
which had at least an indirect bearing on the Optants 
question. According to ancient practice, the Hungarian 
government has been run under the control of the 
landed aristocracy and gentry who in turn are on good 
terms with Jewish High Finance in Budapest. This 
equilibrium of forces, restored with considerable diffi- 
culty and bloodshed by the post-war Counter-Revolu- 
tion, 1 accounts for the fact that, with the exception of 
Poland, Hungary is the only country left in Europe 
where the quasi-feudal regime of entailed estates is still 
protected by the laws of the land. Linked up with this 
reactionary trend of affairs is of course the possibility of 
a Hapsburg restoration at Budapest, 

Every once in a while, there crops up in Budapest 
a more or less formal exchange of views on the King 
question. In this connection, there is invariably ex- 
hibited an acute divergence of principle between the 

1 The present Electoral Law in Hungary provides for oral voting 
for 199 out of the 245 seats in Parliament. The nation is still await- 
ing the r establishment of trial by jury and freedom of speech and 
assembly, measures repeatedly promised by the Government. 



Legitimists, who support the claims of Archduke Otto, 
the heir of the late Emperor Charles, and the Free Elec- 
tors, whose candidate for the throne of St. Stephen was 
the Hungarian Archduke Albrecht of Hapsburg, up to 
the time of his declaration of fealty to Otto in 1930^ 
Between these two warring camps stands the Govern- 
ment whose official neutrality was again demonstrated in 
November 1928 when Parliament passed a law post- 
poning the coming of age of Otto for two more years, 
when he would be eighteen. In this skirmish, both 
parties to the conflict were agreed at least to the extent 
that the time was not ripe for a showdown. 

The cardinal tenet of Legitimism in Hungary is based 
on the argument that the Dethronement Act is illegal 
and invalid because passed under foreign pressure. Up 
to the present, the Legitimists, led by Count Apponyi and 
Count Julius Andrassy, the last Austro-Hungarian For- 
eign Minister in 1918, have been able to hold their ground 
against the onslaughts of the Free Electors, at least in 
the sense of putting off the solution of the King question. 
The leaders of this movement are in constant touch with 
the youthful Archduke at the Court of Lequeitio, Spain, 
whose education, thanks to his Mother, the ex-Empress 
Zita, has been largely entrusted to Hungarian priests. 
From all accounts, Otto is an attractive hard-working 
boy, having already mastered most of the languages 
spoken by the peoples once under the rule of the Haps- 
burgs. Behind these leaders inside Hungary are the 

2 See page 181, 


Higher Catholic Clergy and a large section of landed 
magnates. Lastly, it is interesting to note that the 
statesmen who form the keystone of Legitimism are 
both over eighty years of age. 8 

On the opposite side of the fence are the Free Electors 
who are fighting for a "patriotic" solution of the King 
question. By virtue of the ancient Hungarian Consti- 
tution and the Dethronement Act, they maintain that the 
nation, as represented in Parliament, enjoys the inalien- 
able right of choosing its own king. Strongly chauvin- 
ist in its attitude on both domestic and foreign affairs, one 
branch of this group, especially M. Julius Gombos and 
his cohorts, was closely associated with the White 
Guards, and later organized the Society of Awakening 
Magyars under the direction of Dr. Tibor Eckhart, The 
well-known fact that both these leaders are in intimate 
contact with Admiral Horthy needs no particular com- 
ment. Significantly enough, M. Gombos was taken into 
the Bethlen Cabinet in 1929, as Minister of War. 

The plain truth is that the mooted King question is 
not of any stirring importance even inside Hungary 
today, Legitimism, never having boasted of being a 
fighting political force, has seemingly lapsed into 
an annual banquet affair in Budapest* In any case, the 
adherents of Archduke Otto gave up the expense of a 
daily mouthpiece in 1929. The Free Electors, on the 
other hand, still lack the courage to force a decision in 
the controversy, being content to leave Admiral Horthy 

3 The death of Count Julius Andrassy was announced in June, 1929. 


as Regent for the remainder of his life. Moreover, the 
Legitimists have definitely turned down a conciliatory 
overture to urge ex-Empress Zita to formally renounce 
Hapsburg pretensions to the Austrian throne. Should 
this impasse continue in effect for many years, the out- 
come may well be that Hungary will be "sentenced to 
the fate of being a Republic" for the fourth time. 

The outward neutrality of the Government in the 
conflict over the King question is perhaps the outcome of 
expediency rather than of principle. Though the broad 
masses of peasants and workers exhibit little concern 
as to which way the problem is settled, no overt solu- 
tion can apparently be obtained without encountering 
serious difficulties both at home and abroad. Here a 
decisive factor remains the attitude of the Little Entente 
and the Great Powers with whom Hungary, by dint 
of her formal pledges, is bound to deal before proceed- 
ing to a settlement of the question. 

This brings us back to the agitation over treaty re- 
vision which lies at the bottom of the unhealthy rela- 
tions between Hungary and her neighbors. 

* * % 

As time goes on, Hungary shows but faint signs of 
moderating her hostility to the territorial provisions of 
the treaty. The internal propaganda remains as strong 
as ever in the press and in the schools. 4 A Society for 

4 Throughout Hungary, in the trains, schools, churches and public 
buildings, is placarded the "National Creed of the Magyar." These 
three lines are chanted daily in schools, army and prison: 


Treaty Revision has been organized in Budapest. 
Broadcast throughout the country are maps represent- 
ing the brutal dismemberment of the thousand-year-old 
Kingdom, which bear the legend, "Nem f Nem, Soha!" 
This "No, No, Never!" attitude is aptly expressed by 
four prominent statues in Budapest, symbolizing in 
turn the territories lost to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, 
Jugoslavia and Austria. These statues, which depict 
Liberty struggling to free herself from the clutches 
of Brute Force, are arranged in a semicircle round a 
rostrum over which rises a flagpole, decorated with the 
national colors and topped by a huge hand grasping a 
sword. Draped upon occasion with black mourning, 
the statues are covered with fresh flowers from time to 
time. Around this rostrum are held public meetings 
which generally develop into patriotic demonstrations. 
Every Easter Saturday, just as twilight is coming on, a 
huge religious procession is formed outside the Basilica 
Cathedral. To the strains of funeral music, the solemn 
procession marches through the streets to Indepen- 
dence Square where the colors of pre-war Hungary 
are dipped before each statue, and the resurrection ser- 
vice is continued in spirit. This parade is led by patriotic 
leaders dressed in national costumes and by high ec- 
clesiastics, followed by contingents of the police, gen- 
darmes, boy scouts, girl guides and other organizations. 

"I believe in one God, I believe in the Unity of my Country, 
I believe in one Eternal Divine Justice, 
I believe in the resurrection of Hungary. Amen." 


The bitter feeling in Hungary against the peace set- 
tlement has a powerful if adventurous champion abroad 
in the person of Lord Rothermere, The anti-Trianon 
campaign of the Rothermere Press started early in June 
1927 when his newspapers came out for the Hungarian 
cause in the Optants question. Using this dispute as a 
test case, the Rothermere Press, launching out on violent 
accusations against the Governments of the Little En- 
tente for their alleged maltreatment of Magyar minori- 
ties, demanded territorial revision in favor of Hungary. 

The anti-Trianon campaign acquired new significance 
in March 1928 when Lord Rothermere himself published 
a sensational interview with Premier Mussolini in the 
Daily MaiL In this interview, the Italian Dictator put 
forward some remarkable statements regarding the 
Hungarian question. Announcing himself in favor of 
a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, he said, in part: 

"The inviolability of treaties must be maintained, but this 
principle should not prevent a modification of the details of a 
given treaty if, after a careful examination, such a modification 
should prove to be desirable," 

Signor Mussolini then went on to indicate what, in 
his opinion, was the essential difference between the 
Hungarian frontiers as fixed by the Treaty of Trianon 
and the Austro-Italian frontier drawn under the Treaty 
of St. Germain. According to his theory, it was neces- 
sary to leave a quarter million of Austro-Germans inside 
Italy in order to make a geographic frontier, which he 


characterized as "a guarantee of international peace." 
Though Hungary in his opinion cannot have a geo- 
graphic frontier, she at least can and should have an eth- 
nographic one. 

The Rothermere campaign came to a climax in May 
1928, when Mr. Harmsworth, eldest son of Lord Rother- 
mere, paid a visit to Budapest where he was feted with 
extravagant enthusiasm. 6 These events have indeed 
all played their part in strengthening the irredentist agi- 
tation inside Hungary. For example, a leading Buda- 
pest daily, called Magyarsag, about that time published 
an article entitled, "What is the Difference between the 
Versailles and Trianon Treaties?" The main burden 
of the argument here was that the two treaties are en- 
tirely different from each other so far as concerns the 
possibility of territorial readjustments. Thus, while the 
Treaty of Versailles formally prohibits all modification 
of frontiers established under it, the Treaty of Trianon 
envisages, in the text of the covering letter signed by 
M. Millerand, the possibility of such revision. This is 
the juridical basis of the Hungarian claim. Moreover, 
in contrasting the treatment accorded to Germany on 
the Rhine and to Hungary on the Danube and Drave, 
the Magyarsag demonstrated that Hungary was deprived 

5 There are those in touch with Lord Rothermere who are clear 
in their minds that he once nursed the glamorous dream of being 
himself called to the vacant throne of St. Stephen. However that 
may be, his treaty-revision campaign has more than once wrecked 
important negotiations opened up between Hungary and her neigh- 
bors, more often than not, to the annoyance of Budapest. 


of strategic bridgeheads on the two rivers which form 
a part of her new frontiers. The article wound up with 
an appeal to the Great Powers to explain why Germany 
has been treated with such comparative leniency. 

This article is a fair sample of a wide-spread attitude 
in Hungary today. The declarations of the Hungarian 
Government are hardly less definite in this matter. 
During the parliamentary debates over the Budget in 
April 1928, M. Walko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

"There is no doubt that the Treaty of Trianon enters the cycle 
of problems which await solution. The Hungarian Government 
has never concealed the fact that it considers the treaty unjust 
and that it will never cease in its efforts to obtain a modification 
of the treaty by all peaceful means. The world public opinion 
begins to realize that the Treaty of Trianon was based on data 
and arguments presented by only one side. Hungary is deter- 
mined to obtain in this matter a just and amicable solution by 
means of international conventions, because she wants peace 
and because she is using all efforts to establish better relations, 
especially with her neighbors." 

The statesmen of the Little Entente look upon Hun- 
gary's adherence to the Briand-Kellogg Pact as a step 
in the right direction, and they are not inclined to lay too 
much stress on the moral reservation, which the Hun- 
garian Government made in accepting the anti-war 

6 "The Hungarian Government gives its assent to the proposal of 
the Government of the United States, naturally under the assumption 
that the Government of the United States, together with the other 
Signatory States, will seek a means whereby the reparation of the in- 
justices [of Trianon] will be secured along peaceful lines." 


treaty. They are rather more impressed with the mis- 
carriage of the Rothermere campaign on all fronts. 
They are also aware that the German Government put 
its foot down on the proposal of Lord Beaverbrook to 
open up a similar crusade over the Polish Corridor. 
Lastly, less is being heard these days to the effect that 
a thorough-going democratization of Hungarian politi- 
cal life is a prerequisite to establishing normal relations 
in the Danubian basin. Convinced of the desire for peace 
evinced by Budapest, they are hopeful that the Hague 
agreements will now open the door to a full-fledged 
collaboration between Hungary and her neighbors. 

While every incident tending to strengthen the Hun- 
garian claims for treaty revision puts the Little Entente 
on its guard, there is within Hungary a growing belief 
that the alliance itself is not so formidable as it appears. 
This feeling is based on an analysis of the situation which 
perceives two points of inherent weakness in the sys- 
tem. These factors are the internal instability of each 
country of the Little Entente, and the divergence of 
international interests among them. 

The adherents of this analysis argue that it is only a 
matter of time before the internal conflicts within the 
neighboring states will lead to their disruption. They 
see, for example, a good chance of a break-up in Czecho- 
slovakia between Slovakia and Bohemia, between Serbia 
and Croatia in Jugoslavia, and between the pre-war 


Kingdom of Rumania and Transylvania. Such a proc- 
ess of disintegration would end up by the former Hun- 
garian territories returning to the fold. This would 
amount to an automatic solution of the problem of 
treaty revision. 

Should this eventuality fail to materialize, however, 
they are counting on the inability of the Little Entente 
to survive as a strong combination because of the diver- 
gence of international interests among the three powers. 
Above all, they see each state preoccupied witlj a danger 
which threatens it from the side of a Great Power neigh- 
boring on it Czechoslovakia threatened by Germany, 
Rumania by Russia, and Jugoslavia by Italy. Should 
these strained relations ever reach the breaking point, 
the Little Entente in their opinion could not hold to- 
gether in view of its frankly regional character. At the 
same time, they are watching with deep concern the 
sporadic efforts made by Italy to draw Rumania into her 
sphere of influence which may drive a wedge between 
Bucharest and Belgrade in the event of a conflict on the 

The net result of this analysis is the calculation that 
the broader foreign interests of the Little Entente states 
may become of such pressing importance that their com- 
mon aims against Hungary would recede into the 
background and cease to be the element of cohesion 
binding them together. Hungarian diplomacy, to the 
degree that it is based on this analysis, is eager to win for 
itself a position of friendship with the power from which 


there is the greatest likelihood of friction with one of 
the Little Entente countries. Hence, the importance at- 
tached to the rapprochement with Italy, since the weak- 
est link in the present alignment lies in the relations be- 
tween Jugoslavia and her Adriatic neighbor. 

The next few chapters are in turn devoted to an ex- 
amination of the internal stability of each of the Little 
Entente states and of their divergent international in- 
terests. This survey covers the more important political 
problems of Central Europe, without some knowledge 
of which it is impossible to come to any conclusion as to 
the inherent strength of the Little Entente and its posi- 
tion in the diplomatic constellation of Europe. 





THE efficacy of the Little Entente system largely de- 
pends on the degree of internal stability achieved by the 
member states. The first question is can the three 
countries be considered as permanent national entities 
in the European constellation? Insofar as natural en- 
dowment and economic equipment are concerned, there 
is no reason at all to expect a dissolution of either Czecho- 
slovakia, Rumania, or Jugoslavia. The important ques- 
tion, then, is really to what extent has each state worked 
out the problem of social and political consolidation. 

At the very outset, the small victor powers (Czecho- 
slovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia), established on the ruins 
of the Hapsburg Monarchy, faced a set of vital prob- 
lems. The issues at hand had to do primarily with in- 
ternal policy, and yet they were much the same in funda- 
mental character. For the sake of simplicity, we can 
examine them in each instance under four headings the 
creation of administrative machinery and constitutional 
organization; the establishment of a monetary and fiscal 
system; the formation of political groupings; and the 
reconciliation of racial minorities. 



Let us begin by seeing what progress Czechoslovakia 
has made in the handling of these important questions. 

The Czechoslovak Republic is a country about the 
size of the State of Illinois. Before the war, the western 
two-thirds of her territory enjoyed the status of semi- 
autonomous provinces in the Austrian half of the Haps- 
burg Empire, while the Eastern third for a thousand 
years formed an integral part of the unitary Kingdom 
of Hungary. 1 Her population of nearly fourteen mil- 
lions is made up of more than nine million Czecho- 
slovaks (seven million Czechs and two million Slovaks), 
three million Germans, 750,000 Magyars, and 500,000 
Ruthenes. The Czech and German populations live in 
the western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, while 
the Slovaks, Magyars and Ruthenes inhabit the provinces 
of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Two-fifths of 
the population is engaged in agriculture and about the 
same proportion in industry. Czechoslovakia fell heir 
to about two-thirds of the industrial equipment of the 
defunct Monarchy, and to more than one-third of its 
national wealth. 

The declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 
October 28, 1918 brought to the forefront the pressing 
necessity of setting the administrative machinery of the 
new Republic in motion. Throughout the course of the 

1 The two maps at the back of the book give a general picture of 
the territorial changes effected at Paris. 


war, the Czech leaders at home had gradually been pre- 
paring the ground with this end in view, but following 
the collapse of Austria-Hungary the immediate task was 
to find administrative personnel that would prove both 
competent and loyal to the new state. Thanks to the 
autonomous status of Bohemia and Moravia under the 
old Monarchy, the Czechs potentially had a well-trained 
staff of officials. On the other hand, the Slovaks were 
entirely lacking in this respect, and the loyalty of the 
German and Magyar officials remained in question for 
some years after the war. Thus, the new Government 
was mainly staffed with Czech officials at the outset who 
were perforce sent in to govern certain districts inhabited 
by Slovaks as well as by Germans and Magyars. 

This emergency situation led to many abuses during 
the first few years of the Republic. Moreover, it was in- 
evitable that the number of German and Magyar offi- 
cials was greatly curtailed along with the abrupt shift of 
political fortunes. 2 Meanwhile, the essential loyalty of 
non-Czech officials has stood the test of time, while in 
Slovakia there has been a gradual substitution of Slovaks 
for Czechs going on as rapidly as new officials there 
could be trained. The early friction caused by the selec- 
tion of administrative personnel has largely disappeared 
from the Czechoslovak scene. 

2 During the critical spring of 1919, when Hungary, submerged by 
a wave of Bolshevism, advanced her forces into Slovakia, the Magyar 
railroad and postal employees there walked out on strike against the 
newly imposed authority of Prague. This act of public sabotage cost 
them their posts in the civil service, without pension. 


The Prague Government showed considerable compe- 
tence and dispatch in disposing of the problem of con- 
stitutional organization. The National Assembly passed 
the new Constitution early in 1920. Thoroughly demo- 
cratic and modelled on French lines, it provided for a 
Cabinet responsible to Parliament and a Chief Execu- 
tive with no administrative burdens. General elections 
promptly took place on the basis of universal and equal 
suffrage, following which Parliament elected Professor 
Masaryk first President. 

Rather more knotty than the constitutional structure 
was the problem of finding the proper working balance 
between centralized authority and local autonomy. The 
first effort in this direction met with failure, for it sought 
to set up the machinery for a unitary state at the expense 
of local self-government. Slovak and German leaders 
alike were lusty in airing their early grievances on this 
score. It was not until 1928 that the reform of local 
administration was carried through in its entirety under 
a series of laws which recognized anew the principle of 
organizing the four provinces as integral administrative 
units under the control of the central Government. These 
laws came into force when the Cabinet contained repre- 
sentative Slovak and German leaders. Thus, the ad- 
ministrative aspect of constitutional organization has 
been settled in sound fashion in Czechoslovakia. 

Czechoslovakia was one of the first countries in Europe 
to put her currency and budget in order after the war, 
At the end of 1922, the currency was stabilized at the 


ratio of one-to-seven in terms of the pre-war parity of 
the Austrian crown. This energetic policy of stabiliza- 
tion brought in its trail such a severe economic crisis 
that the Government was not able to balance the Budget 
completely until three years later. The costly liquida- 
tion of war disorganization and the urgent need of new 
capital outlays were important factors in causing early 
budgetary deficits. Since 1925, the monetary and fiscal 
system of the new Republic has been strengthened all 
along the line, and early in 1930 the currency was finally 
put on a gold basis. 

The formation of permanent political groupings in 
Czechoslovakia is a matter demanding longer analysis. 
During the period from 1918 to 1926, the Prague Gov- 
ernment was dominated by the so-called National Coali- 
tion which, having carried out the revolution against 
the Hapsburg Monarchy, shouldered the responsibility 
for organizing the new state. This Coalition was com- 
posed of the five major Czechoslovak parties, leaving the 
German and Magyar parties, together with the Com- 
munists, in violent opposition. During these eight years, 
there was considerable shifting in the balance of power 
back and forth within the National Coalition. The first 
Prime Minister was Dr. Kramar, Nationalist leader. He 
was forced to resign in June 1919 when the first com- 
munal elections revealed a marked swing of popular 
feeling towards the radical labor parties. During the 


next eighteen months, an able Socialist leader, the late 
Dr. Tusar, was Prime Minister. Then followed an in- 
termediate period, with Dr. Benes as Premier, when the 
swing was back again towards the centre. Late in 1922, 
Dr. Svehla, founder and chieftain of the peasant 
Agrarian party, formed his first Cabinet. Svehla's com- 
ing to power in Czechoslovakia coincided with the grad- 
ual settling down of the political fever through which 
all countries passed after the war. 

It was natural that the preponderant element of ra- 
cial solidarity which gave birth to the National Coalition 
should gradually weaken as general conditions improved 
throughout the Republic. In its stead, there emerged 
the more lasting political factors of economic interest 
and social outlook which were precisely the rock on 
which the old Coalition went shipwreck* This underly- 
ing trend broke through to the surface immediately 
following the general election of 1925. The more sen- 
sational issues of that campaign revolved around the 
Hus Day incident which had led to the rupture between 
Prague and the Vatican. 3 The result of the polling 
showed a distinct shift in the parliamentary voting 
strength of the five parties forming the National Coali- 
tion. Both the Clerical and Agrarian parties came out 
of the fray with several additional seats, while the Social- 
ists lost heavily to the Communists. It was after con- 

8 The Vatican withdrew its Nuncio from Prague as a protest 
against the memorial celebration on July 6th, the day on which the 
national hero of Bohemia was burned at the stake for heresy at Con- 
stance in 1415, See below page 56. 


siderable delay that Dr. Svehla formed a new Cabinet 
which stayed in office a bare three months, and upon 
his resignation Dr. Cerny, a high and trusted official, 
formed a non-party Ministry of experts. 

During the seven months in 1926 when Dr. Cerny and 
his Cabinet kept the wheels of government going, there 
took place a second revolution in the balance of political 
power in Czechoslovakia. The aggressive onslaughts of 
the Agrarian and Clerical politicians led up to the June 
crisis when the populace of Prague and other industrial 
centres was treated to a dangerous overdose of parades 
and counter-demonstrations by working-class mobs 
loudly denouncing the bills proposed by the conservative 
parties. The Agrarians were indeed clamoring for the 
introduction of a flat agricultural tariff to protect the 
standard of living of the peasant farmers. The Clericals, 
on the other hand, were agitating for an increase in the 
government subsidy to the clergy so as to bring it up to 
the salary level of the state school teachers. When pre- 
sented to Parliament, the Socialist labor parties voted 
against these bills in loud protest on the ground that they 
would indirectly lead to a rise in basic prices. 

These crucial bills passed into law only by dint of the 
fact that the Czech Agrarian and Clerical parties suc- 
ceeded in mustering on their side the votes of the Ger- 
man parties of similar persuasion. The decisive vote 
therefore cut straight across the once impregnable front 
of racial alignment in Parliament, and from that day 
onwards voting has generally been along the lines of 


economic class interest rather than on the basis of na- 
tional sentiment. This new line-up of parties enabled 
Dr. Svehla to form a conservative Coalition in Parlia- 
ment, and less than a month after Germany was wel- 
comed as a member of the League of Nations, he again 
assumed power with two German Ministers in his Cabi- 
net. This Cabinet remained in office until the winter of 
1929 when Dr. Svehla resigned his post because of pro- 
longed ill-health. 

At this juncture, the Agrarian party turned to his 
trusted colleague. Dr. Udrzal, for many years Minister 
of National Defence, and President Masaryk duly 
charged him with taking over the reins of Government. 
The conservative Coalition held together until Parlia- 
ment, in a somewhat nervous temper, dissolved itself, 
and new elections took place the following autumn. All 
extremist parties came out of the battle with damaged 
prestige. The rejuvenated Socialists gained heavily at 
the expense of the Communists, while the Nationalists 
and Clericals of all hues lost ground to the moderate 
liberal parties, labor and peasant groups alike. The 
1929 elections cleared the political sky with remarkable 
suddenness, the only trouble being that all parties, leav- 
ing aside the Communists, German Nationalists and 
Magyar groups, put in a bid for choice seats in the new 
Cabinet. It took nearly two months before Dr. Udrzal, 
aided by Dr. Benes, could whip his all-party Coalition 
into shape, the resulting Cabinet commanding 210 out 
of the 300 votes in Parliament. 


Let us turn now, to the social basis of political stability 
in Czechoslovakia. Here we find that the progress of 
social reconstruction has followed hand in hand with 
the normalization of party groupings in Parliament. 
The overthrow of the reactionary Monarchy at the end 
of a thoroughly demoralizing war called for revolu- 
tionary social legislation to curb the spirit of mass dis- 
content. The first step in this direction was the breaking 
up of the huge entailed estates under a radical Land 
Reform Act which ultimately placed most of the land 
in the possession of those who tilled it. 4 The lot of in- 
dustrial workers and miners has undergone substantial 
improvement through the introduction of the eight- 
hour day and a comprehensive system of social insur- 
ance. Particular attention has been paid to the problem 
of protection of women and children in industry, 
and a modern system of public health has been started. 
Over a thousand new elementary schools have been 
opened in Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia in a de- 
termined campaign to stamp out illiteracy in those prov- 
inces. It is no exaggeration to say that Czechoslovakia 
has made noteworthy progress in social reform in the 
first decade of independent existence. 

4 The broad social results of the Land Reform have been somewhat 
marred by an undercurrent of political favoritism and corruption on 
the one hand, and by the early policy of settling some Czech and 
Slovak farmers and legionnaires in districts once exclusively inhab- 
ited by German and Magyar peasants, mostly along the frontier. 


Coming now to the problem of minority reconcilia- 
tion in Czechoslovakia, we find that the three million 
Germans living along the frontiers of Bohemia and 
Moravia enjoy an importance, at least in the economic 
domain, out of proportion to their numbers. Since the 
disillusioning days of 1918, the attitude of the German 
leaders to the new state has passed through three rather 
distinct stages. The first was a policy of separatism and 
overt resistance to the new authorities. This policy col- 
lapsed long before the peace treaties were signed which 
put an abrupt stop to the Pan-German movement in 
Austria, and was followed by a negative attitude which 
sought little more than to deny the legality of the Re- 
public. Gradually, one group among the Germans 
moved in the more realistic direction of what is known 
as Activism. This policy triumphed during the "revo- 
lution of 1926." On the other side, the Czechs have made 
considerable effort to meet the Germans half-way in 
dealing with their well-founded grievances, with the 
result that a working understanding has been arrived at 
on the basis of community of economic interests and 
fair treatment. 

So much cannot yet be said about the position of the 
Magyar minority in the eastern part of the Republic. 
The inclusion of 750,000 Magyars inside Czechoslovakia 
was not an exceptional instance where economic and 
strategic arguments won out at Paris over the abstract 
principle of self-determination. Be that as it may, the 
Magyar minority leaders in Slovakia are still pursuing 


a policy of negation towards Prague. The Government 
on its side is making sincere if sometimes halting at- 
tempts to meet their reasonable demands. It is per- 
haps inevitable that the Magyar leaders in Czecho- 
slovakia cannot entirely shake off the influence of Buda- 
pest where feeling is still running high against the 
Little Entente states. The important thing to note, 
however, is that the Magyar population in Slovakia, 
largely peasant farmers, shows no signs of discontent 
with their status at present. Like other peasant culti- 
vators, in Czechoslovakia, they have received a more or 
less fair share of land under the Agrarian Reform, they 
have a good market for their produce, and they don't 
bother their heads much over political doings. 

This statement also goes as a rough approximation of 
the attitude of the Slovak peasant who has gradually 
taken on a new dignity and self-respect under the Re- 
public. That Slovakia should become a fully self-gov- 
erning province was envisaged in the Constitution as 
well as in the so-called Pittsburg Convention which Pro- 
fessor Masaryk signed in America in 1918. More im- 
portant than installing any preconceived system of 
autonomy in that province was for the Slovaks to as- 
sume their full share of responsibility in the Prague Gov- 
ernment, and it soon became clear that this desideratum 
could better be gained without setting up an autonomist 
Diet at Bratislava, the provincial capital. If the Slovaks 
under Magyar rule had not more than a thousand edu- 
acted leaders and professional men, as Professor Seton- 


Watson has carefully estimated/ today they have more 
than that number of schools where instruction is given in 
their own tongue and for the most part by their own 
teachers. A decade after their liberation saw the Slovaks 
largely in position to run their own state services. 

The post-war readjustment has been difficult for Slo- 
vakia, without a doubt. The revolutionary storm which 
swept over Central Europe hit Slovakia with peculiar 
force. The newly enfranchised population became .the 
easy prey of demagogues, Communist and Clerical 
alike. 6 Religious struggles added to the general con- 
fusion, partly owing to the fact that the Catholic dioceses 
there remained under the ecclesiastical direction of the 
Hungarian Archbishopric of Esztergom. As a result 
of the Modus Vivendi which Czechoslovakia made with 
the Vatican in 1928, diocesan boundaries were redrawn 
in accordance with present international frontiers. The 
significance of this settlement for internal consolidation 
is suggested by the words of Dr. Benes who took the 
occasion to inform Parliament that for the first time in 
modern history no part of the Czechoslovak nation 
would remain under foreign jurisdiction of any kind. 

The province of Carpathian Ruthenia presents a spe- 
cial problem to the Republic. Guaranteed under both 
the Peace Treaties and the Constitution a status of au- 
tonomy, Czechoslovakia took over this territory from 

5 See "The New Slovakia," page 14. 

6 Witness the Slovak Treason Trial of 1929 when Professor 
Tuka, after rather harsh treatment, was sentenced to prison on 
evidence of none too a substantial character. 


Hungary with a population largely illiterate and without 
political training. In such a case, the granting of the 
responsibility of self-government must necessarily be a 
gradual process. Prague set about immediately to de- 
velop public instruction, sanitation and roads, with the 
result that gradually there is coming to the fore a class 
of young officials and school teachers, all of them Ruthe- 
nian Russians. That political discontent should still exist 
in the province is more due to growing pains than to 
alleged maladministration. Indeed, both Slovakia and 
Carpathian Ruthenia are slowly moving in the right 
direction of democratic development, and most of their 
responsible leaders have repeatedly demonstrated their 
entire allegiance to the Republic. 

Czechoslovakia has thus shown a high degree of po- 
litical maturity in handling and solving its vital prob- 
lems of internal consolidation. An important element 
in achieving internal stability has been the calibre of 
leadership provided by President Masaryk and his two 
principal collaborators, Dr. Benes and Dr. Svehla. Their 
contribution to the art of statescraft in post-war Europe 
has yielded many positive results, some of which we have 
noted above. Perhaps more important for the future 
of the Republic is the less tangible influence which their 
example and work are exerting in moulding the rising 
generation of leaders. 

To sum up, Czechoslovakia shows no signs whatever 


of breaking asunder either through the dissensions of 
the German minority or through the secession of Slo- 
vakia. Economic forces are steadily working in the di- 
rection of domestic consolidation, and the political sen- 
timent of the country is unmistakably making for 
constructive effort. The amazing nation-wide demon- 
stration in honor of President Masaryk on his eightieth 
birthday on March 7, 1930, was another proof of the 
internal solidarity which the Republic has achieved in 
the first decade of independent existence. 



WE now come to consider the trend of internal devel- 
opments in Rumania, at present a country roughly the 
size of New Mexico. As a result of territorial allot- . 
ments under the Peace Treaties, the pre-war Kingdom 
of Rumania, known as the Regat, was enlarged by the 
annexation from Hungary of the Province of Transyl- 
vania, part of the Banat, and a strip of land along the 
fringe of the Hungarian plain; from Austria it took 
over the province of Bukovina; and from Russia the 
province of Bessarabia. These acquisitions increased the 
population of Rumania from six millions before the 
war to eighteen millions at present. More than four 
millions out of the total population today fall into the 
category of racial minorities, as follows 1,600,000 Mag- 
yars, 1,000,000 Russians, 800,000 Jews, 600,000 Germans, 
and a quarter of a million Turks and Bulgarians, in the 
Dobrudja. Rumania is predominantly an agricultural 
country, with four-fifths of its people living on the land 
and afflicted with wide-spread illiteracy. 

Though Rumanian leaders were not confronted with 
the necessity of creating the machinery for an entirely 
new state, the fundamental problem of administrative 



organization at the end of 1918 came to much the same 
thing. The two years prior to the armistice saw the 
Regat under the military occupation of the Central 
Powers. The chaotic situation, existing upon the re- 
turn of the Rumanian Government to Bucharest, called 
for the complete reorganization of the administrative 
apparatus, and in addition there was the urgent neces- 
sity of improvising the administration of the newly ac- 
quired provinces. The adventurous march of Rumanian 
troops into Budapest in the fall of 1919 and unsettled con- 
ditions along both the Russian and the Hungarian fron- 
tiers were factors which contributed to disastrous delay 
and irregularity in handling important questions of 
state organization. 

The early policy of the Rumanian Government was 
to send out Regat officials to govern the new provinces. 
This action was fraught with grave consequences and 
abuses against which both the Rumanian and minority 
populations protested bitterly. The new provinces, with 
the exception of Bessarabia, enjoyed an economic and 
cultural standard of living superior to that existing in the 
Regat, and were not lacking in capable administrative 
personnel of Rumanian nationality. Yet the central 
government, which was gradually passing under the 
sway of the Bratianu Liberal party, was not disposed to 
put faith in these former Austro-Hungarian officials, 
regardless of their nationality. This in brief was the 
origin of perhaps the most rapacious exploitation of the 
spoils system which modern Europe has experienced. 


The political excesses of the Bratiami dictatorship thus 
became the central issue in the struggle for power at 
Bucharest between the champions of democracy and the 
cohorts of reaction. 

In disposing of the problem of constitutional organiza- 
tion, the new Rumania was at the outset faced with a 
relatively simpler situation than was the case in Jugo- 
slavia, owing to the complete absence of any movement 
towards provincial autonomy. The democratic consti- 
tution of 1923 provided for a constitutional Kingdom 
within the framework of a unitary centralized state. On 
the other hand, Rumania was faced with the stupendous 
problem of unifying five separate legal and administra- 
tive systems existing in the different provinces at the 
end of war. The slow improvement in administrative 
practice did not make possible the tackling of the prob- 
lem of a full-fledged reform of administration and local 
self-government until 1929. 

Despite the wide-spread disease of political demoral- 
ization, Rumania made early, though faltering, head- 
way in putting her currency and budget in order. Bud- 
getary equilibrium of a rather dubious kind was achieved 
at the end of 1922. About the same time, after a period 
of inflation debauchery, the Rumanian leu was halted 
in its downward plunge at the level of about half a 
cent, around which point it has since fluctuated within 
rather generous limits. The legal revalorization of the 
currency was put off year after year in Rumania, until 
finally an international Stabilization Loan was con- 


eluded In February 1929. Since that date, the Rumanian 
Government, with the help of M. Rist, French advisor 
to the National Bank, has completed the process of set- 
ting up a new monetary and fiscal system. 

Rumania has also worked out the proper social foun- 
dations for political stability. The principal factor in 
this far-reaching achievement was the radical trans- 
formation in the ownership of farm lands under the 
Agrarian Reform. As a result of this all-important law, 
which was passed under pressure of a surging tide of 
agrarian Bolshevism, peasants now own eighty-five 
percent of the arable land in small holdings. The final 
consummation of this agrarian revolution, which 
touched directly the livelihood of a third of the popula- 
tion, can take place only through a more intensive devel- 
opment of rural education and cooperative undertakings. 
Constructive political and social endeavor cannot be ex- 
pected overnight of a nation starting off on its career of 
full-fledged statehood with perhaps half of its number 
illiterate. The Government is pushing its program of 
public instruction and the training of technicians neces- 
sary to carry on the business of a modern state. Slowly 
Rumania is also making headway in the general field 
of economic reorganization and consolidation. 

The evolution of political groupings centered around 
the bitter fight waged against the Bratianu dictatorship 
during the first decade of the new Rumania. The Lib- 


eral party under the late lonel Bratianu, which ruled 
the Regat before the war, found itself in a strategic posi- 
tion when the Rumanian Government came back to 
Bucharest after the armistice. Early attempts were 
made to form a coalition including the organized ele- 
ments of Transylvania and other new provinces. These 
negotiations fell through time and again, owing to the 
fact that Bratianu failed to concede, notably to the Na- 
tionalist party of Transylvania, anything like the position 
of equality demanded. The Liberal party swung into 
complete control of the Government in 1922 as a result 
of probably the most corrupt elections known in Balkan 
history. For the next four years, Rumania was ruled 
with a heavy and at times competent hand. Up through 
1926, however, the new provinces of the Kingdom were 
looked upon as a field of lucrative exploitation by office- 
seekers and concessionaires sent out from Bucharest, and 
the people at large were outraged by the methods em- 
ployed by the Liberals to extend their grasping hand 
over the entire country. 

Such were the circumstances under which the Par- 
liament, elected in 1922, came to the end of its term. 
Bratianu saw the danger of presenting the record of 
his party for popular approval. He also saw that opposi- 
tion to his regime was so hopelessly disorganized that 
he would have no trouble choosing a friendly and none 
too independent successor. In 1926, King Ferdinand 
accepted the resignation of his favorite Prime Minister 
and called the popular old General Averescu to power. 


The last act of the Bratianu Cabinet, before Parliament 
was dissolved, was to pass the famous Electoral Law 
which would guarantee a parliamentary majority to the 
Averescu party. 

The Electoral Law of 1926, based on a Mussolini model 
of the time, provided that the party polling forty percent 
of the votes was automatically accorded sixty per- 
cent of the seats in Parliament. This simple calcula- 
tion was worked out on the assumption that any Gov- 
ernment, with the help of official pressure and the mili- 
tary, would have no difficulty in obtaining the required 
minimum of votes. The essential purpose of the law 
was to keep the two popular opposition parties out 
of power at any cost. The first of these was the Tran- 
sylvanian Nationalist party under the leadership of 
Dr. Maniu, and the other was the Peasant party 
whose potential strength stretched across the en- 
tire country. Needless to say, the elections, held in 
May 1926, gave General Averescu a crushing majority 
in Parliament. 

Rumania marked time politically during the brief 
year that General Averescu remained in power. The 
younger members of his party, headed by M. Manoilescu, 
waged a desperate struggle to free the Government 
from the shackles imposed by the all-pervading power 
of the Liberals. The final showdown came when the 
Averescu Government proposed two bills one lower- 
ing the tariff barrier on industrial articles and the other 
opening the doors of full equality to foreign capital 


both of which measures struck at the roots of the vested 
interests of the Liberals. The outcome of the struggle 
was, however, a foregone conclusion, for the Averescu 
party had neither' popular backing nor the support of 
influential, financial circles. 

The failing health of King Ferdinand in the spring of 
1927 threw a new factor into the political situation which 
worked in favor of Bratianu's comeback. Discussion 
became lively and heated over the question of the Suc- 
cession. Before resigning office back in 1926, however, 
Bratianu had provided for just this emergency by having 
Parliament pass the famous Succession Law which would 
forever bar Crown Prince Carol from ascending the 
throne. The bitter feud between Carol and the Brati- 
anu party was of old standing. Seizing the occasion of 
the Crown Prince's romantic flight to Italy late in 1925, 
Premier Bratianu persuaded the King to demand of his 
eldest son and heir either the resumption of dignified 
behavior or a formal renunciation of his rights to the 
Succession. When Carol announced that he would not 
return to his Princess Helen, Parliament passed the Suc- 
cession Law on January 4, 1926, under which his four- 
year-old son Mihai was proclaimed heir to the throne. 
The same law provided for the appointment of a Re- 
gency Council should King Ferdinand die during the 
minority of little Mihai. Under the circumstances, it 
was inevitable that the composition of the Regency 


Council left nothing to be desired from the standpoint of 
the Liberal party. 

The last important act of King Ferdinand was the 
calling back of the Liberals to power. Owing to the 
fiasco of the Averescu Government, Bratianu indeed took 
office with renewed prestige and strength. Six weeks 
later, on July 20, 1927, King Ferdinand passed away, and 
the country was thrown into a turmoil. The elections, 
which were called in order to provide the Liberal party 
with a working majority in Parliament, took place under 
martial law. Soon afterwards the Liberals took re- 
venge on M. Manoilescu, who was hauled into court for 
High Treason, but the Government could not prove its 
charge that he had intrigued to bring Carol back to 
Rumania to regain his lost throne. 

No sooner had the new Parliament assembled than 
Rumania was thrown into another panic by the death 
of Premier lonel Bratianu, four months after the passing 
of the King. The Regency Council then appointed 
his brother Vintila Bratianu, for many years Minister 
of Finance and a less skilful politician, as Prime Minis- 
ter. Beneath the surface, however, the country was seeth- 
ing with political discontent, and it was thanks to a 
regime of martial law that the new Premier kept his 
hold on the reigns of Government. In November 1928, 
he was finally forced to give way to Dr. Maniu, the 
Transylvanian leader. 

The collapse of the Bratianu dictatorship in Rumania 
hung on the rise of the National Peasant party, repre- 


senting the amalgamation of the two parties which Brati- 
anu succeeded in keeping out of office for a full decade* 
After a host of compacts and election agreements, the 
final fusion of these two parties took place in 1927 when 
the late lonel Bratianu came back to power for the last 
time. On the occasion of the anniversary of the union 
of Transylvania and Rumania on May 10, 1928, the 
National Peasant party organized a giant demonstration 
at Alba Julia, the Transylvanian capital, for the purpose 
of threatening the Bratianu Cabinet with a mass march 
on Bucharest if it did not resign. Though neither the 
resignation nor the march on Bucharest materialized, 
it was only a matter of time until fear of wide-spread 
disturbances would force the Regency to oust the Lib- 
erals from power. 

During the summer of 1928, the Liberal Government 
was in process of negotiating the floating of a Stabiliza- 
tion Loan abroad. The National Peasant leaders took 
advantage of these crucial negotiations to put pressure 
on their enemies. The formal decision of the party to 
abstain from the tenth anniversary celebrations of 
Greater Rumania, if they should come with the Brati- 
anu Cabinet still in office, was broadcasted with an eye 
more to domestic consumption. The next barrage went 
home. This was the announcement of the Opposition 
that for its part Rumania would not consider herself 
bound by any international contract, meaning the Stabil- 
ization Loan, which was ratified by a Parliament elected 
by fraud and violence. M. Bratianu soon handed his 


resignation to the Regency, which was accepted, much to 
his astonishment. 

The first acts of the Maniu Cabinet were the direct 
outcome of the new Premier's democratic professions. 
The regime of press censorship and martial law was 
immediately abolished with a view to reassuring public 
opinion that the country would be treated to the luxury 
of free and honest elections. These elections took place 
without disturbance the middle of December 1928. In 
some sections of the country, public feeling was running 
so high, however, that no Liberal candidates presented 
themselves for reelection. Thanks, ironically enough, to 
the Bratianu Electoral Law, the National Peasant party 
gained an overwhelming majority in the new Parlia- 

The coming to power of Dr. Maniu is the most hope- 
ful development in post-war Rumania in the process 
of domestic consolidation. The new Premier is a leader 
of stout courage and probity. A true democrat, he en- 
joys the confidence of work-a-day people. No one is 
more aware than Dr. Maniu himself of the Herculean 
task confronting his party. He knows that the gaining 
of political maturity and morality is a long uphill fight, 
not to be accomplished on the spur of a moment's en- 
thusiasm. His party has launched out on a well-balanced 
program of economic and social reform. Perhaps the 
acid test of his regime will be the ability he shows in 


composing and controlling the discordant voices and 
youthful enthusiasm which inevitably crop up when 
such a large and heterogeneous party comes to power for 
the first time. Here Dr. Maniu is struggling to maintain 
the delicate balance between the radical peasant elements 
of his party, led by his Minister of Agriculture, M. Mihil- 
ache, and the more conservative section taken over from 
the original Transylvanian Nationalist party, founded 
by Dr. Maniu himself in Hungarian days. 

The new Cabinet set about its business of reform in 
competent fashion. In July 1929, Parliament passed a 
bill revamping the administrative apparatus in the di- 
rection of provincial decentralization. This law bids 
fair to be the doing away in large part with the much- 
abused concentration of power in the hands of the old 
Bucharest bureaucracy. The unhealthy regime of privi- 
leged protection, instituted in the heydey of Liberalism, 
has been abolished by a general scaling down of the 
tariff level and the suppression of agricultural export 
taxes. A good beginning has been achieved in providing 
cheaper loans for peasant farmers through the newly 
established system of credit cooperatives, and the ex- 
cellent 1929 harvest generally strengthened the fiscal 
foundations of the country. Moreover, M. Madgearu, 
Minister of Finance, has embarked on the arduous task 
of modernizing budgetary practice and public account- 
ing. Earlier in the year, as Minister of Commerce, he 
drew up the new Tariff Act as well as a more equitable 
Mining Law which allows foreign capital to participate 


on terms of equality with domestic firms* M. Madgearu 
also took a hand in reorganizing the Rumanian state 

The National Peasant regime has already weathered 
several severe storms, such as the one which blew up 
in October upon the death of M. Buzdugan, member of 
the Regency Council. Before the deceased Regent was 
actually in his grave, however, M. Constantine Sarat- 
zeanu, non-party jurist, was nominated, elected and 
sworn into office. This speedy work, however necessary 
in the circumstances of Balkan politics, caused friction 
within the Cabinet between the peasant leaders and the 
dominating Transylvanian faction. Where the Gov- 
ernment encounters unbending resistance is in its cam- 
paign to get rid of official corruption and incompetence, 
whereas its Liberal opponents are constantly shouting 
that the country is in danger of being ruined by ill-con- 
sidered reforms. For example, M. Duca, former Foreign 
Minister, made a savage attack on the new administrative 
reform in July, saying that "the bill alters the once uni- 
tary character of the State and destroys the Constitution." 
However that may be, the nation is still firmly behind the 
Maniu regime, as evidenced by the fact that the National 
Peasant party maintained a substantial majority in the 
communal and municipal elections held early in 1930. 

The Maniu Cabinet, after eighteen months in the 
saddle, has to its credit a solid record of accomplishment. 
The new leaders have indeed introduced an entirely 
new tone into Rumanian politics. So far as one is able 


to judge at present there is no reason why the National 
Peasant party should not remain in power for another 
year at least. One thing is clear in any event the Lib- 
eral party, crushed by the blow of disaster and moral 
repudiation, is slowly undergoing a process of regenera- 
tion. This movement within Liberal ranks may end 
by the throwing out of M. Vintila Bratianu as titular 
head of the party and the rise to power of the younger 
generation, led by M. Duca, for many years Foreign 
Minister. Even should M. Bratianu come back to power 
tomorrow, his party would take office under vastly dif- 
ferent terms than it did before the death of King Ferdi- 

The tortuous evolution of political groupings in Ru- 
mania has finally ended in the formation of a two- 
party system. On the one side is the conservative party 
which happens to call itself the Liberal party, the party 
of property, vested interests and High Finance. On the 
other side is the progressive party which goes under the 
name of the National Peasant party, representing the 
people, the masses, the peasants. The rise to power of 
the latter party under Dr. Maniu and the accompanying 
reorganization of the Liberal party as the real conserva- 
tive party of the country are good evidence that Rumania 
is at last working out political groupings of a sound 
representative character. 

The dynastic problem in Rumania has more than 


once taken on grave proportions since the war. In the 
twilight years of King Ferdinand, the Liberals played 
the role of "court party/' and on occasion enjoyed a 
none too savoury repute. Prior to Prince Carol's sensa- 
tional flight back to Bucharest in June 1930, the Mon- 
archy was indeed rescued at two dangerous junctures 
once at the end of the war when the Bratianu Govern- 
ment passed the agrarian reform laws, and again in 
1928 when the Regency Council capitulated to the moral 
challenge thrown down by the Maniu party. Though 
the setting up of the Regency Council in itself put a curb 
on court intrigues, the death of Buzdugan, late in 1929, 
deprived that important body of its only outstanding 
member. Yet the desperate efforts made to fortify the 
symbol of the Monarchy by fostering the legend of the 
"Boy King" did not carry convincing weight in the 
judgment of his exiled father. 

His mind made up, Carol dashed home in the fullness 
of time primarily for the purpose of gaining his right- 
ful Crown and of proving his worth as a ruling Sover- 
eign. The first objective he achieved with a display of 
acumen and dispatch, the prodigal Prince having acted 
with the knowledge and approval of the Maniu Cabinet. 
As a point of formality, the Government resigned; in- 
deed, the events provoked by Carol's arrival moved along 
too briskly for the ever-cautious Premier to handle. The 
Regency Council called upon Dr. Mironescu, retiring 
Foreign Minister, to throw together a stop-gap Cabinet 
charged with the sole duty of arranging for Parliament 


to proclaim the new King. Such was the simple expedi- 
ent whereby the Council prepared its own grave. Two 
days after his arrival, on June 8th, Parliament without 
a dissenting voice proclaimed Carol King of Rumania. 
The Act in question nullified the dethronement regula- 
tions engineered by his arch-enemy in 1926 and provided 
that the reign of Carol II should date from the day of 
his father's death. The Prince of Alba Julia was the 
title given Little Mihai on this occasion. 

After twenty-four hours of hectic labor, the Miron- 
escu Cabinet withdrew from the scene, and King Carol 
turned to his trusted collaborator. Dr. Maniu, to form 
an all-party Government. The National Peasant 
party declined this undertaking, again showing its un- 
willingness of cooperate with the Liberals who were 
absent from Parliament on the historic day of June 8th. 
Marshal Presan of war fame then attempted to organize 
a Cabinet which, if successful, might well have ended 
up in a military dictatorship. Having thus shown the 
Army his appreciation for its critical support during the 
coup, King Carol allowed Dr. Maniu to reconstitute his 
Ministry, as before, out of National Peasant ranks. A 
prominent newcomer in the Cabinet was M. Maniolescu, 
who was probably the effective liaison between the Gov- 
ernment and Carol in exile. 

While the Government was settling down on its 
old foundations, the Liberal party was in the throes of 
dissension caused by the rigid anti-Carol stand taken by 
Vintila Bratianu, who openly scored Carol's return as 


unconstitutional and illegal. The younger, more alert 
members of the party, led by Professor George Bratianu 
and quietly backed by M. Duca, came out boldly in favor 
of the new ruler. On July pth, however, the elder 
Bratianu allowed himself to be received by King Carol in 
informal audience. Characteristically enough, he was 
careful not to issue any statement after his reception at 
the Royal Palace. This uncompromising attitude in- 
flicted real damage to party prestige, but the youthful 
rebellion led by his new nephew could make little head- 
way so long as Vintila Bratianu kept his fingers firmly on 
the party purse-strings. 

When King Carol originally urged Dr. Maniu to form 
an all-party Coalition, he was probably aware that a 
political truce between the Liberals and the National 
Peasant party was out of question. Yet the gesture 
proved to be a good weapon to carry out the intent of 
his first proclamation to the nation. This was a solemn 
promise not to follow a policy of revenge and resentment 
against those who had sought to obliterate the "spiritual 
ties" uniting him with his Fatherland. The proclama- 
tion opened up with the moving appeal: "Penetrated by 
a great love for my country, I have come into the midst 
of my people, in accordance with my promise, to be the 
protector of my son and the guardian of my country." 

In seizing the Crown from the brow of his son Mihai, 
Carol was unquestionably sincere in his belief that he 
was thereby saving the Monarchy from grave disorders 
in the not very distant future. The question thus arises 


what are the prospects that Carol will turn out to be a 
competent ruler? Clearly it is within his power to 
render unique services to the nation. His personality 
is well entrenched in the hearts of his people, and the 
Army is back of him almost to the last officer. The 
smooth manner in which the June coup went off strongly 
suggests that the best elements in public life have shown 
their readiness to cooperate. There is some danger, 
however, that Carol in the long run will lack the neces- 
sary steadfastness and political courage to help mould 
Rumania into a healthy modern democracy. His well- 
known admiration for Signor Mussolini and his system, 
and the experience of King Alexander, his brother-in- 
law in Jugoslavia, may in a crisis lure him into the 
treacherous labyrinth of military dictatorship. 

King Carol at present is faced with the urgent problem 
of reaching an understanding with Princess Helen. The 
gentle dignity and firmness of his divorced wife during 
years of ill-treatment and humiliation at his hands made 
a deep impression on his subjects. Indeed, the Maniu 
Government has refused to go ahead with coronation 
plans until such a reconciliation is accomplished, at least 
in its political implications. 1 While the legal brains 
of Bucharest are busy working out a formula for annul- 
ing the royal divorce, the Dowager Queen Marie has 
turned her towers of persuasion on Princess Helen. Not 

1 Having forfeited the King's confidence, Dr. Maniu gave way to 
Dr. Mironescu as Prime Minister in November 1930, the assump- 
tion being that M. Titulescu, Rumanian Minister at London, will 
soon be called to form a concentration Cabinet. 


until Carol wins her over to his cause will the King be a 
persona grata at the Courts of Western Europe, particu- 
larly in London a delicate point for a new Sovereign 
who can ill afford to be without such moral rec- 

A disquieting factor in the process of internal con- 
solidation in Rumania is the status of the minority races. 
In order to grasp the essential features of the Magyar 
problem in Transylvania, the point of geographical lo- 
cation is important to bear in mind. Only about a 
quarter of the 1,600,000 Magyars there live in a compact 
bloc in the immediate vicinity of the present frontier 
of Hungary. About 800,000 Magyars, known as the 
Secklers, are situated in eastern Transylvania along the 
Regat frontier. This leaves some 400,000 Magyars who 
form more or less scattered islands amidst the Rumanian 
population. There is little doubt that the Magyar peas- 
ants in Transylvania were not dealt with on an equal 
footing with the Rumarian peasants in the matter of 
confiscation and parcellations under the Land Reforms. 
Incidentally, this policy of discrimination did not touch 
the German peasants who were already in possession of 
the land they tilled before the war. 

The discontent of Magyar peasants with their lot 
in Rumania does not come anywhere near taking the 
shape of a secession movement, and all efforts to organize 
such a movement from the side of the more audible ele- 


ments of Magyar dissatisfaction in Rumania have proved 
out of place. By these elements are meant the Magyar 
intelligentsia who, together with the Hungarian-speak- 
ing Jews, once held a clear majority in all urban centres 
in Transylvania and the Banat. This class includes 
former Hungarian officials and school teachers who were 
hard hit when the Rumanian Government sent out a 
new staff of officials, and closed down many of the 
Hungarian middle schools and colleges. Large num- 
bers of Magyar intelligentsia flocked back into Hun- 
gary proper after the war where they threw themselves 
on the mercy of Budapest, while those who stayed on 
in Transylvania found it extremely difficult to adjust 
their life to revolutionized conditions. 

There is no occasion here to dwell on the series of 
attacks to which the Jews have been subjected in Ru- 
mania in recent years. Sometimes these atrocities were 
excused on the ground that the Jews were acting as 
tools of Magyar propaganda from across the border; at 
other times, in Bessarabia, they were charged with be- 
ing Soviet agents. Popular feelings against the Jews 
in any given instance may or may not have been justi- 
fied. It is safe to conjecture, however, that behind the 
cloak of these outrages stood either the fear of their 
economic power as village middlemen and usurers, or 
jealousy of their prococity as students, for Jewish emanci- 
pation is of recent date in Eastern Europe. Unfortunate 
as is the occasional outbreak of student demonstrations 
against the Jews, there are grounds for believing that 


even the youthful ringleaders do not really consider the 
Jews in present-day Rumania as a threat to the security 
of the state. 

Rumanian policy towards minority races has probably 
been at its worst in Bessarabia where Communist agi- 
tation from across the Dniester has proved a highly dis- 
turbing factor. Until the advent of M. Maniu, the 
former Russian province suffered from both malad- 
ministration and iron martial rule. At the time of the 
Tartar-Bunar uprising in 1925, Bucharest agents were 
roundly charged with provocative measures. At the 
present moment, however, the situation in Bessarabia 
does not appear critical, despite the existence of the mil- 
itary frontier with Soviet Russia. More serious in many 
ways is the state of unrest in the Dobrudja where thou- 
sands of Bulgarian families were rudely dispossessed of 
their holdings to make way for the influx of Rumanian- 
speaking Kutzo-Wallachs who were driven out of Greek 

To sum up, there has been a wave of rather wide- 
spread dissatisfaction among the various racial minori- 
ties in Rumania since the war, but much of this bad 
feeling was equally shared by the population as a whole 
during the Bratianu dictatorship. The Maniu regime 
in its turn is making every effort to meet the reasonable 
grievances of the minorities. Here one must note some 
improvement in the calibre of local officials and police. 


In any case, the sum total of these minorities is so small 
that they do not present a force undermining the sta- 
bility of the new state. 

Rumania is fortunate in that the Rumanian people 
from one end of the country to the other are endowed 
with an essential cultural and linguistic homogeneity. 
Despite all the troubles and struggles through which 
the country has passed in the first decade of its new ex- 
istence, there has not been a sign of any serious movement 
for provincial autonomy. All political appearances not- 
withstanding, the country enjoys a high degree of com- 
pactness and solidarity. A few years of honest adminis- 
tration and hard work at Bucharest should put Rumania, 
with its rich endowment, on the path to upward advance 
all along the line. 


WITH Czechoslovakia moving steadily along the road 
of stabilized progress and with Rumania definitely 
turning the corner in this direction, the triune King- 
dom of Jugoslavia is still struggling to effect a working 
compromise between the diverse elements of its popu- 
lation. The Serb-Croat-Slovene state is a country as 
large as the whole of New England. Territorial acqui- 
sitions to the former Kingdom of Serbia at the close of 
the war involved the annexation from Hungary of the 
province of Croatia, the western section of the Banat, 
and the three counties, known as the Voivodina, lying 
mainly between the Danube and the Tisza; from Austria 
the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, and 
what is now called the province of Slovenia; and from 
Bulgaria the commune of Tsaribrod and a large corner 
of Macedonia. The Kingdom of Montenegro was ab- 
sorbed into the new state as well. These annexations in- 
creased the population from five millions in pre-war 
Serbia to about thirteen millions in present-day Jugo- 
slavia, divided racially as follows: 7,000,000 Serbs, over 
2,500,000 Croats, 1,000,000 Slovenes, 500,000 Macedonian 
Slavs; and upwards of half a million each of Albanians, 



Magyars, and Germans. Like Rumania, Jugoslavia is 
predominantly an agricultural country, with the percent- 
age of illiteracy running high in her eastern and south- 
ern districts. 

The crux of the Jugoslav situation centres around the 
difficulties involved in arriving at a working under- 
standing between these different races. The Jugoslavs 
themselves make up the great bulk of the population, 
namely, about eleven out of thirteen millions. They are 
branches of the same race, but each one has passed 
through distinct historical experiences in modern times, 
and this process has caused the development of marked 
social and cultural differentiation. Take, for example, 
the case of the Croats and the Serbs: they speak exactly 
the same language, but the Serbs write it in Cryillic let- 
ters while the Croats use the Latin alphabet. In religion, 
the Croats and Slovenes are Catholic, the Serbs and Mace- 
donians being Orthodox. Having developed under Aus- 
tro-Hungarian rule for many centuries, the Croats and 
Slovenes possess a higher standard of living today than 
the population of Serbia and Macedonia. Politically, the 
situation is the other way round. Old Serbia emerged 
victorious from the Balkan wars as the champion of 
South Slav freedom, and after the World War it was nat- 
ural for her politicians to take a leading role in forging 
the new state. This policy led to an irrepressible struggle 
which represents as much a clash of ideas as of system. 
It is the conflict between the onslaught for a Greater Ser- 
bia and the ideal of a free and federated Jugoslavia. 


The Belgrade Government was first faced with the 
pressing problem of setting up an administrative system 
for the new country. For three years, the old Kingdom 
of Serbia had wasted away under the military occupation 
of the Central Powers, while all the annexed provinces 
were groaning under the repressive war regime of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy. Swarms of new officials, more 
or less incompetent and corrupt, were sent out from Bel- 
grade to govern the country. This policy was justified by 
the Belgrade authorities on the ground that, regardless 
of nationality, the former officials of Austria-Hungary 
would not be loyal to the new state. This assumption 
proved in most cases to be unfounded, and in the grad- 
ual readjustment which followed the great body of 
these Croat and Slovene officials have stayed on at their 
posts to this day. The key-positions throughout the 
Kingdom, however, are mostly held down by Serbs, 
particularly in the army and bureaucracy, but not in 
the schools and courts. 

During the early post-war years, the people of Jugo- 
slavia, as was the case in Rumania, suffered from the 
widespread abuse and exploitation which comes when a 
group of inferior culture and training is thrown into 
the position of ruling over provinces with a higher 
standard of culture. As time went on, the friction caused 
by the problem of supplying administrative personnel 
to run the new state has largely disappeared, but its es- 
sential features, deeply imbedded in the political situ- 
ation at Belgrade, have been projected into the long- 


lasting struggle over the working out of the constitu- 
tional organization o Jugoslavia. 

The passing of the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 was 
a triumph of the idea of a unitary state. The funda- 
mental law of the land provided for the abolition of 
provincial autonomy and the suppression of the local 
Diets. The Constitution, however, envisaged a valuable 
system of county and communal self-government which 
finally came into force in 1927. An important step in 
the administrative unification of Jugoslavia was com- 
pleted with the execution of the all-important tax re- 
form on January i, 1929. While the Vidovdan Con- 
stitution itself went far in the direction of centralizing 
authority in the hands of the Belgrade bureaucracy, the 
whole issue of Centralism versus Federalism became 
a dangerous political football at an early date. This 
ultimately led to the political impasse which forced 
King Alexander to abrogate the Constitution, dis- 
solve Parliament, and proclaim a dictatorship early 
in 1929. 

Jugoslavia has also made progress in handling the 
dual problem of currency and budget stabilization. 
Towards the end of 1923, the Belgrade Government suc- 
ceeded in balancing its budget which has since remained 
substantially in equilibrium. Likewise, since 1925, the 
Jugoslav dinar has been reasonably stable at the level 
of about two cents, but the legal revalorization of 
the currency has been held up until a Stabilization 
Loan can be floated abroad which will enable the Na- 


tional Bank to increase its holdings of gold and foreign 
bills. These critical negotiations have been postponed 
time and again owing to the parlous political situation. 
Jugoslavia has thus created a new monetary and fiscal 
system in very large degree. 

We are now ready to turn our attention to the develop- 
ment of political groupings since the war. 

The chronic political crisis at Belgrade had its origin 
largely in the state of public opinion in the different 
provinces at the end of the war. There was indeed at 
that time a striking similarity between the attitude of 
Belgrade and Bucharest politicians. The Serbians felt 
that they had won the war: they were naturally accus- 
tomed to rule ever since Serbia threw off the Turkish 
yoke. Their feeling was that their brother Croats and 
Slovenes, traditionally trained in a policy of opposition 
and obstruction to Budapest and Vienna, were far from 
fitted to assume the task of government. On the other 
hand, Croat and Slovene leaders could not always re- 
strain a feeling of contempt for the rough-and-ready 
ways of Balkan politics. After the cleanliness and beauty 
of Zagreb and Ljubljana, they looked down on poor little 
Belgrade, gutted by the war. In other words, they were 
outsiders breaking into a new game about which they 
had much to learn, and in the fight for equal rights and 
privileges in the state which originally bore their name, 
they resisted the domination of Belgrade and of Serbian 


politicians as leading to a Balkanization of the whole 

Another factor of outstanding significance was that 
the parties at that time were all organized on a sectional 
basis. To begin with, there was in Serbia the Demo- 
cratic party under the leadership of M. Davidovich. 
Then there was the veteran Radical party whose chief 
was Pashich, patriarch of all Belgrade statesmen and 
Father of Jugoslav unity. During the declining years 
of its founder, who died in 1926, the Radical party de- 
generated into the most reactionary party in the King- 
dom. Though often squabbling between themselves, for 
Pashich and Davidovich were fervent enemies, these two 
parties were largely responsible for the early regime of 
carpetbagging and official incompetence in Jugoslavia. 

As for the new provinces, Croatia was entirely under 
the thumb of the Peasant party whose leader was the 
late Dr. Radich, a man of brilliant mind, but a danger- 
ously short-sighted politician. 1 The Croatian Peasant 
party was well organized, as was the Slovene Clerical 
party which had its own way in the westernmost prov- 
ince of the Kingdom. Father Koroshetz is the able 
leader of this party ever since Austrian days. Lastly, 
there was the party of Dr. Spaho, leader of the Moslem 
Serbs in Bosnia. 

1 Pashich could never have manoeuvered through the centralist 
Vidovdan Constitution, had Radich not stayed up in Zagreb grum- 
bling about the "cultural backwardness of the Serbs." Later in his 
career (1928), he was among the first to urge the King to turn the 
Government over to the tender mercies of the army, "our national 


The very nature of circumstances attending the birth 
of the new Kingdom played into the hands of the two 
leading parties of old Serbia, the Radicals and the Demo- 
crats. Their position was further consolidated through 
the workings of the Electoral Law passed after the pro- 
mulgation of the 1921 Constitution. Thanks to this 
law, they gained by artificial means a preponderant 
voting strength in Parliament. This came about through 
the allotment of parliamentary representation which 
was calculated on the basis of the census of old Serbia, 
whereas the war had brought about a decrease of popu- 
lation from five to perhaps four and a half millions. The 
argument used to justify this provision was that the 
province of Serbia should not be penalized for ravages 
and losses wrought in the war of liberation. 

Otherwise the Electoral Law was thoroughly demo- 
cratic on paper. It provided for universal male suf- 
frage, secret voting and proportional representation. 
The liberal intentions of the law, however, collapsed be- 
fore the onslaught of official pressure and corruption for 
which Balkan elections are all too famous. This sys- 
tem of electoral intimidation did not extend to the 
former Austro-Hungarian provinces where elections 
themselves have been remarkably free and above board. 
Its worst effects were seen in Macedonia where, thanks 
to what amounted to martial law, the Democrat and 
Radical parties between them captured some fifteen ad- 
ditional seats. 

During the early years of the Jugoslav Kingdom, 


Pashich, chief exponent of the Greater Serbia program, 
enjoyed almost uninterrupted supremacy. It was dur- 
ing this period that the Radical party extended its influ- 
ence into every corner of the new state. The unitary 
Constitution of the realm was a triumph for the forces 
working for centralized authority. Even as late as 
the general elections of 1925, the Radical party obtained 
a clear majority in Parliament,, and its actual ascendancy 
was even more complete, owing to the fact that the Croat 
Peasant party absented itself from parliamentary pro- 
ceedings in Belgrade. 

During the first six years, Radich and his followers 
in Zagreb were pursuing a policy of passive resistance 
to the Belgrade Government. During this period, there 
was indeed considerable flirting with republican ideas 
in this group, and on one occasion Radich paid a sensa- 
tional visit to Moscow. Late in 1924, Radich and five 
other Croatian leaders were thrown into prison on the 
charge of High Treason. Upon being released some 
months later, he led his party into the Belgrade Parlia- 
ment where they swore their allegiance to the King. 
The impetuous Croat chieftain did not stop there. He 
soon made his peace with Pashich who included him in 
his Cabinet formed in the fall of 1925. This political 
bargain ended the understanding between the Radical 
party and the Pribichevich Democrats, the latter having 
some time earlier broken away from the main Democrat 
body under M. Davidovich for the purpose of joining 
hands with the Pashich Government. 


It was during this period that King Alexander began 
to play a more prominent role in the internal political 
situation. Moreover, the almost hypnotic prestige of 
Pashich was beginning to lose its potent spell, and in 
the last year of his extraordinary life as past-master in 
the art of Balkan politics, his effective domination was 
already a thing of the past. His death in the fall of 
1926 left Jugoslavia without a leader of commanding 
importance, and there soon began the phenomenon of 
the "bi-monthly Cabinet" at Belgrade. 2 

Parliamentary chaos reigned at Belgrade for the next 
two years. The 1927 elections broke the Radical ma- 
jority in Parliament, and the ensuing crisis came to a 
head the following spring when Foreign Minister Ma- 
rinkovich saw the necessity of submitting for ratification 
the famous Nettuno Conventions 3 which, negotiated 
some years before, accorded Italian interests special 
rights on the Dalmatian coast. This courageous action 
promptly drew the fire of the Croat leaders who were 
holding down the opposition benches for the moment. 
During a heated debate in Parliament on July 20, 1928, 
when a Croat was making an impassioned assault on 
the Conventions, a deputy-desperado from Montenegro, 

2 More accurately speaking, nine Cabinets in something over two 

8 They are thirteen in number, texts available in the League of 
Nations Treaty Series, volume LXXXIII. 


named Rashich, shouting that his personal honor was 
at stake, fired six shots in the direction of Radich and 
his followers. Two Croats were wounded and two 
others killed point blank, while Stephan Radich was 
mortally stricken. The Croat Peasant party promptly 
withdrew from Belgrade Parliament with a vow never 
to return. Three weeks later, Radich succumbed in 
Zagreb from his wounds, and hundreds of thousands 
of peasants swarmed into Zagreb to pay homage to their 
dead leader. 

Radich's last political move was to make a compact 
with the Pribichevich Democrats who enjoy a large 
Serb following in the Voivodina, Croatia and Dalmatia, 
provinces formerly under Austria-Hungary. Dr. 
Pribichevich himself was a member of the Government 
when the Nettuno Conventions were signed with Italy, 
and as Minister of the Interior he was officially respon- 
sible for the locking up of Radich and his colleagues back 
in 1924. For this and other reasons, it would be a mis- 
take to place too much stress upon this agreement be- 
tween the two parties which withdrew their support 
from the Belgrade Government in the summer of 1928. 
Following the death of Radich, however, an increas- 
ingly radical interpretation was put on the terms of the 
compact, when it fell to Dr. Machek, a country lawyer 
from Croatia, to assume the burden of party leader- 

The essential aim of the Pribichevich-Machek entente 


in Zagreb was to force the Government to revise the 
Constitution on a federative basis. Their program was 
never explicit on this point, but they had in mind the 
establishment of provincial Diets in which the main 
powers of government would be concentrated at the 
expense of Belgrade authority. There was also a lot 
of loose talk in Zagreb about transforming Jugoslavia 
into a Dual Monarchy, with only the element of Per- 
sonal Union binding the two component parts together. 
In order to bring about the submission of Belgrade, this 
group attempted to enforce a tax boycott at home and 
to vent its feelings abroad, especially with a view to 
undermining the negotiations for the Stabilization Loan. 
Following the tragic events in Parliament, the King 
called upon Father Korochetz, Slovene leader, to form 
a Cabinet. During the six months of the Korochetz 
Government, the administrative machinery of the state 
was kept going, and there was no overt threat to internal 
order and security. The underlying solidarity of the 
country during the crisis was not alone due to the fact 
that the Serbian authorities held the key-posts in both 
army and administration. Yet during this period, little 
progress was made towards effecting the much-needed 
reconciliation between Zagreb and Belgrade. The 
dearth of any signs of real statesmanship in both camps 
was encouraging military circles in Belgrade to press 
their demand for an outright dictatorship. The first 
step in this direction came at the end of November when 
the Government sent General Maximovich up to Za- 


greb, as Governor of Croatia, where he was greeted with 
bloody riots on the part of the students. 

It was on January 6, 1929 that King Alexander pro- 
claimed the Dictatorship by suspending the Constitu- 
tion and dissolving Parliament. 4 The royal proclama- 
tion assured the nation of an efficient and just adminis- 
tration and promised a gradual return to democratic 
government as promptly as the necessary reforms were 
made in the constitutional structure of the state. He 
then entrusted General Zivkovich, commander of the 
Royal Guard, to head up a Cabinet of military leaders 
and non-party experts drawn from all sections of the 

The first effect of the proclamation was a dis- 
tinct clearing of the political atmosphere in Jugo- 
slavia. It was after all a blow to the domineering 
tactics of the Serbian parties, and this fact alone was the 
subject of what turned out to be premature rejoicing 
in Zagreb. The early reforms carried through by the 
Dictatorship provided the nation with a happy antidote 
to the sterile activities of the late parliamentary regime. 
This new blood was a health-giving force in one respect, 
for as Professor Beard remarked in his brilliant book, 5 

4 The utterly petty politics which brought about the fall of the 
Korochetz Cabinet and made the King put an end to "parliamentary 
government" for the time being, is well described in Armstrong's 
"Where The East Begins" (1929), pp. 11-13. 

5 "The Balkan Pivot -.Jugoslavia," (1929) p. 174. 


"Not a single Government formed since the establish- 
ment of national unity has staked its life upon any great 
constructive legislative program." 

By the summer of 1929, however, Jugoslav opinion 
had lost its early hopes that the Royal Dictatorship would 
bring about a quick liquidation to the Serbo-Croat im- 
passe. With the Press tightly gagged, scores of opposi- 
tion figures, including both Pribichevich and Machek, 
became the victims of police terrorism, and the famous 
Sokol Society, organized on the Czech model and par- 
ticularly strong in Croatia, was thrown under the offi- 
cial ban. The series of repressive measures, dishearten- 
ing enough at home, scarcely produced a favorable im- 
pression abroad, particularly at Geneva where the Little 
Entente representatives put through the election of the 
South Slav Kingdom to the Council only with difficulty. 
Returning to Belgrade late in September, Foreign Min- 
ister Marinkovich exerted himself to strengthen the 
King's resolve to push forward with the final task of 
constitutional reorganization. 

A royal decree, issued on October 3, 1929, announced 
the first step towards liquidating the Dictatorship. The 
official name of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was 
changed to Jugoslavia, and the country divided into 
nine new provinces, forming administrative units to be 
ruled by a Governor appointed by Belgrade. These 
provincial administrations became the recipients of cer- 
tain powers originally delegated to the Central Gov- 
ernment under the now defunct Vidovdan Constitu- 


tion. The decree envisaged the election of provincial 
councils set up to supervise, but not to control, the func- 
tions of the Governors. In this sense, the new admin- 
istrative reform in Jugoslavia follows the example of 
Czechoslovakia and Rumania. 

Insofar as this measure will bring a devolution of 
powers away from Belgrade, it marks a step forward, 
but its structural features move in the wrong direction. 
The boundaries of the new provinces inflict great vio- 
lence to historical tradition, cutting as they do through 
the heart of old geographical and economic units. The 
brutal practice of electoral gerrymandering has devel- 
oped new twists in Central Europe since the war; but the 
new administrative division of Jugoslavia decrees out of 
existence whole provinces which have enjoyed a long 
and rich history, thus destroying instead of strengthening 
the basis of true integration and reconciliation between 
the various members of the Jugoslav race. Dictated by 
military conceptions rather than based on political and 
economic realities, the administrative law may turn out 
to be the forerunner of serious disturbances to the Dic- 
tatorship. 6 

Jugoslavia has thus entered the second decade of her 
existence without her political groupings being formed 
on a sound basis. Some progress can be noted along 
this line which gives hope for the future. Parties, for 
example, no longer bear an exclusively provincial com- 

8 See Professor Seton- Watson's informative article which appeared 
in the London Times for December 14, 1929. 


plexion, and the Serbian parties in particular have ex- 
tended their influence into every province of the King- 
dom. A reconciliation between the two factions of the 
Democrats would turn them into a real national party. 
There are, on the other hand, no prospects that the lead- 
ing parties of Croatia and Slovenia will abandon their 
provincial character in the immediate future. Here 
again much depends on the outcome of the experiment 
in dictatorship which has of course put a rude stop to 
organized political activity. 

Police brutality in this direction showed up at its 
worst during the Croat conspiracy trial which ended 
at Belgrade on June 7, 1930, by the acquittal of Dr. 
Machek and the sentencing of fifteen Croats to prison. 
Having failed to mould together the various national 
particularisms into a free Jugoslavia, Belgrade now 
seems intent on uniting the country by crushing them 
under heel. Probably the next step in this process will 
involve the creation of a state party, framed along Fas- 
cist lines and supported by the nationalized Sokols and 
other patriotic organizations. 

This brings us to a consideration of the minority 
problem in Jugoslavia. Here we find that the Govern- 
ment is faced by no overwhelming difficulties. Neither 
the Germans nor the Magyars in the north, though by 
no means content with their present status and treat- 
ment, form an element threatening the stability of the 


state. Their numbers, less than a million between them, 
are too small to present a serious problem, and their lead- 
ers have shown considerable willingness to cooperate 
with Belgrade. Rather more troublesome have been the 
half million Albanian tribesmen in the southwestern 
corner of Jugoslavia, but barring the outbreak of a war 
along the Albanian frontier, there is fair reason to be- 
lieve that, despite forced emigration, this phase of the 
minority problem in Jugoslavia will work itself out in 
time. On the whole, therefore, Jugoslav security is not 
threatened by serious danger from the side of minority 
races. Yet neither Jugoslavia nor Rumania has come 
to the point reached in Czechoslovakia, where the prin- 
cipal minority race has definitely put its shoulder to the 
wheel of state. 

Here a word should be said about the special problem 
of Macedonia. The Macedonians bear roughly the same 
relationship in race and culture to the Serbs as the Slo- 
vaks do to the Czechs. There is, however, a complicating 
element in the situation, by culture and language both, 
the Macedonians stand even closer to the Bulgarians 
than to the Serbs, while Bulgarians of Macedonian origin 
are found high up in every influential circle at Sofia. 
They exerted crucial pressure on ex-King Ferdinand to 
throw Bulgaria into the camp of the Central Powers in 
1915. This was the principal cause of the long and bitter 
struggle between Bulgaria and Serbia over the annexa- 
tion of Macedonia. The conclusion of the Balkan wars 
saw Macedonia divided into three parts, Serbian, Bui- 


garian and Greek, by far the largest of which went to 
Serbia, while Bulgaria got only a corner of Macedonia. 
This artificial partitionment of Macedonia, perhaps as 
much as the Great War, led to the economic ruin of the 
once fairly prosperous province; 

After the war, the new Belgrade Government was 
not sufficiently strong nor farsighted to institute a lib- 
eral regime in Macedonia. The policy of repression and 
Serbianization was countered by a campaign of violence 
on the part of the secret Imro (Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization), which was originally 
launched back in 1903 to throw off the yoke of the Porte. 
This band of conspirators envisages the creation of an 
independent Macedonia composed of the three parts 
of the homeland now under "foreign rule." Its two 
main weapons in attaining its ends are political assassi- 
nation at home and violent propaganda abroad. The 
spirit of discipline and self-sacrifice among the rank 
and file of the people who stand behind the Central 
Executive Committee leaves the impression that Jugo- 
slavia is faced with a really desperate problem in Mace- 
donia. The international complications of this dead- 
lock, as we shall see in a later chapter, constitute an 
even more serious threat to Balkan peace. 

The situation in which the Imro found itself in the 
summer of 1928, following the assassination of its chief, 
General Protogueroff, was truly precarious. This inci- 
dent brought to the surface an elemental struggle going 
on between two rival factions inside the organization. 


General Mikhailoff, new leader and enemy of Porto- 
gueroff, enjoys the confidence of the younger members 
of the organization in his effort to compose the internal 
strife which threatens the group with disruption. This 
rivalry is not so much a struggle for power between mod- 
erate and radical factions; it is rather a dispute between 
the Central Committee and its representatives abroad. 
The Central Committee under General Mikhailoff 
stands for the tradition of unitary authority which it de- 
rives directly from the General Assembly of the move- 
ment. The foreign representatives,, on the other hand, 
maintain that they get their powers directly from this 
sovereign body. General Mikhailoff and the Central 
Committee are determined to bring the foreign repre- 
sentatives of the Imro under their complete control. 
This internal strife is a fairly clear sign that the disinte- 
gration of the movement is already under way/ and in- 
deed there is good reason to state that the organization 
would be ready to make a truce with Belgrade today if 
the Jugoslav Government undertook to restore full civil 
liberty and to institute a regime of cultural autonomy 
in Serbian Macedonia. 

Thus, Jugoslavia still faces two primary problems be- 
fore her internal consolidation can be considered at hand. 
The first of these is the final liquidation of the moral 

7 The Mikhailoff faction has apparently received fresh encour- 
agement and aid from Italian sources in Albania and elsewhere. 


crisis in which all countries found themselves at the end 
of the war, and in Jugoslavia this problem persists to 
this day in acute form in the petty party politics in Bel- 
grade. The second problem is the necessity of revising 
the constitutional structure of the state with a view to 
striking a balance between centralized authority and 
local self-government, and to providing a working basis 
for healthy cooperation between the component parts 
of the Kingdom. The failure of the new regime to 
bring about substantial improvement in the adminis- 
trative and political life of the nation would of course 
damage the prestige of the Crown. 8 

The Balkanization of Jugoslav politics is a deep- 
seated malady which may take the country a long time 
to throw off. The mere federalization of the Consti- 
tution will not turn the trick, and the setting up of 
provincial Councils on an artificial basis may even be 
a dangerous move. The least hopeful sign in the present 
crisis is the utter dearth of leadership at Belgrade. The 
most promising element in Jugoslavia is the fact 
that the country is made up of solid, hard-work- 
ing peasantry with a rich endowment of political 
common sense. 

Indeed, Jugoslavia possesses inherent social stability 
which has been reinforced through the execution of a 
land reform and the promotion of mass education. 
Nothing short of a miracle, for example, has been 

8 An official Belgrade communique, issued on June 5, 1930, gave 
the first indication of the permanent character of the Dictatorship. 


wrought in public health development under the direc- 
tion of Dr. Stampar. 

It would thus be a mistake to overemphasize the im- 
portance of the political impasse, for the very reason 
that in other realms of activity the essential community 
of interest and sentiment of the Jugoslavs is finding a 
profitable basis of collaboration. The Dictatorship 
grasps the importance of promoting these unifying 
forces through the development of communications. 
A bridge across the Danube at Belgrade is now under 
construction which will bring northeastern Jugoslavia 
into direct touch with the capital, enabling at the same 
time the opening of a direct line with Bucharest. An- 
other vital link in Jugoslav communications, as shown 
on the map, is the continuation of the Belgrade-Sarajevo 
line to Split on the Dalmation coast. Until the Gov- 
ernment obtains the foreign capital necessary for this 
difficult piece of construction work, Belgrade's only con- 
nection with Dalmatian ports remains over the cir- 
cuitous route passing through Zagreb. 

Though Jugoslavia has not completed her process of 
internal consolidation as yet, there is no reason to expect 
that the country is proceeding along the path of disso- 
lution. What the nation needs at present is a period of 
orderly development, and this is taking place, assuredly 
at a price, under the aegis of the Royal Dictatorship. 

In order to preserve the fruits of hard-earned labor, all 


three states of the Little Entente indeed require a long, 
uninterrupted period of peace both at home and abroad. 
The pacific policy pursued by the Little Entente is thus 
in sound harmony with the requirements of the domestic 
situation in the three countries. And because of her in- 
herent strength and leadership, Czechoslovakia remains 
the keystone of the Little Entente system. 




GETTING back again to the Hungarian thesis, the sec- 
ond weak point in the Little Entente's armor lies in 
an acute divergence of international interests among the 
three states which is gradually leading to a disruption 
of the alliance. More concretely, each Little Entente 
country has a big neighbor, relations with whom are 
causing an increasing degree of anxiety and preoccupa- 
tion. This tense situation is sucking the life blood out of 
the system., the danger being that a conflict may arise 
between a neighboring power and a Little Entente 
state, thus involving the entire alliance as an operating 
system. That is, Czechoslovakia is fighting hard against 
being drawn into the vortex of rehabilitated Germany, 
Rumania is threatened in the east by Soviet Russia, 
and Jugoslavia is engaged in a life-and-death struggle 
to hold her own diplomatically against Fascist Italy. 

In sum, there is no question that the Entente states are 
faced today with what can be termed the Big Neighbor 
problem. Let us examine this question in its various 
phases with a view to determining in just what way 
this problem effects the stability and efficacy of the 

The Little Entente got under way in 1920-21 as a 



regional alliance with a frankly restricted scope. Its 
immediate concern at that time was the preservation 
of the territorial status quo against the onslaughts of 
Magyar irredentism. In order to obtain a diplomatic 
free hand in the Danubian basin, the statesmen of the 
Little Entente worked out a system of coordinated ac- 
tion vis-a-vis the Allied Powers. This was in reality 
the first step in proclaiming the diplomatic independence 
of the successors to Austria-Hungary, the opening blast in 
the movement of "Central Europe for the Central Euro- 
peans." Yet outside and beyond the framework of the 
Little Entente, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia 
have always had vital international interests which are 
a potential factor of disagreement among them. On 
the other hand, the existence of Big Neighbor prob- 
lems acts like a cement binding together the three small 
allies in common diplomatic undertakings. In order 
to get down to the core of the Big Neighbor problem, 
it is necessary in this section to outline the cardinal fea- 
tures of the international position of each Little En- 
tente state, taken by itself. 

For reasons of chronological convenience, the status 
of Rumania comes first. 

Immediately after the war, the new Rumania saw 
herself threatened on every side by enemies, real and 
potential. More particularly, the Rumanian Govern- 
ment at that time held that the hostile attitude of Rus- 


sia on one side and of Hungary on the other presented 
problems of equal importance to the security of the new 
state. This was the main reason which prompted Take 
lonescu, the shrewd Rumanian statesman, to pro- 
pose the creation of a sweeping alliance of the victor 
powers extending from the Aegean to the Baltic Sea. 
He viewed such an alliance as the most effective cordon 
sanitctire which could be set up between Hungary and 
Russia, Germany and Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary, and 
so on. Take lonescu was supported in this scheme by 
Marshal Pilsudski in Poland, the late Premier Pashich 
of Jugoslavia, and Premier Venizelos in Greece. Far 
more important, France at that time was strongly in 
favor of establishing a cordon sanitaire in Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans against her former enemies, particularly 
between Germany and Soviet Russia, 

For reasons noted in Chapter I, Czechoslovakia took 
strong exception to the proposal to perpetuate the 
regime of two armed camps dividing Europe in twain. 
President Masaryk and Foreign Minister Benes held 
that the outcome of such an alliance, even granting the 
doubtful point of its inherent feasibility, would be two- 
fold it would block the path to international recon- 
ciliation, and it would place the new states under the 
diplomatic tutelage of the Allied Powers. As a substi- 
tute to the proposal of setting up an all-embracing al- 
liance, Czechoslovakia put through the Little Entente 
scheme with more modest and at the same time more 
concrete aims. 


The creation of the Little Entente left Rumania with 
the necessity of guaranteeing her new frontier against 
Soviet Russia. The opportunity to conclude an alliance 
between Warsaw and Bucharest presented itself only 
after Poland and Soviet Russia made an armistice in 
October 1920 for the purpose of negotiating a general 
peace treaty, which was actually signed at Riga some 
five months later. In the meantime, Rumania and 
Poland signed a treaty of alliance on March 3, 1921 
against Soviet Russia, while Poland concluded a more 
sweeping defensive alliance with France. The Franco- 
Polish treaty of 1921 was perhaps the most striking suc- 
cess of French military policy in post-war Eastern 

Poland, situated as she is today between two poten- 
tially hostile powers from whom she took major por- 
tions of her territory, stands in vital need of support 
from the side of the Little Entente. The early associa- 
tion of Poland in Little Entente conferences gave her 
the status of a sort of associate member, and this spirit 
of cooperation is often manifest at Geneva to this day. 
Moreover, the frontier differences between Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were settled back in 1925 when Dr. 
Benes went to Warsaw to sign treaties of arbitration and 
friendship. 1 A similar convention exists between Poland 

x For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, volume XLVIII. 
Under this convention, no promises of mutual military aid are under- 
taken, either by Czechoslovakia in the event of Russian or German 
aggression against Poland, or by Poland in the case of a Hungarian 
attack on Czechoslovakia, 


and Jugoslavia. Lastly,, the 1921 treaty of alliance be- 
tween Poland and Rumania was renewed, with more 
sweeping commitments, in ip26. 2 Instead of being 
merely a defensive alliance directed against Soviet Rus- 
sia, it now provides for joint military action in the event 
of an unprovoked attack from any third party. That 
is, Poland undertakes to come to the aid of Rumania 
in the case of Hungarian aggression, and Rumania 
would likewise be drawn into a war started by Germany 
over the Polish Corridor or Upper Silesia. 

Rumania has to this day withheld formal recognition 
from the Soviet Government, and Moscow in turn dis- 
putes the legality of the annexation of Bessarabia by Ru- 
mania in 1919. The official standpoint of Bucharest 
holds that the act of union passed by the Bessarabian As- 
sembly represented the free decision of the people of the 
former Russian province in favor of joining Greater 
Rumania. Moreover, the Bessarabian Convention of 
1920, signed by the Allied Powers at Paris, constitutes 
a binding international sanction of the act of incorpora- 
tion. This Convention came into force in 1926 with the 
ratification of the Italian Government. 

In taking exception to the Rumanian thesis, Moscow 
argues that the Bessarabian Assembly was an illegal body 
and that the act of union was passed under the pressure 
of the Rumanian authorities. The Moscow Government 

2 For text, see Treaty Series, volume LX. 


counters with the demand that a free plebiscite take 
place in Bessarabia to allow the people to express their 
decision as to whether the province should remain in 
Rumania or be turned back to Russia. It was just on 
this point that a whole series of conferences between 
official delegates of the two Governments have come 
to smash. 3 

Another point of acute disagreement between the two 
parties concerns the disposition of the gold belonging 
to the Rumanian National Bank, which was sent to 
Moscow for safekeeping when the armies of the Central 
Powers were marching on Bucharest at the end of 1916. 
The new Maniu Government has announced its de- 
termination to reach a definitive settlement with Soviet 
Russia in the near future, and it is possible that a basis 
of compromise can be found whereby Soviet Russia 
would abandon its pretensions in the Bessarabian ques- 
tion, and Rumania would in turn give up its claim to 
the gold which, after all, has probably vanished from 
Moscow coffers long since. Bucharest can envisage 
no such agreement until Moscow undertakes to put 
an end to subversive propaganda in Rumania, above 
all in the backward province of Bessarabia. 

The Little Entente has formally announced on several 
occasions that the policy of the member states towards 
Soviet Russia is purely a matter of independent action 

3 For an informative account of the breakdown of the last Russo- 
Rumanian conference, held at Vienna in 1924, see Toynbee's "Survey 
of International Affairs for 1924," pp. 263-265. 


on the part o each. Up to the present moment, no 
Little Entente state has accorded formal recognition 
to the Soviet Government, though Prague has a con- 
sular agreement with Moscow of long standing. 

The lack of diplomatic relations between Moscow and 
Bucharest today is little more than a formality, and in 
no sense can this situation be construed as an element 
of danger to Rumanian security. The plain fact is that 
the Soviet Government, notwithstanding its paternal- 
istic professions abroad, nurses no vital desire to grab 
back the impoverished province of Bessarabia from Ru- 
mania. Indeed, Moscow today seems to be pursuing 
an entirely peaceful policy towards both Bucharest and 
Warsaw. Differences there still are of serious character 
between Soviet Russia and her western neighbors, but 
the Litvinov Protocol, providing for the immediate 
coming into effect of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, is a fair 
indication that the peace of Eastern Europe will not 
be disturbed, in the near future at any rate. This 
Protocol was signed at Moscow on February 9, 1929, 
by Soviet Russia, Poland, Rumania, Estonia, and 

To sum up, Rumania derives a certain sense of se- 
curity on her eastern frontier through her alliance with 
Poland. Bucharest and Warsaw have constantly 
strengthened the bonds of mutual interest existing be- 
tween them, this development being revealed in the 
widening of the scope of their alliance in 1926. More- 
over, France underwrites the diplomatic implications 


and military obligations involved in this relationsnip. 
On the other side, Moscow has manifested her desire 
and need for peace upon many solemn occasions, and 
during the winter months of 1930, the Soviet Govern- 
ment again denied flatly the recurrent rumors of any 
mobilization or reorganization of her forces along the 
Rumanian frontier. 

The combination of these two factors the Rumano- 
Polish alliance, guaranteed by France, and the pacific 
intentions of Moscow indicates that Rumania is not 
threatened with acute danger from the side of Soviet 
Russia. The Bucharest Government is indeed faced 
by a Big Neighbor problem, but not one which in any 
vital sense diverts her from holding up her end of Little 
Entente obligations in a peace-abiding Europe. 

* France and Rumania signed a convention of friendship and 
arbitration in 1926, amounting in effect to a defensive alliance, text 
of -which is available in the Treaty Series, volume LVIII. 



THE formal interest of the Little Entente in preserving 
the new status quo south of the Danube found expres- 
sion in the provisions of the Rumano- Jugoslav treaty of 
alliance, whereby these two countries contracted to come 
to each other's assistance in the event of Bulgarian ag- 
gression. Here Rumania's fear was over the status of 
Southern Dobrudja which, annexed in 1913, was reoc- 
cupied by Bulgaria during the World War, but reverted 
to Rumania after the armistice of 1918. Bucharest once 
pursued a repressive policy in that province, and among 
other things thousands of Kutzo-Wallachs were settled 
in Bulgarian villages. The result has been twofold 
huge emigration of Bulgarians back to the homeland 
and tense relations between Bucharest and Sofia. To- 
day with the Maniu Cabinet in office, there are good 
prospects of removing the causes of friction between 
the two countries, and informal conversations have al- 
ready been opened over the proposed construction of a 
railway bridge over the Danube at RushchuL 

This project is connected with the plan to build a broad 
gauge line from Sofia down the Struma valley to Salon- 
ika. The absence of this line results in the absurd prac- 



tice of transporting Bulgarian coal for Greek railroads 
from the Struma valley up through Sofia and across to 
Bourgas on the Black Sea where it is transshipped 
through the Dardanelles to Salonika. Up to the pres- 
ent, however, Greece has not fulfilled her treaty promise 
to provide Bulgaria with an Aegean outlet through the 
province of Western Thrace which was taken from Bul- 
garia under the Treaty of Neuilly. 

Time has shown that the danger of military trouble 
from the side of Bulgaria has been illusory. Yet frontier 
raids there have been aplenty on the border between 
Jugoslavia and Bulgaria. We shall examine later the 
present relations between these two countries. In the 
meantime, there has arisen a fresh threat to Balkan 
peace in the form of a protracted crisis between Bel- 
grade and Rome. This clash of interests is the most 
critical phase of the Big Neighbor problem which the 
Little Entente has faced to this day. 

Up to the summer of 1926, there were good grounds 
for believing that Italy and Jugoslavia would succeed 
in settling their outstanding differences without further 
outbursts of popular feeling on both sides of the Adri- 
atic. Back in 1920, the two Governments concluded a 
treaty of friendship in which the contracting parties 
"mutually engaged to keep watch over the strict execu- 
tion of the treaties of peace signed at St. Germain and 
Trianon; in particular, they will adopt by common agree- 


ment all measures and policy calculated to prevent the 
restoration of the House o Hapsburg to the throne of 
Austria and Hungary." This treaty was renewed and 
strengthened in 1924 by the Treaty of Rapallo which 
regulated the definitive status of Fiume, and the fol- 
lowing year saw the signing of the Nettuno Conven- 
tions under which the Jugoslav Government recog- 
nized the special interests of Italy on the Dalmatian 
coast. Noteworthy is the fact that Signor Mussolini 
was at the helm of state in Rome for three years when 
these last accords were signed with Jugoslavia. 

Meanwhile, Fascist Italy was becoming charged with 
a feeling of her historic destiny. This back-to-Rome 
movement was only in part motivated by purely patri- 
otic sentiment; it was busily striking roots in the soil 
of economic reality. Largely cut off from emigration 
overseas, Italy was faced with the problem of absorbing 
a staggering increase of population every year. This 
meant industrial development at home and commercial 
expansion abroad, the opening up of new world markets 
to be protected, if need be, by political pressure. The 
nearest outlet for domestic products was provided by 
Italy's traditional influence along the Dalmatian coast, 
and this opportunity gave birth to the Fascist theory of 
turning the Adriatic into an Italian lake: a throw-back 
to D'Annunzio's seizure of Fiume in 1919. Here the 
gaunt figure of Jugoslavia stood athwart her path, a new 
and untried country clamoring for a much-needed out- 
let to the sea. 


The prestige policy of Italy should also be viewed 
in the light of Franco-Italian rivalry in the Balkans 
and North Africa. It was natural that France after 
the war should assume the role of protectress over the 
Little Entente, and today France is bound by a defen- 
sive alliance with each of the three allies. Aiming to 
break the ring of French influence in the Balkans, Fascist 
Italy concluded treaties of friendship with Hungary, 
Rumania, and Greece, and is exerting strenuous efforts 
to draw Bulgaria and Turkey into her sphere of diplo- 
matic influence. Italy's penetrating wedge into the 
Balkans lies in the buffer state of Albania with whom she 
has concluded a binding alliance. Over this delicate 
problem, Belgrade and Rome have waged an acrimoni- 
ous diplomatic battle for the last four years, the end of 
which is not yet in sight. 

Less than a year after the Fascist March on Rome, 
Signor Mussolini made his first aggressive gesture on 
the Adriatic by ordering the bombardment and occu- 
pation of the Greek island of Corfu. This venture ended 
in diplomatic humiliation at Geneva. Italy suddenly 
turned her attention once again in the direction of Al- 
bania which her forces had evacuated under pressure 
in 1920. The summer of 1924 saw Mgr. Fan Noli, leader 
of the pro- Jugoslav faction at Tirana, driven out by the 
pro-Italian party headed by Zogu, the present King 
Zog. This change of Government paved the way for 
the effective penetration of Italian influence and for the 
conclusion of a military alliance between Italy and Al- 


bania which was actually signed at Tirana in November 
1926. This decisive step showed that Italy had definitely 
abandoned her interest in a long-standing plan to make 
a three-cornered guarantee pact with France and Jugo- 
slavia, which circumstance now left the two latter allies 
free to negotiate a separate convention. 

Four months later, Jugoslavia broke off diplomatic 
relations with Albania because of an incident at Tirana 
which revealed strained feelings on both sides of the 
border. Following this rupture, the Italian Dictator 
denounced Jugoslavia for ordering a secret mobiliza- 
tion along the Albanian frontier, and demanded that 
an international commission of investigation be ap- 
pointed to proceed to that district to forestall the war- 
like preparations of Belgrade. The Jugoslav Govern- 
ment promptly accepted the challenge of bad faith, 
but suggested that the scope of the inquiry be extended 
to the Albanian side of the frontier as well. This pro- 
posal was blocked in Rome. A few days later, the 
Belgrade representatives of the Great Powers, including 
Germany, conducted an informal investigation on the 
spot without uncovering any unusual movement of 
troops there. The plain fact was that Jugoslavia had 
already carried through her plans for military reorgani- 
zation along the Albanian frontier during the period 
when Italy was proceeding apace with the militariza- 
tion of Albania proper. 

Though the war scare between Italy and Jugoslavia 
gradually passed off the scene during the spring of 1927, 


relations between the two countries remained strained 
throughout the year, and press recriminations were al- 
most a daily occurrence in both capitals. The temper 
of the Fascist press was clearly revealed when France 
and Jugoslavia signed their treaties of friendship and 
of arbitration 1 in November 1927, and this despite the 
fact that they were the first treaties of any kind concluded 
between France and her ally since the war. Two weeks 
later, Signor Mussolini countered by announcing the 
signing of a twenty-year military convention 2 with Al- 
bania which virtually transformed that little country 
into an Italian satellite. 

The year 1928 saw some improvement in the rela- 
tions between Rome and Belgrade. This clearing of 
the atmosphere was not a little due to the bold move 
of Foreign Minister Marinkovich in pushing the ratifi- 
cation of the Nettuno Conventions through Parliament 
a few days after Radich had been shot. Despite this 
tragedy and despite wide-spread demonstrations against 
Italy in Croatia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, Dr. Marinko- 
vich had the full backing of the Government in his 
policy to bring about a reconciliation with Rome at all 
costs. Unhappily, the Italian Government was not in 
the mood at that time to come to terms with Jugoslavia, 
and the reason therefor became manifest on September 

1 The official English translation of these treaties is published in the 
League of Nations Treaty Series, volume LXVIII. 

2 Text available in Toynbee's "Survey of International Affairs for 
1927," page 542, the text of the Tirana Treaty of 1926 being already 
published in the Treaty Series, volume LX. 


ist when Zog was proclaimed King of the Albanians. 
Croat leaders seized this occasion at Zagreb to charge 
Italy again with bad faith, but the Belgrade press hardly 
did more than to note that Zog's title was King, not of 
Albania, but of the Albanians. 

When Jugoslavia passed into the family of dictator- 
ship states early in 1929, Fascist circles in Italy took evi- 
dent satisfaction in commenting on King Alexander's 
decision, but this circumstance failed to lead to any 
marked improvement in mutual feeling during the 
course of the year. While Jugoslavia was patching up 
a frontier convention with Bulgaria, the emissaries of 
King Boris failed in their final attempt to persuade the 
Pope to grant Princess Giovanna the necessary dispensa- 
tion to marry the Orthodox ruler of Bulgaria. 8 

Italy met with more success in consolidating her rela- 
tions with both Austria and Greece during 1929, giving 
rise to Jugoslav anxiety of diplomatic encirclement. 
Moreover, the Belgrade press waxed warm and furious 
when a Slovene student named Gortan was executed at 
Pola in October 1929, on the charge of High Treason. 
Anti-Italian demonstrations broke out afresh in Jugo- 
slavia and even at Prague, protesting against alleged per- 
secution of the Slovene minority in Italy. On February 
26, 1930, for example, twelve Slovenes were sentenced to 
long terms of imprisonment for disturbing public order 

8 This royal marriage was solemnized at Assisi on October 25, 
1930, the Vatican's condition being that, despite the Bulgarian 
Constitution, the children will be brought up in the Catholic Faith. 


and security, and six months later four Jugoslav "terror- 
ists" were executed at Trieste. Thus, the year 1930 
opened with continued bad feeling on both sides of the 
Adriatic, while a Naval Conference disaster at London 
might well lead to further strained relations between 
Italy and France's ally, Jugoslavia. This estrangement 
of feeling is all the more deplorable in that economically 
Italy and Jugoslavia have every reason to get together on 
a constructive program of mutual endeavor. 

Another outstanding Balkan danger lies in the inter- 
national aspects of the Macedonian problem, especially 
in its bearing on relations between Belgrade and Sofia. 
The Bulgarian Government since the war has made 
every effort not to get mixed up in the Macedonian 
quarrel, but this line of policy has been difficult to 
follow in all its ramifications. The first complicating 
factor is that the Macedonians have traditionally played 
a prominent role in the public and cultural life of Bul- 
garia. Again, owing to the wholesale deportations from 
both Greek and Serbian Macedonia, there are today 
nearly half a million Macedonian refugees in Bulgaria 
who are a severe economic burden on the country. It 
was not until 1926 that Bulgaria, thanks to a Refugee 
Loan arranged by the League of Nations, was in posi- 
tion to undertake the settling of these helpless folk 
in permanent homes. Under these circumstances, the 
Bulgarian Government was handicapped in cooperating 


with Jugoslavia and Greece in a joint undertaking to 
solve the Macedonian question, even to the extent of 
curbing the activities of the Imro (Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization) operating from inside the 
Bulgarian frontier. In this sense, Bulgaria was perhaps 
overdisarmed under the provisions of the Neuilly 

The Stambouliski regime in Bulgaria (1919-1923) 
made every effort to effect an early reconciliation with 
Jugoslavia, and the pacifist peasant Premier even went 
so far as to state his conviction publicly that the South 
Slav ideal would never be completely realized until 
Bulgaria was included as an integral member of a fed- 
erated Jugoslavia. Stambouliski and a host of his fol- 
lowers were assassinated in 1923 during the Tsankoff 
coup d'etat which unleashed the forces of violence within 
Bulgaria, and it was not until M. Liapcheff became 
Prime Minister three years later that Bulgaria returned 
gradually to normal political life. This process of in- 
ternal consolidation was substantially aided by the float- 
ing of the Refugee Loan in 1926 and of the League 
Stabilization Loan in 1928, despite the acrimonious 
discussions which preceded their final acceptance both 
in Sofia and Geneva. 

During the last few years, relations between Sofia 
and Belgrade have remained in a parlous state* No 
sooner would signs of improvement appear on the 
Balkan horizon than a bloody clash would occur on 
the frontier, sometimes between gendarmes of the two 


states and other times between Jugoslav gendarmes and 
a band of Macedonian rebels attempting a clandestine 
crossing. In the latter case, Belgrade would renew its 
demands that Sofia Government take steps to aggressive 
action against the activities of the Imro. Public opinion 
in Bulgaria, on the other hand, has felt all along that 
the repressive regime in Serbian Macedonia was responsi- 
ble for the deplorable acts of violence. Matters finally 
came to a head in October 1927 when the Serbian Com- 
mander in Macedonia, General Kovachovich, was shot 
by Macedonian agents as the last of a series of brutal acts 
in the terrorist campaign initiated four months earlier. 
Holding that these assassins came from Bulgaria not 
long before, the Jugoslav Government closed the frontier 
and kept it bolted against Bulgaria for the next sixteen 

It was during the period of high tension between 
Belgrade and Sofia that there occurred the earthquake 
in South Bulgaria during April 1928, and the disaster 
evoked expressions and acts of sympathy from the side 
of Jugoslavia which augured well for the future. This 
circumstance led General Protogueroff, the Macedonian 
chieftain, to advocate a more moderate policy towards 
the Jugoslav regime in Macedonia which on its side 
was showing signs of improvement. This bold step on 
General ProtoguerofPs part was probably the reason 
for his undoing at the hand of an extremist in July 1928. 

The assassination of the rebel leader in turn prompted 
Great Britain and France to make a joint protest at 


Sofia urging the Liapcheff Government to abandon its 
neutral policy vis-a-vis the Imro. Though this Franco- 
British intervention probably erred on the side of vigor- 
ousness, it was timely in the sense that Bulgarian opinion 
had cooled of! considerably in its outlook on the Mace- 
donian problem. During the fall of 1928, there took 
place a private conference between General Mikhailoff , 
the new Macedonian chieftain, and a group of prominent 
Bulgarians. The latter came back with the conviction 
that the Imro was now in the mood to treat with the 
Jugoslav authorities on the condition that a regime of 
cultural autonomy and civil liberty be instituted in 
Serbian Macedonia in short order. 

It seems unfortunately clear that the military dictator- 
ship at Belgrade is not prepared to make immediate 
concessions in this direction. On the other hand, the 
Jugoslav Government opened the Bulgarian frontier 
early in February, 1929. A conference between Bul- 
garian and Jugoslav delegates promptly took place 
thereafter at Pirot where two points of dispute were dis- 
posed of, the more important of which was the setting 
up of a neutral zone running along both sides of the 
frontier. Within this zone, the respective authorities 
have the right to expel any person not resident in the 
district. Other questions were discussed in a preliminary 
way at the Pirot meeting which may have far-reaching 
consequences along the path of cooperation and under- 
standing between the two South Slav peoples. 

By the middle of February 1930, the mixed Commis- 


sion which grew out of the Pirot conversations com- 
pleted their arduous labors at Sofia. Two agreements 
were signed of fundamental significance to Serbo-Bul- 
gar relations one regulating the maintenance of fron- 
tier order and security, and the other settling the con- 
tentious question of double property. On March loth, 
the Sofia Parliament pushed through the ratification of 
these conventions on the urgent plea of Foreign Minister 

This step followed on the heels of the fourth bomb 
outrage in South Serbia during the month following 
the signing of the agreements. The machinery of 
the new mixed frontier commission promptly set to 
work examining into the circumstances of the crime, 
Jugoslavia demanding energetic measures against the 
culprits several of whom were named. Representatives 
of the Great Powers at Sofia, led by Great Britain, made 
formal interventions, and the Bulgarian Government 
promised speedy and effective action against the Mace- 
donian revolutionaries. The pro-Mikhailoff organ, pub- 
lished at Sofia, calmly announced during the crisis that 
recourse to bullets and bombs against Serbian tyranny 
was necessary since the League of Nations had entirely 
ignored the latest Imro petition. 

The status of Bulgaro-Jugoslav relations at the open- 
ing of spring 1930 is thus as follows. The Pirot agree- 
ments have laid the basis for reconciliation and collabora- 
tion, but progress along this tortuous path is constantly 

4 For text, see L f Europe Nouvelle, Paris, for March 15, 1930. 


blocked by Macedonian violence. Further outrages oc- 
curring along the frontier will probably force Jugoslavia 
to demand a forceful suppression of the Imro which in 
turn will place the Bulgarian Government in a danger- 
ous position. 5 Mutual cooperation and patience are vital 
at all costs, and above all Jugoslavia must realize that her 
most effective weapon in bringing about the dissolu- 
tion of the Imro lies in a liberalizing regime in Serbian 

M. Venizelos' return to power at Athens in 1928 was 
a hopeful sign on the stormy horizon of Balkan poli- 
tics. For years following the debacle of Greek arms in 
Anatolia which resulted in the flight of King Constan- 
tine and M. Venizelos, relations between Greece and 
her neighbors have been on a thoroughly unsound foot- 
ing. The year 1923, when the critical negotiations were 
proceeding at Lausanne for revamping the impossible 
Treaty of Sevres with Turkey, saw the Corfu incident. 
Jugoslavia at the same time was pressing the new Re- 
public to make good on its promise to create a Jugo- 
slav Free Zone at Salonika. The year 1924 saw the ex- 

6 Bulgaria took another step in checking Imro lawlessness when on 
August 11, 1930, the Government ordered the arrest of the redoubt- 
able General Mikhailoff, chief of Macedonian extremists. Though 
Sofia has been under constant diplomatic bombardment, the actual 
decision in this instance seems to have been due to the courageous 
foresight of the new Minister of Justice, former Premier Tsankoff, 
who in 1928 was instrumental in persuading the late General Proto- 
gueroff to initiate a policy of legal action and moderation. 


piration of the Greco- Jugoslav treaty of friendship. Dur- 
ing following year, the Pangalos dictatorship started the 
erection of the Jugoslav Free Zone at Salonika, but this 
privilege was cancelled in 1927 by his successors whose 
coup put an end to his regime in Athens. The Greek 
Parliament on this occasion denounced the proposed 
commercial convention with Jugoslavia. Moreover, the 
isolation of Greece in the Balkans was already complete 
as a result of the raid of Greek gendarmes into Bulgarian 
territory in October 1925. Such was the parlous state 
of Greece's foreign relations when M. Venizelos re- 
turned to power in the summer of 1928. 

M. Venizelos lost little time in embarking on a con- 
ciliatory foreign policy upon his return to Athens. His 
first political pilgrimage was to Rome where he signed 
a treaty of friendship with the Italian Dictator. A simi- 
lar convention was signed between Jugoslavia and 
Greece shortly afterwards, upon which occasion the con- 
troversy over the Jugoslav Free Port at Salonika was 
cleared up in a fashion moderately satisfactory to both 
parties. ML Venizelos has opened negotiations for simi- 
lar treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. Two 
points of long dispute still block the path to reconcilia- 
tion between Sofia and Athens. The first obstacle arose 
when Greece refused to implement, or carry out, the 
Molloff-Kaphandaris property agreement, already duly 
ratified, when the reparation authorities decided to grant 
Bulgaria a second reduction in her reparation payments 
on acount of the earthquake disaster. 


Far more complex Is the Bulgarian demand for an 
outlet to the Aegean Sea, owing to her having lost West- 
ern Thrace to Greece under the Treaty o Neuilly. 
This matter gets back to a haunting fear on the part of 
Greece that a rapprochement between Bulgaria and 
Jugoslavia might involve a parallel push down the 
Struma and Vardar valleys converging on Salonika. 
Shades of 1912, when Greek troops rushed into the 
prized port almost under the cover of Bulgarian guns 
which were blocking the path of Turkish reinforce- 
ments through Western Thrace. 

This summary of Balkan relations is not complete 
without some word suggesting the strong undercurrent 
of mutual rancor and hatred which gnaws at the vitals 
of the body politic of every country in the storm centre of 
Europe. It seems to be the inescapable circumstance of 
these relations that no two countries can make the 
faintest gesture of friendship or collaboration without 
arousing the suspicions of all other parties. Such steps 
are invariably interpreted as being an ominous threat 
directed against other neighbors no matter how remotely 
their interests or feelings would seem to be touched. No 
permanent pacification of the Balkans is likely to take 
place until a new generation of leadership is reared which 
has not passed through the nightmare of a decade of 
war atrocities and mass deportations. 

Under present circumstances, it is a sheer figment of 


imagination to talk about a Balkan Locarno. Today it 
is all too easy to make a sweeping denunciation of the 
official policy of the states involved. Yet we must realize 
that the starting-point for Balkan peace is a whole- 
hearted reconciliation between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
and the keystone to this problem lies in Macedonia. 
Another essential point in Balkan equilibrium is the 
full independence of Albania, but this prospect is farther 
from realization today than at any time since the war. 
The most that can be hoped for here is that Italy will 
not continue her provocative policy in Albania. 6 Bel- 
grade is not far from the mark when characterizing this 
policy is smacking dangerously of pre-war Austrian 

Such is the nature of the Big Neighbor problem which 
Jugoslavia faces today. Unhealthy relations with Italy 
since the war have blocked her from developing a normal 
commercial outlet through Fiume. 7 The tension on 
the Adriatic coast may ease up in time through the con- 
struction of new railways and ports in Dalmatia. Jugo- 
slavia and Greece are likewise finding it difficult to come 
to a satisfactory understanding over Salonika rights. If 
something should occur to close up this door to the 

6 Italy hits back at the Little Entente on this score, charging that 
France and Czechoslovakia between them are actively encouraging 
the arming of Jugoslavia, though it is overshooting the mark to sug- 
gest thereby that Franco- Jugoslov relations stand on the same foot- 
ing as do Italian interests in Albania. 

7 Today the tiny Jugoslav port of Susak, once a mere suburb of 
Fiurae, is booming, while Fiume finds itself in an ever deepening rut 
of depression. 


Aegean, Jugoslavia would be forced to bargain with 
Bulgaria over transit right to the Black Sea. Yet this 
is only the economic side of the question: Jugoslavia is 
patently blocked from importing munitions in the event 
of war with a maritime power. 

Balkan relations being what they are in the year 1930, 
there is often need of the weapon of effective mediation 
to stave off the threat of war. It goes without saying 
that the Big Powers, particularly France and Great 
Britain, use their office constantly in this direction. 
Czechoslovakia is also in position to play such a role, 
thanks to her having held aloof from the Balkan com- 
mitments involved in the Rumano-Jugoslav treaty of 
alliance. Yet recurring Serbo-Bulgarian frontier clashes 
indicate a diseased condition auguring ill indeed for the 
extension of Little Entente influence in the Balkans. 
Here, then, is another capital reason for the peaceful 
policy of the Little Entente. 



THE LITTLE ENTENTE group faces a Big Neighbor prob- 
lem of different character in the relations between 
Czechoslovakia and Germany. Even during the dark 
days of the Ruhr occupation, there was never an ex- 
cessive strain between Prague and Berlin, and since 1924 
there has been a steady growth of better feeling all along 
the line. Two underlying causes have contributed to 
this improvement Czechoslovakia took only a tiny 
corner of territory from Germany after the war, and 
Bohemian Germans have come to a working understand- 
ing with the Czechs in nearly all spheres of activity. In 
1925, Czechoslovakia and Germany signed a treaty 1 
of compulsory arbitration at Locarno which laid the 
foundation of good sound relations for both Govern- 
ments to build on. The friendly attitude of both coun- 
tries was well exhibited when Dr. Benes paid his first 
visit to Berlin shortly after the German elections of 1928. 

When we come, however, to examine further the 
question of Czecho-German understanding, there at 

1 The official English translation of this treaty is published in the 
League of Nations Treaty Series, volume LIV. 



once appear two major obstacles standing in the way. 
The first is largely an economic problem which looms 
up in the guise of the commercial penetration policy of 
Germany. The second obstacle to full-fledged collabora- 
tion is the problem of the Anschluss (Austro-German 
union). To this very day, Czechoslovakia remains 
adamant in her efforts to prevent the Anschluss from 
taking place, and in this matter she has the full backing 
of both France and Italy. The Anschluss is the key to 
Czechoslovakia's Big Neighbor problem, and we pro- 
pose to look at it from different angles the Austrian, 
the German, and the Little Entente. This survey will 
lead us to a consideration of the factors in the general 
situation which are important to the stability of the 
Little Entente. 

There is no need here to recite the story of Austria's 
plight at the end of the war. Strangled by a double 
blockade and flanked on three sides by hostile states, 
the feeble government of the new Republic made a des- 
perate effort to salvage the wreckage by merging Austria 
with the German Reich. This escape movement met 
with a stern veto from the Peace Conference, and finally 
Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain stipulated: "The 
independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than 
with the consent of the Council of the League of Na- 
tions." Germany formally recognized Austrian inde- 
pendence in a diplomatic act of November 22, 1919. 
The juridical significance of this treaty provision is 
simply that a single vote on the League Council can 


block any move at Geneva towards bringing about the 

Circumstances in Central Europe in 1919 forced 
Austria to come to terms with her neighbors, and her 
main efforts in this field were directed towards getting 
relief, first in foodstuffs and then in raw materials for 
her paralyzed industry. Progress in this direction was 
painfully slow, but the situation cleared up somewhat 
as a result of the economic conference held at Porto 
Rose in the summer of 1921 where the heirs of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy met for the first time 
to discuss matters of mutual interest, particularly com- 
munications. More helpful in these emergency years, 
however, was the international aid which Austria got, 
especially from the American Relief Administration. 
During this period, the attitude of the Allies towards 
Austria went through three successive phases. The plan 
to get reparations out of Austria collapsed before the 
crying need of relief action, which in turn gave way to 
the program of financial reconstruction. 

Up to 1925, the trend of events abroad pushed Austria 
more and more under the shelter of the Little Entente 
camp. Striking evidence of this orientation of Viennese 
foreign policy was the conclusion of the political con- 
vention between Czechoslovakia and Austria in 1921 
whereby the latter undertook to help the Little Entente 
maintain peace on all fronts. Nor was this policy de- 
void of all tangible results in the strengthening of Aus- 
tria's position both at home and abroad. Without the 


moral backing of the Little Entente, to mention only 
one case, it seems unlikely that Austria could have held 
her new position in the Burgenland against the Magyar 
irregulars who blocked the Austrian authorities from 
taking over the provincial capital of Sopron. What 
might be called the pro-Ally foreign policy of Vienna, 
embarked upon by Chancellor Schober, was carried to 
its logical conclusion by Mgr. Seipel in 1922, 

It was in the autumn of that year that the able chan- 
cellor-priest of Austria brought to a successful issue the 
negotiations for financial reconstruction under the 
League guarantee and supervision. Along with Great 
Britain, France and Italy, Czechoslovakia took an equal 
share in the guaranteeing and floating of an interna- 
tional loan. In connection with the Reconstruction 
scheme, a protocol was signed on October 4th, 1922, at 
Geneva, which opened with the solemn declaration that 
both Austria and the Allies "respect the political inde- 
pendence, the territorial integrity, and the sovereignty of 
Austria." Such were in brief the circumstances attend- 
ing the birth of the experiment to prove the viability 
of present-day Austria. 

During the next three years, Czechoslovakia and 
Austria made repeated efforts to work out a formula 
for creating a preferential customs system in the Danu- 
bian basin. The turning point in these negotiations came 
in 1925, the year that the provision expired under Ar- 
ticle 222 of the St. Germain Treaty, envisaging such 
preferential treatment between Czechoslovakia, Austria 


and Hungary. Some months before the lapsing of this 
treaty privilege, a conference of Czech and Austrian ex- 
perts took place with a view to drawing up a concrete 
agreement to present to the Big Powers for sanction. 
These negotiations broke down, owing to the insistence 
of Rome that Italy should enjoy full and equal rights 
in any such customs regime in the Danubian basin. 
The attitude of the Fascist Government of course de- 
stroyed the very intent of the effort to recreate the Aus- 
trian Empire, so to say, on an economic footing. Since 
that time, the Danubian States have fallen back on the 
piecemeal policy of improving commercial relations 
through the conclusion of tariff conventions along most- 
favored-nation lines. 

Since 1925, Austria has taken an increasingly inde- 
pendent stand in her foreign policy vis-a-vis the Little 
Entente group. Two events brought this point to light. 
The first was the conclusion of a treaty of friendship 
and arbitration 2 with Czechoslovakia on March 5, 1926 
to supplant the 1921 accord which turned out to be too 
binding an instrument for those circles in Vienna which 
have again taken hope of reviving the Anschluss move- 
ment. Yet there is no doubt that the 1926 treaty is more 
satisfactory to all parties concerned, being the first ap- 
plication of the Locarno method to the problem of 
Danubian relations. Secondly, Austria in the spring 
of 1927 denounced the expiring tariff convention with 
Czechoslovakia, and it was only after some months of 
close bargaining that a new commercial treaty was 

2 Fnr tPYt JPP Tr*atv SPIMAO irnliimo T T 


signed between the two countries. This action on Aus- 
tria's part was indicative, however, of her growing dis- 
illusionment over the economic trend of affairs, and 
this feeling of hopelessness in turn gave rise to a growing 
desire for closer relations with Germany. 

There are two main causes contributing to the recent 
revival of the Anschluss movement in Austria eco- 
nomic maladjustment and lack of will to survive. As 
to the first, the plain fact is that the League reconstruc- 
tion scheme, though putting Austrian finances in ex- 
cellent shape, stopped short of helping in a thorough- 
going reorganization of production. Austria continues 
to have a huge import surplus in her foreign trade, 
amounting to an annual average of $150,000,000, and 
every winter there is an acute unemployment crisis, a 
quarter of her workers being permanently idle. Al- 
though since the spring of 1927 Austria participated in 
the general upward movement of business which took 
place all over Europe, Vienna grew more and more con- 
vinced that continued prosperity was entirely dependent 
on the economic situation in Germany. 

Moreover, the feeling of economic dependence on 
Germany seems to run parallel to an amazing lack of 
will-power to struggle along as an independent state* 
The truth of the matter, of course, is that Austria shows 
no signs of developing a strong sense of national pa- 
triotism, as distinguished from the sterling local pride 
of the Tyrolese or the Viennese. 


It appears that the stand of Austrian political parties 
in the Anschluss question can be largely discounted as 
being subject to change without notice. In any case, 
it is clear that the ultimate decision of a given party will 
be determined by a variety of considerations. For ex- 
ample, the Austrian Clericals would prefer political 
suicide rather than vote for joining a Germany dom- 
inated by Marxist Socialists, for such a move would 
only end in strengthening their arch-enemies in Vienna. 

The case of the Clericals, the party of Mgr. Seipel, 
who resigned the Chancellorship at Vienna in 1929, 
is interesting in other respects. This party stands out 
stoutly against the Anschluss, and yet its centre of 
strength is in the rural districts where, in the Tyrol, for 
example, the peasant has always looked with sympathy 
to joining hands with his brother in Bavaria. This 
same peasant would never willingly submit to the 
harshness of Prussian rule, the apprehension of Prus- 
sian domination being general all over Austria. Again, 
there is the Austrian Socialist party on the other side 
of the political fence, which has at times paid flattering 
tribute to the Anschluss ideal, and yet Austrian labor 
looks with strong disfavor at working under either the 
less liberal social laws of Germany or the less easy- 
going ways of a superintendent from the Reich. It is 
interesting to note in passing that the Socialist party to- 
day is increasingly lukewarm in its advocacy of the 

From the economic standpoint, the problem of Aus- 


tria essentially is the problem of Vienna, the centre of 
power and influence. It was the Socialists who carried 
out the revolution against the House of Hapsburg, and 
since that time they have politically had the upper hand 
in the municipal government of the capital. What might 
be loosely called Viennese feeling is resolutely opposed to 
the Anschluss which, if effected, would entail the re- 
ducing of the great city to the status of a provincial capi- 
tal like Dresden or Munich. Again, Viennese banks 
have their own international connections, and it is an 
open question to them whether they would gain by 
Vienna's becoming the advance guard of German com- 
mercial penetration into the Balkans and the Near East. 
On the other hand, the sentiment of both manufacturers 
and bankers in recent years has rather come around to 
favoring the Anschluss idea. This is an entirely natural 
drift since German capital and management is rapidly 
invading the field of Austrian industry. 

The Anschluss problem presents a different set of 
elements to Germany, though the sentimental and eco- 
nomic arguments heard on both sides of the frontier 
bear the same general tenor. There is no doubt that 
the appeal for racial unity is strong, but that after all 
is but one among many other factors. There is the 
prospect of an enlarged Germany with closer proximity 
to the Eastern market. This obvious advantage must be 
counterbalanced by the possibility that Austria in her- 
self would turn out to be an economic liability. On the 
political side is the problem of adding several million 


more Catholics to the population of the Reich, and this 
issue would bring up afresh the whole question of 
Prussianism versus Federalism in Germany. 

Moreover, the majority of parties and economic groups 
in Germany today, whatever lip service they may pay 
to the Anschluss plan, are thoroughly back of the late 
Dr. Stresemann's policy in holding that it is not a mat- 
ter of RealpolitiJ^ under present circumstances. To be- 
gin with, Germany realizes that her diplomatic position 
is not strong enough in Europe to permit her to broach 
the subject of Anschluss without entailing enormous 
sacrifices in the bargain. There are indeed a whole 
series of international questions which Germany must 
see disposed of to her satisfaction before the Anschluss 
can even receive official mention. These problems are 
four in number control of the Saar Basin, Young Plan 
revision, disarmament, and the Polish Corridor. Bar- 
ring an international catastrophe, Germany will proba- 
bly let well enough alone in her relationship to Austria. 
Lastly, Berlin for some time to come has a tacit under- 
standing with Vienna that all preliminary moves in the 
direction of Anschluss must originate from the Austrian 
side of the frontier. 

It would be a gross mistake, to think that nothing 
practical is being accomplished to smooth the way for 
the ultimate realization of the Anschluss. To begin 
with, there is a systematic campaign to educate public 
opinion in both countries and abroad. Again, the Aus- 
trian Government is taking steps to unify and harmonize 
her administrative practice and legal system with Ger- 


many's, and identical Law Codes are being drafted in 
each country. In the work of coordinating such practice, 
Germany and Austria are far in advance of other coun- 
tries in Europe. Lastly, Professor Kelson of Vienna pub- 
lished in 1927 a technical juridical study/ which repre- 
sents the first serious attempt to formulate the correct 
modality for carrying the Anschluss into execution. 

It is not surprising to learn that the Little Entente 
is opposed to the union of Austria and Germany. Of 
the three countries, Czechoslovakia is clearly the state 
whose economic and political interests would be most vi- 
tally disturbed by such a change in the balance of power 
in Central Europe. In the first place, she looks with un- 
mixed anxiety on becoming a peninsular surrounded on 
three sides by the powerful German Reich. Her stra- 
tegic position would thereby be seriously undermined, 
leaving the country exposed to the danger of commer- 
cial conquest and economic penetration. Secondly, the 
internal stability of Czechoslovakia might be threatened 
should the Anschluss be effected by an overt act of vio- 
lence. In such an emergency, the Bohemian Germans 
might be stampeded into a secession movement. Here 
again it becomes clear that from the viewpoint of self- 
interest Czechoslovakia is following the correct line 
in her policy of fair treatment to the German minority 

3 "Die staatsrechtliche Durchf iihrung des Anschlusses Oesterreicha 
an das Deutsche Reich." 


at home and of friendly collaboration with both Austria 
and Germany abroad. 

Rumania of course has a more remote concern over 
the Anschluss problem than has Czechoslovakia. To 
be sure, if the act of Austro-German union should be 
carried out with a parallel military coup against the 
Polish Corridor, then Bucharest would be bound to 
stand by Warsaw in the crisis, according to the provi- 
sions of the 1926 treaty. Again, Rumania's standpoint 
would be influenced by any concession Germany might 
make in Hungary's favor in the matter. On the other 
hand, certain economic circles in Bucharest now incline 
to the view that the country would profit agriculturally, 
even though it might lose ground industrially, through 
the more active commercial penetration of Germany 
into the Balkans which would result from the Anschluss. 

Jugoslavia has a more tangible interest in the fate of 
the Anschluss movement than Rumania through the 
possibility of Germany's becoming a neighboring Power. 
Jugoslavia fears the economic penetration of Germany, 
though for other reasons than does Czechoslovakia. 
During the last two years, however, a new current of 
opinion has gained headway in Jugoslavia which is 
favorable to the idea of having a strong neighbor to 
counterbalance the disturbing pressure exerted by Italy. 
According to this theory, France, owing to other pre- 
occupations, has not rendered her little ally the full 
quota of support in the latter's quarrels with Italy, and 
consequently Jugoslavia should look elsewhere for ways 


and means of strengthening her international position. 

Germany on her side is wide-awake to the opportunity 
of playing Jugoslavia and Italy off against each other by 
holding out tempting economic offers to both countries 
in return for support in her Balkan policy. Thus, the 
ultimate decision of Belgrade concerning the Anschluss 
is likely to turn on the terms Berlin offers the Little 
Entente in compensation. 

The Hungarian attitude towards the Anschluss is 
one of neutral opposition at present. Her industries 
would probably suffer and her agriculture benefit by 
Germany's becoming a neighbor. It is doubtful whether 
Berlin could secure the consent of Budapest to the 
scheme merely by promising to return Burgenland to 
its ancient owner. Such a bargain, moreover, would 
be a flat betrayal of the argument for racial unification, 
owing to .the German population of the province. As 
for Hungary, she would at heart expect Germany's sup- 
port to more sweeping territorial changes. Lastly, Hun- 
garian friendship for Italy would be thrown overboard 
in the event that Budapest should agree to the Anschluss, 
for Italy has no two minds about the possibility of see- 
ing Germany standing athwart the Brenner Pass. 
' Both France and Italy oppose the Anschluss on the 
grounds that they cannot tolerate the population of 
Germany being increased by nearly seven millions. 
Moreover, the influence and position of both countries 
in the Balkans would suffer a severe setback through 
any aggrandizement of the Reich. Even Great Britain 


is against the Anschluss, all sentimental reasons not- 
withstanding, in the sense of fearing the enhanced mo- 
mentum of German competition in world markets, 
especially in the Near East. London is also keenly 
aware that the trail of treaty revision, once opened up, 
would end with a German drive to recover her lost 
colonies. To sum up, both the Allies and the Little 
Entente are essentially of one mind today in preventing 
the Anschluss from taking place. 

In the years immediately following the war, it de- 
volved upon the Allies to help Austria out of her diffi- 
culties. This was done first through relief action and 
later by the regime of financial reconstruction which 
came to an end on July i, 1926. The Allies maintain that 
Austria today is a viable state, capable of independent 
existence. Such was the decision reached by the League 
commission, headed by Mr. Layton and M. Rist, sent 
out to investigate the economic situation of Austria in 
1925. On the political side, Belgium is cited as the 
case of a small country living prosperously for a century 
alongside a big country with much the same culture. 

Moreover, according to an argument heard in 
Prague, there are over ten million Germans living to- 
day outside Germany and Austria in Switzerland, 
Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Rumania 
and Poland where they exert an influence beyond their 
numbers which contributes to the economic and cultural 
wealth of the German race. This argument winds up 
by pointing out that the Anschluss after all would entail 


the disappearance of a German state which as a buffer 
against Italy and the Balkans may be more valuable 
and useful to Germany than if it were swallowed up by 
the Reich. 

This brief review of the Anschluss situation gives some 
idea of the obstacles Germany must overcome before 
the plan can be transformed into reality. It also indi- 
cates the nature of the complications involved in any 
scheme aiming at the alteration of the territorial arrange- 
ments set up under the peace treaties. At some future 
date, it may be possible for Germany to carry through 
the union without a crisis threatening the peace of Eu- 
rope, but today it is clear that such a step would do 
Germany more, harm than good. Indeed, it could not 
fail to bring about just that situation from which Ger- 
many has been trying to escape since the war her diplo- 
matic isolation and encirclement. 

Such is the nature of the Big Neighbor problem which 
faces Czechoslovakia and its international implications. 
At present, relations between Prague and Berlin are on 
a firm and friendly footing. If both countries continue 
to exhibit a reasonable amount of insight and ability in 
conducting their mutual relations, there is no reason why 
their conflicting interests should not be accommodated 
in a manner satisfactory to both parties. This means 
that outstanding questions of dispute would be regulated 
before they were allowed to enter an acute stage. 



THERE is no dodging the fact that each Little Entente 
state today faces a Big Neighbor problem, of serious 
proportions. But as we have noted above, the crisis 
in Russo-Rumanian relations is not so dangerous as 
the absence of diplomatic relations suggests, and owing 
to the fact of there being no clash of vital interests be- 
tween the two countries it is only a question of time 
and face-saving before they can proceed to the final 
liquidation of their mutual differences. The Big Neigh- 
bor problem of Czechoslovakia is of potential character 
rather than an actual reality. The tension of feeling be- 
tween Jugoslavia and Italy is the most urgent prob- 
lem commanding the diplomatic energies of Little En- 
tente statesmen today, and although the acute phase of 
this crisis has probably passed by, nothing like a perma- 
nent solution is yet in sight. 

The future developments of the three Big Neighbor 
problems are of vital concern to the welfare of the 
Little Entente system. Yet in holding its own in the 
diplomatic arena, the Little Entente, as we have seen 
in so many instances, is sure of a certain amount of 
backing from the side of the Allies, particularly France. 



The early post-war years in Europe revealed the utter 
dependence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugo- 
slavia and Greece on the moral and military backing of 
the Big Allies. Leaving the case of Greece aside, France 
eagerly undertook to lend effective aid to the smaller 
allies, especially to Poland, in setting their new houses in 
order and in coming to terms with the adjoining coun- 
tries from whom they had taken territory. The Ruhr oc- 
cupation in 1923 saw a definite breach in the united front 
of the Allies in dealing with Germany. Both England 
and Italy, for reasons of their own, viewed this military 
adventure with an eye of stern disapproval. Whatever 
the exigencies of the moment, it revealed the inherent 
danger and folly of the policy of pacification by force. 

In the meantime, the Little Entente had been set up 
for the purpose of strengthening the international posi- 
tion of its member states. The success of their efforts 
in this direction inevitably led to their breaking the 
diplomatic hegemony of the Quai d'Orsay in Prague, 
Belgrade and Bucharest. At the height of the Ruhr 
crisis, Dr. Benes went to Paris where he signed a treaty * 
of alliance with the Poincare Government on January 
25, 1924. France had originally urged Czechoslovakia 
to sign a convention of both a military and a political 
character, similar to the Franco-Polish treaties of 1921, 
but Czechoslovakia stood out resolutely for a more bi- 
lateral agreement without military commitments. In 

1 The official English translation of this treaty is published in the 
League of Nations Treaty Series, volume XXIII. 


the end, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister was able 
to persuade the French Government of the wisdom of 
the Prague standpoint. 

The rather unilateral character of the Franco-Polish 
convention takes form in Article 3, which stipulates 
that "the two Governments shall ta\e concerted measures 
for the defence of their territory and the protection of 
their legitimate interests." On the other hand, Article 
2 of the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty leaves the door open 
to a mutual exchange of views in the event of emer- 
gency, by providing that "the High Contracting Parties 
shall agree together as to the measures to be adopted to 
safeguard their common interests." 

The Franco-Czechoslovak treaty of 1924 marked the 
opening of a new era in the international status of the 
Little Entente. The next step in consolidating its diplo- 
matic position was taken at Locarno the following year 
when both Czechoslovakia and Poland, who had al- 
ready signed a treaty of mutual friendship, concluded 
treaties of arbitration with Germany. This was the 
method employed by Dr. Benes to link up the work of 
international consolidation in Western Europe with 
the program of the Little Entente. 

A few months later, on March 5, 1926, Czechoslovakia 
signed her convention of arbitration and conciliation 
with Austria to replace the 1921 treaty. The same year 
saw the conclusion of a treaty 2 of friendship between 

2 The official English translation of this treaty is published in 
the League of Nations Treaty Series, volume LVIII. 


France and Rumania, and in 1927 France and Jugo- 
slavia signed a similar agreement. Both these treaties 
were drawn up along the lines o the Franco-Czecho- 
slovak convention of 1924. 

The general lines o Italian policy in the Danubian 
basin are revealed in her treaty relations. Italy signed 
a treaty 3 of friendship and collaboration with Czecho- 
slovakia on July 5, 1924, modelled along the general 
lines of the Franco-Czechoslovak convention. Six 
months before, Italy and Jugoslavia concluded a similar 
treaty which unhappily was also allowed to lapse in 
1929. The following year, Italy signed a similar accord 
with Rumania when General Averescu was in power 
at Bucharest. Scarcely six months later, Signor Musso- 
lini went off on a radically different tack by signing a 
treaty of friendship with Hungary after the Bethlen 
Government had toned down its overtures in the direc- 
tion of Jugoslavia. On the whole, it is clear that Italy's 
attitude towards the Little Entente today is largely gov- 
erned by the gloomy outlook of her relations with Jugo- 
slavia and France. 

The ups and downs of Franco-German relations since 
the Reich entered the League in 1926 have had a dis- 
tinct bearing on the international position of the Little 
Entente. It is natural for France to become increasingly 
preoccupied with the necessity of coming to terms with 
Germany, and the growing intimacy of their relation- 
ship tends to throw the Little Entente more on its own 

8 Expired in August, 1929, and not renewed. 


resources in regulating problems of common interest. 
All governments of Europe are sincere in their profes- 
sion of good-will, but the countries they represent nurse 
conflicting interests and ambitions tending to disturb 
the delicately balanced equilibrium of peace. These 
clashing forces mean a continual need of give-and-take 
on all sides. We have pointed out how vital it is for the 
Little Entente to preserve peace on all fronts, domestic 
and foreign. Yet the welfare of this system of alliance 
and collaboration demands that peace be kept on its own 
terms, and not on those which would undermine its 
efficacy of acting as a diplomatic unit. 

Finally, how does the Little Entente line up from 
the military angle? It is patent that no Little Entente 
power is deliberately seeking war each country has all 
the possible territory it can want, and no vital interests 
are threatened by another state at present. On the other 
hand, no outside power, not even Hungary, proposes 
to attack a Little Entente country under present circum- 
stances. There remains, then, the eventuality that Eu- 
rope, somehow, somewhere will again blunder into 
an armed conflict. In such an event, the Little Entente 
would be sure of a clean-cut victory only provided that 
the war remained localized. 

Each Little Entente state maintains a conscripted army. 
Czechoslovakia keeps 130,000 soldiers under arms, Jugo- 
slavia 110,000, and Rumania 185,000, making a total 


standing force of 425,000 at the immediate disposal of 
the alliance. Probably Czechoslovakia possesses the 
best trained and best equipped army of the smaller 
states, though for fighting qualities the Jugoslavs have 
been famous throughout their war-like history. The Ru- 
manian peasant is like other peasants: they make good 
soldiers when defending their homeland, and the officer 
material of the Rumanian army has been somewhat im- 
proved since its poor showing during the World War. 

Since the favorable frontier settlements, the armies of 
the Little Entente have not exhibited any bellicose ten- 
dency, and Czechoslovakia in particular is making 
strides forward in the democratic education of recruits. 
On the other hand, the Little Entente during the last 
five years has not made any material reduction in its 
armed forces, and compulsory military service, rein- 
forced by a highly trained professional nucleus of offi- 
cers, seems to be a permanent feature of the mechanism 
of each state. 

The Trianon Treaty imposed upon Hungary the abo- 
lition of military conscription and limited her army to 
35,000 men and officers. Likewise, under the Treaty of 
Neuilly, Bulgaria is not allowed to keep more than 30,000 
soldiers under arms. A glance at the map shows that 
the numerical superiority of Little Entente armies over 
the combined forces of Hungary and Bulgaria, for ex- 
ample, is greatly impaired by the unstrategic geographi- 
cal location, the three countries forming a semicircle 
around the periphery of Hungary. 


Should war break out between the Little Entente and 
Hungary happily an inconceivable occurrence today 
a Little Entente victory would largely depend on the 
capacity of its statesmen to localize the conflict. In such 
a case, Czechoslovakia could easily bear the brunt of the 
attack, as indeed she would be forced to do, (Budapest 
being only some fifty miles from the Czechoslovak fron- 
tier at one point), for both Rumania and Jugoslavia 
would be loath to leave their backdoor frontiers exposed 
to a surprise attack. The danger would always remain 
that the hysteria of the moment would sweep Russia, 
Italy or Bulgaria into the struggle against the Little 
Entente, and then all Europe would burst out into 
flame. Again, there might be a chance hope of localiz- 
ing a military clash between Bulgaria and Jugoslavia; 
in fact, the League actually did stop a frontier fight in 
1925 when Greek gendarmes invaded Bulgarian terri- 

Far more disastrous would be an outbreak between 
Italy and Jugoslavia this would mean a European war 
with scarcely a doubt. Lastly, there is the distant pos- 
sibility of an outbreak between Soviet Russia and Ru- 
mania which would bring Polish forces into the field. 
Outside of whatever effort Lithuania might make to 
recover Vilna, such a conflict could be localized only 
in the event that Soviet Russia were not too successful, 
and this does not seem likely at present. 

In short, from no matter what angle the military posi- 


tion of the Little Entente is viewed, its main strength 
is seen to lie along the path of peace. 

Now in its disarmament policy, the Little Entente 
countries see eye to eye with France, their protectress. 
This identity of outlook is ever manifest at Geneva 
where, for a full decade, France and England have 
clashed over important points of procedure, if not of 
principle. Great Britain boldly argues that the pro- 
gressive reduction of armed forces is the only true safe- 
guard to world peace, and in this campaign she now 
enjoys the full backing of Germany. 

France in turn stands pat on the argument that mili- 
tary security must precede disarmament, whether on 
land or at sea. Yet this consideration does not pre- 
clude M. Briand from acting as the eloquent spokes- 
man and indomitable worker for the cause of moral 
disarmament in Europe. Likewise, the positive minds 
behind the Little Entente are busy strengthening the 
machinery of continental consolidation, the aim in both 
instances being the same namely, to knock the props 
from under the militaristic arguments which still carry 
such decisive weight in the counsel chambers of Europe. 

In conclusion, we get back to the Hungarian thesis 
that the Little Entente is doomed to collapse, owing to 
the growing divergence of the international interests 
of its member states. Our examination of the three 


sets of Big Neighbor problems facing these countries 
today brings out no such conflict of interests and no 
real weakening of the system from extraneous causes. Its 
essential aim remains unaltered to this day, but the focus 
of its attention is continually changing to meet the shift- 
ing demands of modern Europe in the making. In 
this sense, the Little Entente has already revealed its 
inherent vitality and usefulness. 



OUR discussion in the last few chapters leads to the 
conclusion that there is no reason to expect the Little 
Entente system to fall apart either through the internal 
instability of the three states or through any disruptive 
forces growing out of the divergence of their interna- 
tional interests. The question now arises whether the 
Little Entente is inherently strong enough to continue 
evolving into something more than a negative political 
force concerned primarily with preserving the status 
quo. Already it is growing clear that regional combi- 
nations working along constructive lines, either political 
or economic, are destined to play important roles in the 
moulding of a European federation at Geneva. 

Over and above the every-day efforts of Little Entente 
statesmen to promote the common interests of then- 
countries, there is a well-defined sense of direction as 
to ultimate aims. Broadly speaking, this program em- 
braces two aspects, one directed towards the economic 
consolidation of Central Europe and the other aiming to 
bring about a sound regime of international collabora- 
tion. Let us look first at the efforts made by the Little 
Entente states toward finding a basis for intimate eco- 



nomic collaboration and the difficulties standing in the 

way. 1 

The major economic problem faced by Czechoslo- 
vakia, after putting her fiscal system in order, was to 
find an outlet for her industrial products which before 
the war were largely absorbed within the sheltered 
customs union of Austria-Hungary, The collapse of the 
Hapsburg Empire threw these former domestic markets 
into the category of competitive world markets. 2 This 
situation gradually brought about a new direction in 
the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia towards the indus- 
trial West, notably to Austria and Germany, but also 
to England and the United States. It is thanks to these 
rich markets that Czechoslovakia enjoys a consistently 
favorable balance in her foreign trade a fact of vital 
significance for a country sixty percent of whose in- 
dustrial output must be sold abroad. On the other 
hand, this trend is proof that the agricultural countries 
of the Danubian basin, notably Rumania, Jugoslavia 
and Bulgaria, present only a limited capacity as an ex- 
port field for the manufactured goods of Czechoslovakia. 

Looking at the problem the other way round, these 
agricultural states are principally concerned with find- 
ing a market for their grain and farm products. Here 

subject is comprehensively discussed in Pasvolsky's "Eco- 
nomic Nationalism of the Danubian States." 

2 The value of German exports, for instance, exceeded that of 
Czechoslovak exports into Austria for the first time in 1928. 


their best markets obviously lie in large industrial states, 
such as Italy and Germany. On the other hand, Austria 
and Czechoslovakia (the latter being nearly self-sup- 
porting in basic foodstuffs) possess a much more limited 
capacity to accommodate the export requirements of 
Jugoslavia and Rumania. Moreover, population pres- 
sure in the latter countries is stimulating industrial de- 
velopment, which in turn act as a severe deterrent to 
Czechoslovak and Austrian trade with them. 

This conflict of economic needs is attested to by the 
fact that Czechoslovakia had no tariff treaties with either 
Rumania or Jugoslavia until this year (1930). When- 
ever negotiations were opened up for such a convention, 
they went shipwreck on the rock of economic national- 
ism. The powerful Agrarian party in Czechoslovakia 
blocked the government from sanctioning facilities 
being granted for the entrance of agricultural products/ 
while Rumania and Jugoslavia could not afford to leave 
their infant industries without ample protection. Ironi- 
cally enough, German reparation payments in kind help 
to block the development of Czechoslovak exports into 
those two countries. 

Another obstacle to the creation of intimate economic 
relations among the Little Entente states arises out of 
their geographical situation. A glance at the map shows 
that Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Jugoslavia form a 

3 Early in 1930, for example, this party introduced a bill into the 
Prague Parliament providing for an increase, amounting on many 
important items to as much as 100 percent, in the agricultural tariff 


kind of semicircle around Austria and Hungary. For 
this reason, the inclusion of these two countries is in- 
dispensable to the success of any thorough-going scheme 
of economic consolidation. 

As noted in Chapter IX, Austria today is distinctly 
cool to the repeated overtures of the Little Entente in 
this direction. For example, at the end of the Little 
Entente conference held at Bucharest in 1928, the Jugo- 
slav Foreign Minister gave a prominent interview in 
which he spoke of the desirability of an economic rap- 
prochement with Austria. Mgr. Seipel promptly an- 
swered this overture by stating publicly that Austria 
could not be a party to such a combination with the 
Little Entente unless Germany were given equal rights 
under the scheme. In 1925, it was Italy who stood 
athwart the path of closer economic relations in Central 
Europe, and today it is Germany. 

Hungary at present is also disinclined to collaborate 
with the Little Entente in its economic program. Ly- 
ing as she does in the heart of the Danubian basin, more 
than two-thirds of her foreign trade is with her im- 
mediate neighbors. With both Czechoslovakia and 
Austria, she has a tariff convention. Budapest is not 
entirely content with these arrangements from the stand- 
point of either promoting agricultural exports or pro- 
tecting her industries. 4 On the other hand, Hungary 
exports an increasing quantity of manufactured goods 

* The Czechoslovak-Hungarian trade treaty was denounced and 
abrogated in December, 1930. 


into the Balkans without having any need for taking 
farm products in exchange. Thus, Hungary finds it 
difficult to enter into closer economic relations with her 
neighbors on both sides, and imperative political reasons 
preclude her from taking what might well be a leading 
r61e in the economic reorganization of Central Europe. 

Such were the gloomy prospects for realizing an eco- 
nomic Little Entente when the wave of depression swept 
over Central Europe in the autumn of 1929. Falling 
prices of agricultural products more than offset the 
advantage expected from the excellent harvests. Sur- 
plus grain production overseas and Soviet "dumping" 
once again threw the agrarian countries of the Danubian 
basin face to face with the dilemma of vanished markets 
abroad. Possibly such a disaster was necessary to force 
their statesmen to seek out a basis for intensive coopera- 
tive effort. 

Two separate projects for creating a Farm Cartel took 
shape during the following spring one Little Entente 
and the other Polish. These schemes were pretty well 
in accord on fundamentals. They envisaged national 
specialization in certain branches of agriculture, stand- 
ardization of quality and development of foreign mar- 
kets. On the negative side, these states expressed their 
determination to take prompt action to protect them- 
selves against the rising tide of tariff walls in industrial 
Europe. The moot point in the lively discussions over 


the proposed agrarian pool was under whose auspices 
and control the scheme would be launched. 

The first conference looking in this direction opened 
at Bucharest on July 21, 1930, attended by representa- 
tives from Hungary, Rumania and Jugoslavia. They 
promptly came to an agreement on a limited degree of 
collaboration, such as the erection of grain elevators and 
harvest financing. Hungarian capital, backed by its 
network of pre-war connections in Transylvania, the 
Banat and Croatia, is particularly well equipped to 
organize such undertakings. The meeting, however, 
collapsed over the more important issue of creating a 
centralized export monopoly, presumably under the con- 
trol of Budapest. 

Before breaking up, the delegates drafted a joint an- 
swer to a League questionaire, recommending the sup- 
pression of the most-favored-nation clause in trade 
treaties as the best way of promoting cooperation .be- 
tween the industrial and agricultural states of Europe. 
The daily press of Prague did not conceal its nervousness 
over the Bucharest conference, and Hungarian liberals, 
who are exerting their utmost to promote more cordial 
relations with the Little Entente, took small comfort 
over the announcement that the three countries would 
attempt to work out a real Farm Cartel at a later date. 

A day or so later, representatives from Rumania and 
Jugoslavia alone proceeded to formal discussions at 
Sinaia for extending the economic scope of the Little 
Entente. On August ist, the delegates duly recom- 


mended to their governments the immediate execution 
of certain measures, including the creation o a joint 
Institute for the marketing of cereals, the conclusion 
of comiiiercial, veterinary and railway treaties, and the 
setting up of a Rumano-Jugoslav customs union. 
Moreover, two agrarian partners of the Little Entente 
announced their readiness to reach an agreement with 
Czechoslovakia for the mutual exchange of agricultural 
and manufactured products, more or less on a quota 
basis. Indeed, Czechoslovakia and Rumania had al- 
ready signed, on June 27th, a tariff treaty at the annual 
meeting of the Little Entente. 

Next came the Warsaw conference, held at the end 
of August and attended by delegates from Poland, Es- 
thonia, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Little Entente coun- 
tries. This gathering, aided by the momentum achieved 
at Bucharest and Sinaia, tackled the agrarian crisis with 
a far-flung agenda. The resulting deliberations revolved 
around two different approaches to the problem inter- 
national accords Between the industrial and agrarian 
states, and agreements based on collaboration between 
themselves. To expedite the work of the annual meet- 
ings, a permanent organization was set going, in- 
cluding a secretariat, information bureau and research 

The conference came out flatly as favoring preferen- 
tial treatment for the farm products of Europe and the 
abolition of export bounties and of indirect protection, 
arising out of the wide-spread practice of administrative 


and railway discriminations. The decisions reached 
at Warsaw 5 were duly transmitted to Geneva about the 
time the League Council and Assembly commenced their 
debates over the proposed organization of a European 
federation. Spokesmen from these countries uttered 
fervent pleas for a concerted campaign to resolve the 
agrarian depression. To the dismay of such grain-pro- 
ducing countries overseas as Canada, the ensuing dis- 
cussions at Geneva made manifest that no economic 
United States of Europe can get under way until the 
industrial states of the continent prove their readiness 
to grant material concessions to the farming countries of 
Eastern Europe. 

As demonstrated above, this is essentially the problem 
facing the Little Entente in the economic relationship 
of its component members. 

The difficulties faced in this field are in miniature the 
problem of the economic consolidation of Europe, the 
rationalization of European trade and production, and 
the necessity of a compromise between the interests of 
the agricultural countries and of the industrial states. 
Before these questions can be brought up for definite 
solution, there are many preliminary obstacles to over- 
come. Not to mention the handling of reparation bur- 
dens under the Young Plan, there is the fight against 

5 L 'Europe Nouvelle for September 13, 1930, published the texts 
of resolutions passed at the Bucharest and Warsaw conferences. 


trade barriers which the League of Nations is waging 
with only very modest success. After abnormal tariff 
barriers are effectively done away with, the nations of 
Europe must proceed to the stabilization of their tariff 
levels. Then and only then can there be a fruitful dis- 
cussion of whether Europe is in position to set up some 
kind of a preferential customs regime for the continent, 
an economic United States of Europe along the lines of 
M. Briand's historic address before the League Assembly 
in September 1929. 

A step in this direction was taken at the conference for 
concerted economic action held at Geneva early in 1930. 
The main battle over the tariff truce negotiations was 
waged between the British and French delegations, but 
economic trends in the Danubian area were also thrown 
into fresh relief towards the end of the meeting. The 
London Times of March 20th published the following 
dispatch on the final phase of the proceedings 

"The text brought in by the sub-committee as a clause of 
Article i of the Protocol laid down (i) that Austria declares 
that she is unable to maintain the provisions of her economic 
treaties with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, while Czechoslo- 
vakia makes a similar declaration in respect of her treaty with 
Hungary; (2) that Hungary accepts the reservations made by 
Austria and Czechoslovakia, while Czechoslovakia accepts the 
reservation made by Austria; (3) that the contracting parties 
may denounce the convention should the negotiations between 
Austria and Czechoslovakia and Hungary result in an increase 
of duties." 

A few days later, the majority of the delegates signed 
three acts pledging their respective governments, in the 


event of ratification, not to denounce any commercial 
conventions prior to April i, 1931. Austria stood alone 
among the Danubian states in accepting these acts with- 
out reservations. It appears that the conference in ques- 
tion accomplished little more than giving formal ex- 
pression to the new theory of the interdependence of 
European commercial policies, this being as far as Euro- 
pean countries were willing to go at present by way of 
stabilizing tariff levels. It is significant to note that no 
extra-European government associated itself in the Ge- 
neva undertaking to promote closer economic relations. 

In the meantime, the Little Entente will have ample 
opportunity to demonstrate its capacity to promote 
closer economic relations in the Danubian basin. Much 
can be accomplished in this direction by the conclusion 
of bipartite tariff conventions of long duration to which 
Rumania and Jugoslavia are parties. Incidentally, the 
Little Entente called a meeting of economic experts 
in September 1929 to survey the ground for such treaties. 
The extension of the network of commercial treaties into 
the Balkans would be a solid accomplishment, but it is 
still open to question whether the next step can be 
taken by setting up a regime of preferential customs 
treatment in the Danubian basin. The present indica- 
tions are that such an arrangement would not go far 
enough in promoting the interests of the parties con- 
cerned, in compensation for the concessions they would 
each be forced to make to realize such a regime. 

In short, the Little Entente would be well advised to 


coordinate its economic activities with the development 
of a continental customs policy. Barring the conclusion 
of an outright customs union, such as contemplated to- 
day between Rumania and Jugoslavia, any tariff system 
based on regional preference will probably run afoul 
the more urgent requirements of Europe as a whole. 

The foundations of more intimate cooperation in the 
Danubian basin were materially strengthened as a re- 
sult of the Hague conferences held during August 1929 
and January 1930. The question of German reparations 
of course had been the object of exhaustive study and 
negotiation ever since the days of the Peace Conference, 
but the Hague meeting provided the first comprehensive 
handling of the problem of Eastern reparations Aus- 
trian, Hungarian, Bulgarian. The issues at stake under 
the Young Plan were of such momentous weight that 
the Great Powers did not realize the importance of 
reaching a final settlement over non-German war obli- 
gations. Such a failure would have amounted to a 
calamity for the smaller states, debtor and creditor alike. 

Here, then, was another instance where Little Entente 
leaders demanded that their case should not be over- 
looked in the shuffle. Dr. Benes reported their stand in 
the following words to the Prague Parliament on 
January 30, 1930: 

"The Central European states indeed recognized that they 
would leave the conference very badly off if they did not tie up 


the solution of all Central European and Balkan politico-finan- 
cial problems with the liquidation of German reparations and 
with the carrying out of the Young Plan. Following the regula- 
tion of their relations with Germany, the Big Powers had lost 
their former interest in Hungarian and Bulgarian reparations, 
and there remained left over our obligations regarding state 
properties and the Liberation Debt. For this reason, the states 
of the Little Entente, supported by Greece and Poland, estab- 
lished at the very outset of the conference in August 1929, as a 
condition to their accepting the reduction of German repara- 
tions and the execution of the Young Plan, the solution of the 
entire complex of their financial rights and obligations grow- 
ing out of the three peace treaties with Austria, Hungary and 
Bulgaria. This also involved the definitive solution of the 
question of state properties and the Liberation Debts of all 
Succession States. For Rumania, it meant at the same time 
that the well-known Optants question would be settled along 
with the negotiations over Hungarian reparations, for whose 
liquidation Rumania had already sought compensation out of 
her reparation claims against Hungary." 

Suck arguments left no doubt as to the seriousness of 
the Little Entente challenge, and soon the representa- 
tives of the Great Powers were playing a decisive role 
in bringing about a compromise between Hungary and 
the Little Entente. M. Loucheur, French delegate, was 
chairman of the commission for Eastern Reparations. 
The first Hague conference, held during August 1929, 
came to a close without even the basis of accord having 
been formulated, and negotiations were resumed at 
Paris during the autumn with little visible success. At 
first, the Hungarian Government stood out against any 
linking up of the Optants question with reparations, as 
noted in Chapter II. 


Before the second conference opened its doors. Count 
Bethlen had come around to accept the wisdom of a 
"total liquidation," but the difficulty arose of finding an 
acceptable formula, let alone the closing of the gap be- 
tween what the Hungarians claimed and what the 
Little Entente was willing to pay in compensation. 
Germany and the Allies had already come to an agree- 
ment over the Young Plan when Italy threw a bomb- 
shell into the final proceedings by announcing that she 
could not sign the Young Plan owing to certain inter- 
locking payments. More precisely, the situation was 
as follows Czechoslovakia refused to settle her Libera- 
tion Debt with the Allies until Hungarian reparations 
were taken care of; and the Snowden compromise 
obligated Italy to pay England an annual sum which 
the former proposed to take out of her share of Czecho- 
slovak payments. 

This brief review gives some idea how it came about 
that the tangle of Eastern reparations loomed up as a 
dangerous stumbling-block during the last stage of 
the Hague conference. Pressure of a none too gentle 
sort was put on the interested parties, and a twenty-four 
hour session of their delegates ensued at the end of which 
a compromise was reached. On January 30, the former 
belligerent states of Europe signed fifteen acts, 6 the 
conclusion of which constituted what has been rightly 
called the "financial liquidation of the war." 

6 H. M. Stationery's Office, London, has published the Hague acts 
in full. 


Five of these accords touched Central Europe directly 
to wit, the three reparation acts of Austria, Hungary 
and Bulgaria, and two arrangements regulating the 
Czechoslovak Liberation Debt and fixing the creditors' 
quota under Eastern reparation payments. As fore- 
shadowed some time ago, Austria was formally liberated 
from all reparation obligations at The Hague. On the 
other hand, the Bulgarian settlement was thoroughly 
unsound from both the political and economic view- 
points. That little country of six million peasants, and 
with virtually no industries to speak of, was saddled 
with reparation payments until the year 1966. Both 
Hungary and Bulgaria pay an average annuity during 
the next 36 years amounting to approximately $2,250,000, 
Hungarian payments after 1943 going into the Special 
Funds referred to below. Lastly, the Liberation Debt 
will cost Czechoslovakia almost exactly the same yearly 
sum over the same period. 

In what sense do the Hague acts represent the "liqui- 
dation of the past" for Central Europe ? The Innsbruck 
Protocol of 1923 and the Prague Protocol of 1925 regu- 
lated interest payments on the pre-war foreign debts of 
Austria-Hungary and pro-rated the share among Aus- 
tria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania 
and Jugoslavia. The Caisse Commune, set up at Paris to 
handle these payments and other pertinent matters, has 
announced an early meeting for the purpose of fixing 
the new capital value of these debts and providing for 
their gradual amortization. Next, the Hague meeting 


disposed of the reparation obligations of Austria, Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria along with Liberation Debts. This 
latter accord covered the indebtedness of the smaller 
Allies and Italy, amounting to over two billion dollars, 
for state properties taken over from Austria-Hungary 
at the end of the war. 

The Hague conference went even further by working 
out the basis of agreement between Hungary and the 
Little Entente states over the claims of Hungarian Op- 
tants arising out of the land reform acts of Rumania, 
Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. Indeed, it was pre- 
cisely the thorny controversy of agrarian claims, and not 
reparations, which provided the main obstacle in the 
negotiations with Hungary. During these exhausting 
conversations, the representatives of Italy, it should be 
noted, worked with the Little Entente Foreign Minis- 
ters in the spirit of loyal collaboration, and it was the 
so-called "Brocchi Plan" which finally laid the basis for 
the compromise accord. 

The Hungarian settlement reached at The Hague en- 
visaged the definitive regulations of all financial claims 
touching agrarian questions and state properties. Two 
Funds are to be created to handle such claims. Fund A, 
dealing exclusively with land claims, has a capital fixed 
at about $45,000,000, which sum represents the maximum 
compensation available for distribution to Hungarian 
Optants. Fund B covers all other claims, such as those 
put forward by the House of Hapsburg, churches, rail- 
ways and industrial properties, its capital being put at 


$20,000,000. The working capital for these Special 
Funds until 1943 is in part provided through deposits 
from England, France and Italy, and during the period 
1943-1966 exclusively by Little Entente states out of 
Hungarian payments. The Hungarian acts stipulate 
that the three sets of Mixed Tribunals (Rumano-Hun- 
garian, etc.) enjoy no further competence to entertain 
financial claims against Little Entente states, their func- 
tion from now on being strictly juridical. 

Owing to pressure of time, the Hungarian accords 
signed at The Hague did not go further than outlining 
the cardinal principles to be put into definitive treaty 
form later on. It is generally admitted that these accords 
were hastily drawn, the delegates of Hungary and the 
Little Entente having labored through three nights prac- 
fically without resting. When M, Loucheur's commis- 
sion for Eastern Reparations resumed its sittings at Paris 
in late February, sharply divergent interpretations were 
put forward by the contending parties. The main point 
of conflict arose when the Hungarian Government elabo- 
rated the theory that the capital of Fund A covered 
only the claims of Optants already lodged with the 
Mixed Tribunals, maintaining that future claims should 
be dealt with separately. The Little Entente representa- 
tives argued that the Hague acts envisaged a total liqui- 
dation of the Optants dispute. Indeed, Dr. Benes had 
already announced in the Prague Parliament that 


Czechoslovakia was not bound to pay a cent more than 
the figures mentioned in the Hungarian acts. 

With a view to opening the way to a final settlement, 
the commission for Eastern Reparations held a plenary 
session at Paris on March 31, 1930, at which Count Beth- 
len represented the Hungarian Government, the Little 
Entente delegates being Dr. Benes, M. Marinkovich and 
M. Titulescu. Four weeks later, on April 28th, the in- 
terested parties, including the Big Allies, signed four 
conventions which embodied the results initialled at 
The Hague. These acts included the reparation agree- 
ment between Hungary and the Creditor Powers, the 
settlement of questions relating to the land reforms and 
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, and the organization and 
powers of the Special Funds. The conflicting stand- 
points of Hungary and the Little Entente countries were 
textually incorporated in these accords. 7 

It should not be overlooked that the Hungarian Gov- 
ernment was forced to make an enormous reduction in 
its financial claims in favor of the Optants. In giving 
his official statement to Parliament on January 30th, 
Count Bethlen pointed out that the Hungarian delega- 
tion at The Hague finally accepted the acts in question 
out of a spirit of conciliation and cooperation, arguing 
convincingly that they represented a great step forward 
in the consolidation of Europe. 

Dr. Benes made his report to the Prague Parliament 
on the very same day. He took this occasion to review 

7 For the original texts, see VEurope Nouvelle of May 3, 1930. 


at length the entire history of reparation negotiations 
and interallied debts, showing the relationship between 
these problems and the handling of the Czechoslovak 
Liberation Debt. The Hague settlement, he said, con- 
stituted the international recognition of the land reform 
in Succession States. Secondly, the Little Entente was 
actually strengthened as a result of the Hague negotia- 
tions where a sound basis was laid for further con- 
solidation in the Danubian basin. It is interesting to 
note that this feeling of optimism was practically uni- 
versal in Central Europe following the agreements, 
signed at The Hague and in Paris. 

The last chapter consequently will be devoted to an 
examination of the outstanding problems which await 
solution at the hands of the Little Entente. 



Two points are clear concerning the Little Entente 
today the system of alliance and collaboration is not 
threatened with disruption and its true significance lies 
in its political character, as distinguished from its mili- 
tary position and its efforts along economic lines. Its 
main purpose aims to promote the regime of reconcilia- 
tion and cooperation on all sides within the framework of 
the peace settlement. Under the present circumstances 
of international relations in Europe, the Little Entente, 
along with France, holds to its original thesis that Eu- 
rope is not ready to open the floodgates of wholesale 
treaty revision as yet. All readjustments and concessions 
necessary to further the work of international coopera- 
tion are made on the basis of the peace treaties which 
after all constitute the juridical recognition of the new 

At the same time, the Little Entente is making system- 
atic efforts to help eliminate the underlying causes of 
conflict in Europe, and the success of these endeavors 
depends on its efficacy to function as a diplomatic unit. 



Above all, peace must be kept and concessions granted 
on its terms. This means, for example, that if France 
and Italy come to an understanding over their conflict- 
ing interests in the Balkans and North Africa, Little En- 
tente leaders are duty bound to see that the Balkan side 
of the bargain will not threaten its vital interests. 
What are then the major problems which the Little 
Entente faces at present and what are the prospects for 
a sound solution all round ? 

Let us take a final look at the Big Neighbor problems. 
Leaving aside the Russo-Rumanian deadlock, the ques- 
tion absorbing the immediate energies of Little En- 
tente statesmen is the tension persisting across the Adri- 
atic between Italy and Jugoslavia. The most that can 
be said at present is that war has been averted, and the 
threat is not likely to return. Jugoslavia must keep her 
head squarely on her shoulders, should serious tribal 
disturbances break out in Albania against the rule of 
King Zog a very possible occurrence in the near fu- 
ture. In the degree that the political skies of the Bal- 
kans clear up, the prospects will improve of finding a way 
out of the Italo- Jugoslav impasse. There is no denying 
the historical fact that Jugoslavia has replaced Austria 
as an Adriatic Power. 

Next, there is the question of Austro-German union. 
Piecemeal efforts leading in the direction of unifying 
administrative practice in Austria and Germany are 


being pushed with ever increasing vigor, 1 but the realiza- 
tion of the Anschluss program as an international act 
seems more remote than ever. Several recent events tend 
to bear out this statement. 

To begin with, Austria was freed from all reparation 
obligations at The Hague, and the Austrian people will 
hardly be disposed to assume any share of the German 
burden under the Young Plan. Secondly, Dr. Schober, 
the Austrian Chancellor, went to Rome where he signed 
a treaty of conciliation with Signor Mussolini on Febru- 
ary 2, 1930. Italy lent her support to the Austrian plan 
of raising a new international loan, and a few days later 
the German leaders in Italian South Tyrol were released 
from prison. Again, Dr. Schober next voyaged to Ber- 
lin, and there came to an agreement with the German 
Government over the long-pending tariff treaty between 
the sister Republics. Austria was sorely in need of a new 
commercial accord with Germany whose imports into 
Austria have been growing at a dangerous pace. 

Lastly, the internal situation in Austria has quieted 
down since Dr. Schober took office in September 1929. 
As a result of constitutional reforms which strengthened 
the executive branch of the government, a temporary 
truce was reached between the rival armed factions, So- 
cialist and Fascist, which threatened public security dur- 
ing a large part of 1929. To sum up, the improved in- 
ternational position of Austria and the progress made 

1 At the end of 1930, Austria is changing over from left-hand to 
right-hand drive on her roads. 


towards domestic consolidation points to the likelihood 
that there is little danger o the Anschluss being carried 
out by an overt coup disturbing the peace of Europe. 

The future stability of the Little Entente system in 
some measure depends on this problem being handled in 
a manner satisfactory to the interests of each member 
state. Assuming that Austria, backed by Germany, 
intends some day to bring up the Anschluss case in all 
seriousness at Geneva, the Little Entente can count on 
having the backing of both Italy and France, but this 
support does not necessarily mean that its vital interests 
will be automatically protected in the bargain. For the 
time being, however, Germany and Austria will prob- 
ably content themselves to achieve gradual union in 
piecemeal stages, and consequently there is no reason to 
expect an outright clash between, say, Czechoslovakia 
and Germany in this event. True, Prague and Berlin 
have not yet been able to conclude a tariff convention, 
negotiations for which have been dragging on for years, 
but the opening of the Czechoslovak Free Zone at Ham- 
burg in 1929 is indicative of goodwill and commonsense 
in harmonizing and adjusting conflicting interests to 
the advantage of both parties. 

More in line with the immediate objectives of the 
Little Entente stands the Balkan problem, the core of 
which lies in Macedonia and its bearing on Serbo-Bulgar 
relations. For reasons not necessary to reiterate at this 
point, it may be a matter of years before a sound solution 
can be worked out to this complex situation. Jugoslavia 
must first proceed to a statesman-like handling of the 


Macedonian problem, and this in turn will pave the 
way for a healthy rapprochement between Belgrade and 
Sofia, the basis for which is laid in the frontier accords 
of 1929 and 1930. There is some danger that this recon- 
ciliation, moving forward too rapidly, might lead to 
an alienation of Rumania on one side and of Greece 
on the other. 

In other words, a true Balkan Locarno, fortified 
by non-aggressive pacts and arbitration treaties, must 
include Rumania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. 
More than this Albania and Turkey for obvious reasons 
must be brought into the combination. Such a sweeping 
undertaking would require the sanction of the Great 
Powers and the whole settlement linked up closely with 
the League of Nations. 2 

Coming back to Central Europe proper, the key to 
future peace lies in the Hungarian question. Despite all 
its useful accomplishments, the Little Entente will prob- 
ably go down in history as a failure if it is not instru- 
mental in bringing about a lasting understanding be- 
tween Hungary and her neighbors. 

Now the essential character of the Hungarian question 
has undergone significant changes in the last few years. 
Hungary in no sense threatens the peace of Europe, and 
it is highly unlikely that she will ever assume the re- 

2 An informal conference held at Athens early in October 1930 
recorded great headway in working out the proper foundations for a 
Balkan union. See UEurope Nouvelle for Nov. 22, 1930. 


sponsibility of crowning a King who can entertain 
serious pretensions to the lost territories of the Crown 
of St. Stephen. Again, Hungary has already ratified 
the Hague settlements which signify the "financial 
liquidation of the past," including the definitive disposal 
of the Optants case. Beyond the scope of this important 
agreement, however, Hungary still nurses a long list of 
grievances arising out of the Trianon Treaty and its 
political consequences. Broadly put, Hungary demands 
(i) substantial frontier rectification in her favor, and 
(2) a regime of fair treatment to Magyar minorities liv- 
ing in Little Entente states, as guaranteed under the 
Minority Treaties. 

The problem of frontier rectification, viewed in fig- 
ures, presents the following picture. It appears that some 
three million Hungarians were included within the 
boundaries of neighboring countries. Characteristi- 
cally enough, there is no agreement as to the exact sta- 
tistics: Hungary claims that the figure stands at some 
3,500,000, while the Little Entente states put the total at 
substantially less than three millions. This large dis- 
crepancy is only in part due to the pre-war practice of 
Budapest census-takers of including Jews as Hungarians. 
In any case, it is patent that Hungary's neighbors helped 
themselves generously to the territorial fruits of victory. 
Even though Budapest may have lost her right to rule 
over minority races, in what sense were her former ene- 
mies justified in imposing foreign rule on three million 
more or less unwilling Hungarians ? 


The argument of self-determination was brushed aside 
at Paris where motives of economic self-interest and 
military strategy dictated the territorial dispositions of 
the peace treaties, Czechoslovakia demanded a pro- 
tected outlet on the Danube and the only east-and-west 
railway in Slovakia (through Kosice) : this meant the 
inclusion of 750,000 Magyars inside the frontier. Ru- 
mania needed the only north-and-south line in Transyl- 
vania (through Arad), and 1,600,000 Hungarians fell 
under Rumanian rule. Jugoslavia asked for the vital 
railway junction of Subotica, and another half million 
Hungarians were cut off from their native land. It 
would be too much to expect Hungary to accept the 
passing of two-thirds of her former territory and nearly 
one-third of her entire race into foreign hands. 8 

Through the vehicle of the Rothermere campaign, 
Hungary demanded back substantially all of the terri- 
tory inhabited by Magyar minorities abroad, but the 
mixed racial character of these districts makes the prob- 
lem far more complicated than is suggested by any 
simple numerical approach. At the very maximum, not 
more than 1,500,000 Hungarians live in solid compact 
blocks along the frontier, and probably the figure is 
closer to a million. Yet frontier changes which would 
transfer even a million Hungarians back within the 
frontiers of their native country would entail drastic 
sacrifices on the part of Little Entente states. 

8 Frontier-determining railroads are clearly indicated on the ac- 
companying map. 


Let us look at the situation realistically. Hungary 
would hardly be satisfied with the return of a few 
thousand square miles of farm lands and villages: she 
would certainly demand the reacquisition of just those 
crucial railway points (Kosice, Arad, Subotica) which 
her neighbors have no intention of giving up, even 
though they are situated near the present frontiers. 
Take the case of the Schutt, an island in the Danube 
lying inside of Czechoslovakia between Bratislava and 
Komarno. Here is a solid community of about 125,000 
Magyar peasants the direction of whose economic rela- 
tions lies exclusively north of the Danube, particularly 
with Bratislava. These peasants have repeatedly begged 
Prague to let them remain inside the Republic, point- 
ing out that there is not a single bridge across the main 
stream of the Danube connecting them with Hungary 

The international complications involved in frontier 
rectification in favor of Hungary present an even greater 
obstacle. Discontented minorities racial, cultural, re- 
ligious, economic exist in almost every state of Europe, 
and thus the Little Entente is not alone in holding her 
ground against treaty revision on this score. Jugoslavia 
would not dream of handing back half a million Hun- 
garians without saying something about the status of 
the same number of Slovenes in Italy who do not enjoy 
protection under the minority treaties. Italy in turn 
would never assent to an international discussion about 
her racial minorities, and neither would France nor Po- 
land welcome the opening up of this delicate subject. 


The plain fact is that the minority problem cannot be 
solved mechanically by frontier changes it is the prob- 
lem of European democracy which is still in its infancy. 

This summary indicates that the chances of frontier 
adjustments for Hungary are not bright under present 
circumstances. Barring another world conflagration, 
it will probably take a decade or more before Europe 
will be ready to consider treaty revision in this sense. 
This being the case, let us see how Hungarian minori- 
ties are faring under foreign rule at present. 

It was not the intention of the f ramers of the minority 
treaties to set up an alien "state within a state." Their 
aim was to guarantee equal rights and fair treatment of 
minorities, and the carrying out of the general intent 
of these treaties was left to the Minority Section created 
in the League of Nations. Now the post-war period 
hardly being a favorable juncture to realize these demo- 
cratic provisions, the most violent accusations against 
Little Entente states have been lodged at Geneva on 
the score of violating minority rights. On the other 
hand, the suppression of the privileged status which 
Germans and Hungarians enjoyed in the days of the 
Dual Monarchy cannot in itself be held up as a breach 
in the rights of these minorities now living in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Italy. It is 
equally clear, however, that the pendulum of political 
power swung back violently against the Hungarian 
minorities during the establishment of authority in the 
hands of Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade. 

In one way or another, Little Entente states have all 


violated the provisions of the minority treaties. Hun- 
dreds of Hungarian schools have been closed which 
should not have been touched; there has been adminis- 
trative discrimination and favoritism in carrying out 
the land reform laws; civil rights have been too easily 
brushed aside when the case of a Hungarian ,was in 
the offing, and citizenship laws have been harshly en- 

Such abuses were far more prevalent during the early 
post-war years than today, but acts of official brutality 
are not readily forgotten across the frontier in Buda- 
pest, The status of Hungarian minorities has greatly 
improved in recent years, and on the whole Little En- 
tente states today are making a serious effort to live up to 
the spirit of the minority treaties. Nor must it be forgot- 
ten that Hungary has a minority problem of her own 
making 200,000 Slovaks and 750,000 Germans are cer- 
tainly no better off under the veiled dictatorship of 
Budapest 4 than are the Hungarians and Germans in 

Thus, the minority problem in Central Europe is 
undergoing a process of gradual improvement. Hun- 
gary and the Little Entente having concluded the Hague 
settlement, the path is now opened for negotiations for 
guarantee and arbitration pacts on the Locarno model. 
These conversations may well drag on for years, for it is 
doubtful whether Hungarian sentiment will give its 

4 Racial minorities in Hungary, for example, are without parlia- 
mentary representation to this day a situation not existing in Little 
Entente Parliaments. 


assent to the inauguration of such a radical shift of policy 
without the demand that frontier changes form the 
basis of a full understanding with the Little Entente. 
Just when the Little Entente governments will be ready 
to consider frontier rectification depends on a variety 
of factors, especially on the progress of European con- 
solidation and the outcome of the clash between dicta- 
torship and democracy. 

For the moment, however, revived interest in the King 
question at Budapest has eclipsed the agitation for 
territorial adjustments. Archduke Albrecht, having 
sworn allegiance to Archduke Otto, was secretly married 
on June 25, 1930 to Madame Rudnay, divorced wife of 
a Hungarian diplomat. This morganatic marriage 
should definitely remove Albrecht as the royal candidate 
of the Free Electors. In consequence, certain Legitimists 
now maintain that the time is growing ripe for Arch- 
duke Otto to return to Hungary to claim his rightful 
throne. The date suggested for his proclamation as 
King would coincide with his coming of age on Novem- 
ber 20th. B 

Though Legitimist circles at Budapest took heart at the 
successful coup of Prince Carol, the path is by no means 
clear for Otto to assume the Crown of St. Stephen in 
like manner. There still exists a strong current of anti- 

5 Otto's birthday passed off in Budapest without significant de- 


Hapsburg sentiment in Hungary, particularly in the 
Army. Herr Combos, now Minister of War, organized 
the military demonstration of Budapest students in 1921 
which blocked ex-King Charles' entry into the capital, 
and gave the Government opportunity to carry on the 
decisive negotiations. 6 During the summer of 1930, 
Herr Gombos again showed his hand by issuing an order 
to arrest Archduke Otto and former Queen Zita, should 
they enter the country. 

Some time before this amazing incident, Count Beth- 
len on July 6th reiterated the opposition of the Govern- 
ment to any hasty handling of the throne question. 
Maintaining that recurrent rumors abroad of a Haps- 
burg coup lacked foundation, he took pains to empha- 
size that the Great Powers and the neighboring states 
had not changed their attitude towards a restoration. 
Therefore, the Government, though ultimately favor- 
ing a constitutional solution, stood ready to take severe 
proceedings against anyone who would plunge Hungary 
into danger. 

The Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente took the 
occasion provided by the annual conference in June to 
reaffirm the unconditional opposition of their Govern- 
ments to a Hapsburg restoration in Hungary. Upon 
returning to Bucharest, M. Mironescu announced in a 
press interview that the Little Entente would employ 

6 The Hungarian Government charged Mgr. Vass to conduct the 
negotiations which led up to the retirement of Charles across the 
frontier. Staunch Legitimist and influential member of the Bethlen 
Cabinet, Mgr. Vass died on September 8, 1930. 


the weapon of economic blockade to counter any such 
threat to overturn the peace settlement. Austria would 
probably associate herself in such an undertaking if the 
powerful Socialist party in Vienna could make its in- 
fluence felt during the crisis. 

Such are the dangers, both foreign and domestic, 
which face Hungary should the Legitimists provoke 
an overt solution of the King Question today. The 
Hungarian people at present cannot accept at face value 
the Hapsburg pretension to rule by divine right. For 
this reason, it seemingly behooves the Legitimists to 
pursuade the ruling classes, at any rate, that the corona- 
tion of Otto would really contribute to national welfare 
and prestige. Certainly the past relationship between 
Hungary and the Hapsburg dynasty does not redound 
with a great record of public service and constructive 

Let us assume, however, that the sentimental appeal 
of the Legitimists will in time triumph over the deep- 
rooted hostility to Hapsburg. In bringing up the deli- 
cate monarchical question on such grounds, Hungary 
must still be wary to avoid all foreign complications. 
This means two things Archduke Otto should abandon 
his claims to the imperial throne of Austria and his re- 
turn to Hungary must not become the rallying cry 
for any foreign adventure. As the years go by, the Allies 
might very well be satisfied by a guarantee from Hun- 
gary of this sort. 

In the absence of such a solemn pledge, Archduke 


Otto could only make his way back to Hungary with 
the active cooperation of a foreign power, presumably 
Italy. Today such a move would be foolhardy, for it 
would speedily entail the final demise of the ancient 
House of Hapsburg and grave consequences to Hungary. 
In the sense of restraining Budapest from proceeding to 
a precipitous solution of the King Question, the Little 
Entente may after all be acting with the best interests of 
Hungary at heart. 

These are the principal problems facing the Little 
Entente today. On the whole, it is clear that the inter- 
national preoccupations of its member states work 
towards strengthening the alliance rather than other- 
wise. Day after day, various phases of these and other 
current problems come up for its statesmen to dispose 
of on the basis of a coordinated program. This work 
gets back to the functioning of the Little Entente as a 
diplomatic unit. A good example of the Little Entente 
at work was provided by the annual conference of its 
Foreign Ministers held at Belgrade during three days of 
May 1929. The fact that this meeting was a purely 
routine affair showed that the system was not threatened 
by any crisis at that period. 

The character of the common interests which bind 
the Little Entente states together is shown in the text 
of the official communique issued on May 2ist. It reads : 
"The three Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente 


states have conferred this morning and afternoon. They 
have continued the discussion of the general political 
situation, and have established the full identity of their 
views. The Ministers have in particular examined the 
relations of their states to neighboring states with a 
view to having these relations develop along normal 
lines. Further, the three Ministers, inspired by the 
recommendation of the League of Nations in this di- 
rection, have also discussed the question of a general 
arbitration treaty between their three states. This gen- 
eral pact for all three states was drawn up in the after- 
noon meeting. Moreover, the Ministers have signed 
the protocol by which the present treaties of alliance 
between the Little Entente states are renewed." 

Getting behind the text of the official communique, 
there is a close connection to be noted between the re- 
newal of the three treaties of alliance and the conclusion 
of a general arbitration pact at Belgrade. 7 Since the strain 
in Italo-Jugoslav relations began, there has been a grow- 
ing feeling in Belgrade circles that the treaties of al- 
liance should be replaced by a single tripartite defen- 
sive alliance. Such a convention would of course in- 
crease the obligation of Czechoslovakia, for her existing 
treaties with Rumania and Jugoslavia leave her a free 
hand in Balkan affairs. Dr. Benes has always held that 
the present arrangement was a source of strength, not 

7 See Appendix B below for an English translation made by the 
Treaty Section of the League of Nations, shortly to be published in 
the Treaty Series. 


weakness, to the Little Entente system. Hence, a com- 
promise was reached at Belgrade by signing a gen- 
eral part of arbitration and conciliation to which any 
neighboring state is free to adhere. It is interesting 
to note that the conclusion of this pact was favorably 
commented upon in both Bulgaria 8 and Italy, which 
would scarcely have been the case with a tripartite al- 

Many other questions came up for discussion at the 
Belgrade meeting. To begin with, the question of Soviet 
recognition was taken up again. Here the Foreign 
Ministers seemed to disagree, but it was, as usual, an- 
nounced that Soviet recognition was not a matter of 
common policy, each state reserving a free hand in the 
matter. The conference came to an understanding as 
to the line of policy which Rumania, as representative 
of the Little Entente on the League Council, should take 
at the June 1929 meeting of the Council in Madrid. 
This in turn led to the examination of the minority 
problem in view of the fact that it was on the current 
agenda of the Council. Lastly, the Foreign Ministers 
discussed matters of common policy in connection with 
the following September meeting of the League, at 
which time Jugoslavia was slated to replace Rumania as 
a non-permanent member of the Council to represent 
the Little Entente. Here the path was not absolutely 
clear on account of misgivings raised in certain quarters 
abroad about the new Dictatorship in Jugoslavia. 

8 Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria indeed concluded an arbitration 
convention soon afterwards. 


The Belgrade conference of the Little Entente con- 
cerned itself with work of a less political character as 
well. There is, for example, an organization known 
as the Little Entente of the Press, whose purpose, out- 
side of political propaganda, is to raise the journalistic 
level of the countries in international affairs. 9 Then, too, 
the Little Entente has a program of social and cultural 
cooperation, involving the exchange of professors and 
students. Various meetings take place from time to 
time of experts and governmental officials. Lastly, there 
is also the Little Entente of Women which concerns it- 
self mostly with questions of public health and chil- 
dren's welfare. Without overemphasizing this kind of 
work, it is nevertheless a factor making for better rela- 
tions all round. International problems, infinitely in- 
tricate in their social and economic ramifications, de- 
mand something more than political conferences and 
diplomatic collaboration. The success of social work 
undertaken by the League suggests that the Little En- 
tente is on the right track in this matter. 

Dr. Girsa, at present Czechoslovak Minister at War- 
saw, once pointed out that the strength of the Little 
Entente lay in the circumstances that it is both little 
and an entente. Behind this cryptic formula lies a fact 
of first significance namely, the usefulness of the system 
is not so much its ultimate purpose as is its day-to-day 

9 Budapest is naturally bitter over the "skilful propaganda" 
broadcasted from Prague. 


capacity to handle and dispose of the pressing demands 
of international relations. The progressive elimination 
of the underlying causes of conflict and dispute is more 
important to the welfare of Europe than is any abstract 
ultimate aim of the Little Entente. 

The Czechoslovak-Rumanian-Jugoslav entente has al- 
ready justified its existence by demonstrating its capacity 
to hold things together in Central Europe. True, its 
methods have been known to be harsh, especially in its 
early years, but the fact remains that the preservation of 
peace is vastly more vital than is the grievance of any one 
nation. If the Little Entente succeeds in doing its bit 
to help establish a sound foundation of peace and co- 
operation in Central Europe, it can perhaps dispense 
with the realization of some of its present aims. So 
doing, the Little Entente may lose its original identity 
as a military alliance, but contribute to the realization of 
a most lasting place in the modern history of Europe by 
merging itself into a system of broader scope and deeper 
significance to the welfare of nations. 

Such was the underlying objective of Little Entente 
endeavor at Locarno in 1925 and The Hague in 1930, 
In forming a useful bridge between the problems of 
Western Europe and the tangled questions of Central 
Europe and the Balkans, the Little Entente system is 
working hand in hand with the Great Powers at Geneva 
to lay the foundations for the United States of Europe. 




Firmly resolved to maintain the Peace obtained by so many 
sacrifices, and provided for by the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, as well as the situation created by the Treaty concluded 
at Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the Allied and Associated 
Powers on the one hand, and Hungary on the other, the Presi- 
dent of the Czechoslovak Republic and His Majesty the King of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have agreed to conclude a de- 
fensive Convention . . . [and the signatories] have agreed as 


In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary against 
one of the High Contracting Parties, the other Party agrees to 
assist in the defence of the Party attacked, in the manner laid 
down by the arrangement provided for in Article 2 of the present 


The competent Technical Authorities of the Czechoslovak 
Republic and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 
shall decide, by mutual agreement, upon the provisions neces- 
sary for the execution of the present Convention. 



Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall conclude an 
alliance with a third Power without preliminary notice to the 


The present Convention shall be valid for two years from 
the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the expiration of 
this period, each of the Contracting Parties shall have the option 
of denouncing the present Convention. It shall, however, re- 
main in force for six months after the date of denunciation. 

THE 23RD APRIL, 1921, 

Firmly resolved to maintain the peace obtained by so many 
sacrifices, and provided for by the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, as well as the situation created by the Treaty concluded 
at Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the Allied and Associated 
Powers on the one hand, and Hungary on the other, the Presi- 
dent of the Czechoslovak Republic and His Majesty the King 
of Rumania, have agreed to conclude a defensive Convention 
. . [and the signatories] have agreed as follows: 


In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary 
against one of the High Contracting Parties, the other party 
agrees to assist in the defense of the party attacked, in the 
manner laid down by the arrangement provided for in Article 
2 of the present Convention. 



The competent Technical Authorities of the Czechoslovak 
Republic and Rumania shall decide by mutual agreement and 
in a Military Convention to be concluded, upon the provisions 
necessary for the execution of the present Convention. 


Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall conclude an 
alliance with a third Power without preliminary notice to the 


For the purpose of coordinating their efforts to maintain 
peace, the two Governments undertake to consult together on 
questions of foreign policy concerning their relations with Hun- 


The present Convention shall be valid for two years from 
the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the expiration of 
this period each of the Contracting Parties shall have the option 
of denouncing the present Convention. It shall, however, re- 
main in force for six months after the date of denunciation. 


Firmly resolved to maintain the peace obtained by so many 
sacrifices and the situation created by the Treaty concluded at 
Trianon on June 4, 1920, between the Allied and Associated 
Powers, of the one part, and Hungary, of the other part, and 
by the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine, concluded on November 27, 


1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers, of the one 
part, and Bulgaria, of the other part,, His Majesty the King of 
Rumania and His Majesty the King of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes have agreed to conclude a Defensive Convention . . . 
[and the signatories] have agreed as follows: 


In case of an unprovoked attack on the part of Hungary or of 
Bulgaria or of both these Powers against one of the High Con- 
tracting Parties with the object of subverting the situation cre- 
ated by the Treaty of Peace concluded at Trianon, or by that 
concluded at Neuilly-sur-Seine, the other Party agrees to assist 
in the defence of the Party attacked in the manner laid down 
by the arrangement provided for in Article 2 of the present 


The competent technical authorities of Rumania and of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes shall by mutual agree- 
ment determine in a military Convention to be concluded as 
soon as possible, the provisions necessary for the execution of 
the present Convention, 


Neither of the High Contracting Parties shall conclude an 
alliance with a third Power without first giving notice to the 


For the purpose of coordinating their efforts to maintain 
peace, the two Governments undertake to consult together on 
questions of foreign policy concerning their relations with Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria. 



The present Convention shall be valid for two years from 
the date of the exchange of ratifications. On the expiration of 
this period each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right 
to denounce the present Convention. It shall, however, remain 
in force for six months after the date of denunciation. 


The Governments of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, and the Czechoslovak Republic desirous of prolong- 
ing and completing the Agreement concluded between them on 
August 14, 1920, by new provisions having the following ob- 

(a) the strengthening and maintenance of peace; 

(b) the consolidation and extension of the political and eco- 
nomic bonds between the two States, 

have accepted, by common agreement, the following Articles 
. . . [and the signatories] have agreed as follows: 


The Agreement concluded at Belgrade, on August 14, 1920, 
between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the 
Czechoslovak Republic is prolonged for the duration of the 
present Convention. 


The High Contracting Parties take note of the political and 
military treaties and of the agreements concluded between the 


Czechoslovak Republic and Rumania, Austria and Poland on 
the one hand, and o the similar agreements concluded between 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Rumania 
and Italy on the other hand* 


The High Contracting Parties will endeavour to establish on 
a solid foundation all their economic, financial and transport re- 
lations and mutually to ensure the closest cooperation: in these 
relations; for this purpose they will conclude arrangements on 
these subjects, and particularly a commercial treaty for this 


The two High Contracting Parties undertake to give each 
other in general all possible political and diplomatic support 
in their international relations; should they consider their com- 
mon interests to be threatened, they undertake to consider to- 
gether steps for their protection. 


The proper authorities of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes and the Czechoslovak Republic shall come to a 
mutual understanding with a view to taking all the steps neces- 
sary for the application of the present Convention. 


The present Convention shall remain in force for five years 
from the date on which the instruments of ratification are ex- 

At the expiration of these five years either of the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall be free to denounce the present Convention 
giving six months' previous notice to the other Party. 


N. B. The above texts o the official translation are taken 
from the League o Nations Treaty Series, volumes VI, XIII, 
and LIV, respectively. 

On May 21, 1929, the Little Entente Foreign Ministers in 
conference at Belgrade prolonged these treaties for another five 
years s and a clause was added thereto making their renewal 
automatic, in default of outright denunciation by one of the Sig- 
natory Powers, at the end of the five-year period. 






Inspired by the friendly relations existing between their re- 
spective nations and imbued with the spirit of confident cordiality 
which characterises their reciprocal intercourse; 

Sincerely desirous of ensuring, by pacific means, the settlement 
of any disputes which may arise between their countries; 

Noting that respect for the rights established by treaties or 
arising out of international law is binding upon international 

Recognising that the rights of each State cannot be modified 
without its consent; 

Considering that the faithful observance, under the auspices 
of the League of Nations, of methods of pacific procedure will 
permit of the setdement of all international disputes; 

Highly appreciating the recommendation made to all States 
by the Assembly of the League of Nations, in its resolution of 

1 Translated by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. 


September 26th, 1928, to conclude conventions for the pacific 
settlement of international disputes; 

Have resolved to give effect to their common intention in a 
Convention, and with that object have appointed as their Pleni- 


His Excellency Dr. Edvard Benes, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic; 


His Excellency Monsieur George Mironescu, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Rumania; 


His Excellency Monsieur Kosta Kumanudi, Doctor of Law 
and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; 

Who, having deposited their full powers, found in good and 
due form, have agreed on the following provisions: 



Disputes of every kind which may arise between the High 
Contracting Parties, or between two of them, and which it has 
not been possible to settle by diplomacy shall be submitted, under 
the conditions laid down in the present Convention, for settle- 
ment by judicial means or arbitration, preceded, according to 
circumstances, as a compulsory or optional measure, by recourse 
to the procedure of conciliation. 


This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events 
prior to the present Convention and belonging to the past, or to 
disputes relating to questions which, according to international 
law, fall within the sole competence of the States. 


1 . Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is 
laid down in other conventions in force between the High Con- 
tracting Parties shall be settled in conformity with the provi- 
sions of those conventions. 

2. The present Convention shall not affect any agreements 
in force by which conciliation procedure is established between 
the High Contracting Parties or by which the High Contracting 
Parties have assumed obligations to resort to arbitration or ju- 
dicial settlement for the purpose of settling the dispute. If, how- 
ever, these agreements provide only for a procedure of concilia- 
tion, the provisions of the present Convention concerning judicial 
settlement or arbitration shall be applied after such procedure 
has been followed without result. 


1. In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according 
to the municipal law of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
falls within the competence of the judicial authorities, the Party 
in question may object to the dispute being submitted for settle- 
ment by the various procedures laid down in the present Con- 

2. A dispute which falls within the competence of the ad- 
ministrative authorities may not be submitted for settlement by 
the various procedures laid down in the present Convention 
until a final decision has been pronounced, within a reasonable 
time, by the competent authority. 

In such case, the Party which desires to resort to the pro- 
cedures laid down in the present Convention must notify the 
other Party of its intention within a period of one year from 
the date of the aforementioned decision. 




All disputes with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as 
to their respective rights shall be submitted for decision to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the Parties 
agree, in the manner hereinafter provided, to have resort to an 
arbitral tribunal. 

It is understood that the disputes referred to above include 
in particular those mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. 


If the Parties agree to submit the disputes mentioned in the 
preceding article to an arbitral tribunal, they shall draw up a 
special agreement in which they shall specify the subject of 
the dispute, the selection of the arbitrators and the procedure to 
be followed. In the absence of sufficient particulars in the spe- 
cial agreement, the provisions of the Hague Convention of 
October i8th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, shall apply so far as is necessary. If nothing is laid 
down in the special agreement as to the rules regarding the sub- 
stance of the dispute to be followed by the arbitrators, the tri- 
bunal shall apply the substantive rules enumerated in Article 38 
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 


If the Parties fail to agree concerning the special agreement 
referred to in the preceding article, or fail to appoint arbitrators, 
either Party shall be at liberty, after giving three months' notice, 
to bring the dispute by an application direct before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. 



1. In the case of the dispute mentioned in Article 4, before 
any procedure before the Permanent Court of International Jus- 
tice or any arbitral tribunal, the Parties may agree to have re- 
course to the conciliation procedure provided for in the present 

2. In the event of recourse to and failure of conciliation, 
neither Party may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court 
of International Justice or call for the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal referred to in Article 5 before the expiration of one 
month from the termination of the proceedings of the Con- 
ciliation Commission. 



All disputes between the parties other than the disputes men- 
tioned in Article 4 shall be submitted obligatorily to a proce- 
dure of conciliation before they can form the subject of a settle- 
ment by arbitration. 


The disputes referred to in the preceding article shall be sub- 
mitted to a permanent or special Conciliation Commission con- 
stituted by the High Contracting Parties. 


On a request to that effect being made by one of the Contract- 
ing Parties to the other Party, a permanent Conciliation Com- 
mission shall be constituted within a period of six months. 



Unless the parties agree otherwise, the Conciliation Com- 
mission shall be constituted as follows: 

1. The Commission shall be composed of five members. The 
Parties shall each nominate one commissioner, who may be 
chosen from among their respective nationals. The three other 
commissioners shall be appointed by agreement from among the 
nationals of third Powers. These three commissioners must 
be of different nationalities and must not be habitually resident 
in the territory nor be in the service of the Parties concerned. 
The High Contracting Parties shall appoint the President of the 
Commission from among their number. 

2. The commissioners shall be appointed for three years. 
They shall be re-eligible. The commissioners appointed jointly 
may be replaced during the course of their mandate by agree- 
ment between the Parties. Any one of the High Contracting 
Parties may, however, at any time replace the commissioner 
whom it has appointed. Even if replaced, the commissioners 
shall continue to exercise their functions until the termination of 
the work in hand. 

3. Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation 
or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time 
in the manner fixed for the nominations. 


If, when a dispute arises, no permanent Conciliation Commis- 
sion appointed by the Parties is in existence, a special commission 
shall be constituted for the examination of the dispute within 
a period of three months from the date on which a request to 
that effect is made by one of the Parties to the other Party. The 
necessary appointments shall be made in the manner laid down 
in the preceding article, unless the Parties decide otherwise. 


i. If the appointment of the commissioners to be designated 
jointly is not made within the periods provided for in Articles 


10 and 12, the making of the necessary appointments shall be 
entrusted to a third Power, chosen by agreement between the 
Parties or, on request of the Parties, to the Council of the League 
of Nations. 

2. If no agreement is reached on either of these procedures, 
each Party shall designate a different Power and the appoint- 
ments shall be made jointly by the Powers thus chosen. 

3. If, within a period of three months, these two Powers 
have been unable to reach an agreement, each of them shall 
submit a number of candidates equal to the number of mem- 
bers to be appointed. It shall then be decided by lot which 
of the candidates thus designated shall be appointed. 


1. Disputes shall be brought before the Conciliation Commis- 
sion by means of an application addressed to the President by 
the two Parties acting in agreement, or, in default thereof, by 
one or other of the Parties. 

2. The application, after giving a summary account of the 
subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the Com- 
mission to take all necessary steps with a view to arriving at an 
amicable solution. 

3. If the application emanates from only one of the Parties, 
the other Party shall without delay be notified by it. 


1. Within fifteen days from the date on which a dispute 
has been brought by one of the Parties before a permanent Con- 
ciliation Commission, any Party may replace its own commis- 
sioner, for the examination of the particular dispute, by a per- 
son possessing special competence in the matter. 

2. The Party making use of this right shall immediately 
notify the other Party; the latter shall in such case be entided to 
take similar action within fifteen days from the date on which 
it received the notification. 



In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the 
Parties, the Conciliation Commission shall meet at a place se- 
lected by its President. 


The work o the Conciliation Commission shall not be con- 
ducted in public unless a decision to that effect is taken by the 
Commission with the consent of the Parties. 


1. In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the 
Parties, the Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own 
procedure, which in any case must provide for the Parties 
being heard. In regard to enquiries, the Commission, unless it 
decided unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance 
with the provisions of Part III of the Hague Convention of 
October i8th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International 

2. The Parties shall be represented before the Conciliation 
Commission by agents, whose duty shall be to act as inter- 
mediaries between them and the Commission. They may, more- 
over, be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for 
that purpose and may request that all persons whose evidence 
appears to them desirable shall be heard. 

3. The Commission, for its part, shall be entitled to request 
oral explanations from the agents, counsel and experts of both 
Parties, as well as from all persons, it may think desirable to 
summon with the consent of their Governments. 


In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the Par- 
ties, decisions of the Conciliation Commission shall be taken 
by a majority vote, and the Commission may only take decisions 
on the substance of the dispute if all its members are present. 



The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate the work 
of the Conciliation Commission, and in particular to supply it 
to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and 
information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to 
allow it to proceed in their territory, and in accordance with 
their law, to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or ex- 
perts and to visit the localities in question. 


1. During the proceedings of the Commission, each of the 
commissioners shall receive emoluments the amount of which 
shall be fixed by agreement between the Parties, each of which 
shall contribute an equal share. 

2. The general expenses arising out of the working of the 
Commission shall be divided in the same manner. 


r. The task of the Conciliation Commission shall be to eluci- 
date the questions in dispute, to collect with that object all 
necessary information by means of enquiry or otherwise, and 
to endeavour to bring the Parties to an agreement. It may, after 
the case has been examined, inform the Parties of the terms of 
settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down the period 
within which they are to make their decision. 

2. At the close of its proceedings, the Commission shall draw 
up a proces-verbal stating, as the case may be, either that the 
Parties have come to an agreement, and, if need arises, the terms 
of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settle- 
ment. No mention shall be made in the proces-verbal as to 
whether the Commission's decisions were taken unanimously or 
by a majority vote. 

3, The proceedings of the Commission must, unless the Par- 
ties agree otherwise, be terminated within six months from the 
date on which the Commission shall have been given cognisance 
of the dispute. 



The Commission's proems-verbal shall be communicated with- 
out delay to the Parties. The Parties shall decide whether it 
shall be published. 



If the Parties have not reached an agreement within a month 
from the termination of the proceedings of the Conciliation Com- 
mission mentioned in the previous articles, the question shall 
be brought before an arbitral tribunal which, unless the Parties 
agree otherwise, shall be constituted in the manner indicated 

Should, however, both Parties agree, the question may, if it is 
a political one, be submitted to the Council of the League of 
Nations, which shall decide in accordance with Article 15 of the 


The arbitral tribunal shall consist of five members. The Par- 
ties shall each nominate one member, who may be chosen from 
among their respective nationals. The other two arbitrators 
and the umpire shall be chosen by agreement from among the 
nationals of third Powers. They must be of different nation- 
al it ics> and must not be habitually resident in the territory or 
be In the service of the Parties concerned, 


i. If the appointment of the members of the arbitral tribunal 
is not made within a period of three months from the date on 
which one of the Parties requested the other Party to constitute 
an arbitral tribunal, a third Power, chosen by agreement between 


the Parties, shall be requested to make the necessary appoint- 

2. If no agreement is reached on this point, each Party shall 
designate a different Power, and the appointments shall be 
made jointly by the Powers thus chosen, 

3. If within a period of three months the Powers so chosen 
have been unable to reach an agreement, the necessary appoint- 
ments shall be made by the President of the permanent Court 
of International Justice. If the latter is prevented from acting 
or if he is a national of one of the Parties, the appointments shall 
be made by the Vice-President. If the latter is prevented from 
acting or if he is a national of one of the Parties, the appoint- 
ments shall be made by the oldest member of the Court who 
is not a national of either Party. 


Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation or 
other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the 
manner fixed for the nominations. 


The Parties shall draw up a special agreement determining 
the subject of the dispute and the details of the procedure. 


In the absence of sufficient particulars in the special agree- 
ment regarding the matters referred to in the preceding article, 
the provisions of the Hague Convention of October i8th, 1907 
for the Pacific Setdement of International Disputes shall apply 
so far as is necessary. 


Failing the conclusion of a special agreement within a period 
of three months from the date on which the tribunal is consti- 
tuted, the dispute may be brought before the tribunal by an 
application from one or other Party. 



If nothing is laid down in the special agreement or no special 
agreement has been made, the tribunal shall apply the rules in 
regard to the substance o the dispute enumerated in Article 
38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Jus- 
tice. In so far as there exist no such rules applicable to the 
dispute, the tribunal shall decide ex acquo ct bono. 




Should a dispute arise between all the High Contracting Par- 
tics, the following rules shall be observed with regard to the 

procedures described in the foregoing provisions: 

As regards conciliation procedure, a special commission shall 
always be set up. The composition of the commission shall vary 
according to whether all the Parties have separate interests, 
or two of them act conjointly. 

In the former case, the Parties shall each appoint one com- 
missioner, and shall jointly appoint commissioners, nationals of 
third Powers, who shall number one more than the commis- 
sioners appointed separately by the Parties. 

In the latter case, the Parties acting conjointly shall agree to ap- 
point their own commissioner jointly, and at the same time agree 
with the other Party as regards the appointment of the commis- 
sioners chosen from among the nationals of third Powers. 

In either case the Parties shall, unless they agree otherwise, 
apply Articles 12 et seq. of the present Convention in so far as 
these are compatible with the provisions of the present article. 

As regards judicial procedure, the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice shall apply* 

As regards arbitration, if the Parties fail to agree on the com- 
position of the tribunal, any Party may, in the case of disputes 


referred to in Article 4, bring the dispute by an application direct 
before the Permanent Court of International Justice; in the case 
of disputes referred to in Article 8, Articles 25 et seq, shall apply, 
but each of the Parties which has separate interests shall appoint 
one arbitrator and the arbitrators appointed separately by the 
Parties shall always number one less than the other arbitrators, 


1. In all cases where a dispute forms the object of arbitration 
or judicial proceedings, and in particular if the question on 
which the Parties differ arises out of acts already committed 
or on the point of being committed, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its 
Statute, or the arbitral tribunal, shall lay down within the short- 
est possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. The 
Parties shall be bound to comply with such measures. 

2. If the dispute is brought before a Conciliation Commission, 
the latter may recommend to the Parties the adoption of such 
provisional measures as it considers suitable. 

3. The Parties undertake to abstain from all measures likely 
to react prejudicially on the execution of the judicial decision 
or arbitral award or on the arrangements proposed by the Con- 
ciliation Commission, and, in general, to abstain from any act 
whatsoever which might aggravate or extend the dispute. 


If in the judicial decision or arbitral award it is declared that 
a judgment or measure enjoined by a court of law or any other 
authority of one of the Parties to the dispute is wholly or partly 
contrary to international law, and if the constitutional law of 
that Party does not allow or only imperfectly allows of the con- 
sequences of the judgment or measure in question being an- 
nulled, the Parties agree that the judicial decision or arbitral 
award shall grant the injured Party equitable satisfaction. 



1. The present Convention shall be applicable as between 
the High Contracting Parties, even though a third Power has 

an interest in the dispute. 

2. In conciliation procedure, the Parties may agree to invite 
such third Power to intervene, 

3. In judicial procedure or arbitration, if a third Power 
should consider that it has an interest o a legal nature which 
may be aflected by the decision in the case, it may submit to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice or to the arbitral tri- 
bunal a request to intervene as a third party. 

It will be for the Court or the tribunal to decide upon this 

4. Whenever the question is one relating to the interpretation 
of a Convention to which States other than those concerned in 
the case are Parties, the Registrar of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice or the arbitral tribunal shall notify all such 
States forthwith. 

Every State so notified has the right to intervene in the pro- 
ceedings, but if it uses this right, the interpretation given in the 
decision shall be binding upon it. 


Disputes relating to the interpretation or the application of 
the present Convention, including those concerning the classifi- 
cation of disputes, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. 


The present Convention, which is in conformity with the 

Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as 
restricting the duty of the League to take at any time, whatever 
action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace 
of the world. 



1. The present Convention shall be ratified and the instru- 
ments of ratification shall be exchanged at Bucharest. 

It shall be registered with the Secretariat of the League of 

2. The present Convention shall remain in force for a period 
of five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications. 

3. Unless denounced at least six months before the expiration 
of this period, it shall remain in force for a further period of 
five years, and similarly thereafter. 

4. Notwithstanding denunciation by one of the Contracting 
Parties, all proceedings pending at the expiration of the current 
period of the Convention shall be duly completed. 

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-mentioned Plenipoten- 
tiaries have signed the present Convention. 

DONE at Belgrade in triplicate on May 2ist a one thousand 
nine hundred and twenty-nine. 




We, Charles the First, by Grace of God Emperor of Austria, 
King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary, of this 
name the Fourth, swear by the living God, the blessed Holy 
Virgin Mary, and all God's Saints -to maintain in their rights, 
prerogatives, their freedom and privileges, their laws, good old 
and confirmed customs the Churches of the Lord, the munici- 
palities of Hungary and of the Croatian, Slavonian and Dalma- 
tian countries, the ecclesiastical and lay inhabitants thereof what- 
ever rank they may belong to, to administer justice to any one, 
to uphold intact the rights, constitution, legal independence and 
territorial integrity of Hungary, the Croatian, Slovenian and 
Dalmatian countries, as well as to preserve the integrity and the 
constitution of the Croatian, Slavonian and Dalmatian countries, 
forming one and the same political unit with Hungary, to ob- 
serve the statutes given by King Andrew the Second, of blessed 
memory, excepting, however, the final clause of the thirty-first 
article of law," beginning with the words: "Quodsi vero nos . . ." 

1 Passed by the Chamber of Deputies December 18, 1916, and 
by the Chamber of Magnates in their sitting of December 20, 1916, 
Translated by the American Legation, Budapest, 

s Te%t of the clause of the thirty-first Article of King Andrew the 
Second's Golden Bull (the Magna Charta of Hungary) granted 
A.D. 1222, and referred to in the formula as not being binding on the 
last Hapfllnirg Monarch! 

"Inasmuch as We, Ourselves, or one of Our successors should ever 
act contrary to this Our disposition, liberty be granted by the author- 
ity of this Our Charter to the bishops, other bannerets and noblemen 


and ending: "in perpetuum facultatem"; not to alienate the fron- 
tiers of Hungary and of the Croatian, Slavonian and Dalmatian 
countries, and of all those parts, which by legal or any other title 
belong to these countries, nor to diminish them, and to do 
everything fairly in Our power to further the interest of these 
Our countries, their glory and their prosperity. 
So help us God and all His Saints! 

of the Kingdom, universally and singly, to those present, those to 
come in the future and to their descendants, to resist and contradict 
Us, as well as Our successors, without drawing down upon them- 
selves the blame of felony, and this liberty to last for ever and ever." 



6, 1921 1 


Concerning the cessation of the sovereign rights o His Ma- 
jesty Charles IV and the rights of succession of the House of 

I hereby inform all whom it may concern that the National 
Assembly of Hungary has passed the following law: 

1. The right to reign of Charles IV has ceased. 

2. The Pragmatic Sanction and all other stipulations of Law 
I and II of 1723, fixing and regulating the right of Succession of 
the House of Austria (Domus Austriaca) are abrogated for all 
time and the privilege of electing a King has thereby returned to 
the Nation. 

3. The Nation returns to the Kingdom's ancient form of 
Government, but postpones the occupation of the royal throne 
until a later date, and directs the Ministry to submit at the 
suitable time proposals relative thereto. 

4. This law takes effect on the day of its publication. 

I order herewith that the above law be published and this 
law being the will of the Nation, I will obey it and see that it is 
obeyed by others. 

Budapest, November 6, 1921. 


Governor of Hungary 
Royal Hungarian Prime Minister. 

1 Taken from the Hungarian Official Gazette, Budapest! Kozlony, 
and translated by the American Legation, Budapest. Published in 
the Statute of Hungarian Laws on November 6, 1921. 


Armstrong, H. F. The New Balkans. 1927. Where the East 
Begins. 1929. Italy, Jugoslavia and Lilliputia* Foreign 
Affairs, January, 1928. The Royal Dictatorship in Jugo- 
slavia. Foreign Affairs, July, 1929. 

Beard, Charles. The Balkan Pivot Jugoslavia, 1929. 

Benes, Edvard. My War Memoirs. 1928. Also articles on 
The Little Entente in the Encyclopedia Britannica and 
Foreign Affairs. 

Buday, Ladislaus. Dismembered Hungary. 1922. 

Cabot, John M. The Racial Conflict in Transylvania. 1926. 

Czechoslovak White Books. Documents diplomatiques con- 
cernant les Tentatives de Restauration des Habsbourg sur 
le trdne de Hongrie t 1922. Documents diplomatiques 
relatifs aux Convention d r Alliance conclues par la RSpub- 
lique Tchecoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates 
et Slovenes, et le Royaume de Roumanie, 1923. 

Foreign Policy Association Information Service. The Problem 
of the Adriatic. Vol. Ill, No. 8, 1927. The Problem of 
an Austro-German Union. Vol. Ill, No, 20, 1927. Obstacles 
to Balkan Cooperation. Vol IV, No. 12, 1928. The Little 
Entente. Vol. IV, No. 14, 1928. 

Graham, Malbone W. New Governments of Central Europe. 

Hungarian Government. Documents diplomatiques relatifs au 
Dtftrdnement des Habsbourg. The Hungarian Peace 2W 
gotiations. 1922. 

Jaszi, Oscar. Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary. 

Macartney, C. A. The Social Revolution in Austria. 1926, 



Machray, Robert, The Little Entente. 1929. 

Mair, L. P. The Protection of Minorities. 1928. 

Masaryk, T. G. The Making of a State, Memoirs and Observa- 
tions 191418. 1927. 

Mitrany, David. The Possibility of Balkan Locarno. Inter- 
national Conciliation, No. 229, 1927. 

Moussct, Albert. La Petite Entente, 1923. L f Europe balJ^an- 
ique et danubienne. 1928. 

Pasvolsky, Leo. Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States. 

Scton-Watson, R. W. The New Slovakia. 1924. 

Slavonic Review. The Foreign Policy of the Little Entente. 
Vol. V, 15, 1927. 

Tcmperlcy, Harold W. How the Hungarian Frontiers were 
Drawn, Foreign Affairs, April, 1928. 

Toynbce, A. J. Survey of International Affairs. Volumes for 
1920-23, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, and 1928. 

Newspapers: The Times (London); Le Temps (Paris); Corriere 
della Sera (Milan); Neue Freie Presse (Vienna, Liberal); 
Arbciterzeitung (Vienna, Socialist) ; Prager Presse (Prague, 
Semi-official); Pester Lloyd (Budapest, Semi-official), 


Adriatic problems, 113-114, 118, 

126, 172, 

Aegean Sea, 112, 125, 126. 
Agrarian Conferences (1930), 


Albania, 126, 172, 175. 
relations with, 
Italy, 114-116, 
Jugoslavia, 114-115. 
Albrecht, Archduke, 32, 181. 
Alexander, King, 13, 75, 83, 88, 

91, 92, 117, 

Anschluss, 129-141, 172-174. 
standpoint of 

Austria, 129, 133-135, 136, 

Czechoslovakia, 129, 137- 


France, 129, 133-135, 
Germany, 135-136, 
Great Britain, 140, 
Hungary, 139, 
Italy, 129, 139-140, 
Jugoslavia, 138-139, 
Rumania, 138, 
vetoed by Peace Conference, 


Apponyi, 29, 32. 

A. R. A., 130, 
Constitutional Reforms, 173, 

Layton-Rist Report, 140, 
League Reconstruction, 131, 

relations with, 

Czechoslovakia, 11, 130, 131, 

132, 144, 161, 

Germany, 133-136, 172-174, 
* Hungary, 11, 25-27, 131, 156, 
Italy, 117, 173, 
Little Entente, 11, 130, 156, 
reparations, 130, 166. 
Austro-Hungarian debts, 166 

Averescu, General, 63, 145. 


Balkan Locarno, 125-126, 175. 

Banat, 5, 10, 77, 158. 

Belgrade Conference (1922) 13, 

(1929) 184-187. 
Benes, 3, 14, 17, 52, 57, 105, 163, 

168, 169-170, 185. 
Bessarabia, 78, 107-108. 
Bethlen, 19, 20, 165, 169, 182. 
Boris, King, 117. 
Bratianu, lonel, 63, 65, 66, 67. 
Bratianu, Vintila, 66, 67, 71, 73- 


Briand, 149, 161. 
Briand-Kellogg Pact, 38, 109. 
Brocchi Plan, 167. 

* Bilateral relations appear under name of country coming first 
in alphabetical order, e,ff, see "Austria" for Austro-German rela- 




Bucharest Conference (1930), 


Aegean outlet, 112, 124, 
Franco-British demarche, 120- 

121, 122, 

League loan, 118, 119, 
refugee problem, 111, 118, 
relations with, 

Czechoslovakia, 127, 186, 
Greece, 112, 124-125, 
Italy, 114, 117, 
Jugoslavia, 111, 119-123, 

126, 127, 

Rumania, 78, 111, 
reparations, 166. 
Bulgarian minorities, 78. 
Burgenland, 11, 131. 

Carol, King, 65, 66, 72-76, 181, 
Carpathian Ruthenia, see Czech- 
Charles, ex-King, 5-6, 8, 9-10, 

15-19, 182. 
Conference of Ambassadors, 11- 

12, 18-19. 

Corfu Incident, 114, 123. 
Coronation Oath (Hungary), 16. 
Corridor, Polish, 39, 107, 136, 


Croatia (see Jugoslavia). 

all-Party coalition, 52, 
Carpathian Ruthenia, 56-57, 
Czech officials, 47, 
land reform, 53, 170, 
League Council member, 14, 
Liberation Debt, 164, 165, 166, 


economic position, 154-156, 
minorities, 46, 

German, 52, 54, 138, 
Magyar, 6-7, 54-55, 176-180, 
Ruthenian, 56-57, 

relations with, 

France, 142-144, 

Germany, 128-129, 141, 144, 

Hungary, 9, 11-12, 17-18, 

Italy, 145, 

Jugoslavia, 3, 9, 17, 

Poland, 106, 144, 

Rumania, 10, 17, 

Russia, 109, 

Vatican, 50, 56. 
Slovakia, 39, 55, 56, 58, 177, 

Slovak treason trial, 56. 


Dalmatia, 99, 113, 117, 126. 
Danubian Problems, 111, 130, 

132, 156, 157, 161-162. 
Davidovich, 85, 87. 
Dethronement Act (Hungary), 

18, 19. 

Dobrudja, 78, 111. 
Duca, 70, 71, 74. 

Eastern Reparations, 163-165, 

Fan Noli, Mgr., 114. 
Farm Cartel, 157-159. 
Ferdinand, King (Bulgaria), 95. 
Ferdinand, King, (Rumania), 63, 

65, 66. 

Flume, 113, 126. 

relations with, 
Germany, 145, 
Italy, 114, 115, 116, 118, 
Jugoslavia, 115, 116, 126, 

138-139, 145, 

Little Entente, 114, 126, 127, 



France, continued 
Poland, 106-143, 
Rumania, 110, 145. 

Free Electors, 32, 33, 181. 

German minorities, 36, 46, 52, 
54, 59, 76, 81, 94, 138, 140, 
173, 180. 

Germany, 136, 141, 
relations with, 
Italy, 139, 
Jugoslavia, 139, 
Poland, 107, 
Girsa, 187. 
Great Britain, 120, 122, 127, 


Greece, 123-125, 175, 
relations with, 
Italy, 114, 117, 124, 
Jugoslavia, 123-124, 126, 
Rumania, 124, 
Turkey, 124, 125. 
Gombos, 33, 182. 


Hague, The, Conferences (1929- 

1930), 30, 163-170* 
Hapsburg Problem, 5-6, 8-10, 
11-12, 16-18, 31-34, 181- 

Helen, Princess, 65, 75. 
Horthy, Regent, 6, 9, 33. 

economic position, 156, 
enters League, 20, 
franc forgery scandal, 22, 
League reconstruction, 20-22, 
military control, 19, 22, 
minorities in, 180, 
optants' dispute, 27-30, 164- 

165, 167, 168, 176. 
relations with, 
Italy, 24-25, 41, 145, 
Jugoslavia, 23-24, 

Rumania, 27-30, 164, 167- 


Revolution, 6, 8, 31, 
reparations, 21, 163-165, 166, 


treaty revision campaign, 6-7, 
Huss Day incident, 50. 

Imro, 96-97, 119-122. 
lonescu, 3, 7, 105. 

German, 36, 173, 
Slovene, 117, 178, 
relations with, 
Jugoslavia, 88, 112-118, 126, 

145, 172, 185, 
Rumania, 145. 

Joseph, Archduke, 6 t 8. 
administrative reform, 83, 92- 


Croatia, Peasant Party, 85, 87, 
Croat Treason Trial (1924), 

87, (1930), 94, 
Land reform, 98, 
League Council member, 14, 


minorities, 80-81, 
Albanian, 95, 
German, 94, 140, 
Magyar, 94, 176-180, 
Pashich supremacy, 86-88, 
public health, 99, 
Radical party, 85-87, 
relations with, 
Rumania, 3, 10, 111, 127, 


Poland, 106-107, 
royal dictatorship, 91-93, 99, 



Jugoslavia, continued 
Serbia, 81, 84, 
Serbian officials, 82, 90. 


Karolyi, 6. 

Koroshetz, Father, 85, 90. 
Kutzo-Wallachs, 78, 111. 

League of Nations, 

Council, 14, 21, 23, 26-27, 28, 

29, 160, 186, 

Economic conference, 161-162. 
reconstruction schemes in, 
Austria, 130, 131, 140, 
Bulgaria, 118, 119. 
Hungary, 20-22. 
Legitimism (Hungary), 32-34. 
Liapchefr, 119. 
Little Entente, 

and Soviet Russia, 108-109, 


at Geneva, 14, 149, 186, 188, 
conferences, 13-14, 157-159, 

182, 184-187, 
disarmament policy, 149, 
economic policy, 153-154, 156- 


military aspects, 146-149, 
of the Press, 187, 
of Women, 187, 
origins, 3-4, 7-12, 
Litvinov protocol, 109. 

Macedonia, 86, 95-97, 118-119, 

120-123, 126, 174. 
Machek, 89, 94. 
Madgearu, 69-70. 
Magyar minorities, 6-7, 46, 54 

55, 59, 76-77, 81, 94, 176- 


Maniu, 30, 64, 66, 68-69, 70, 73, 
74, 75. 

Manoilescu, 64, 66, 73. 

Marinkovich, 88, 92, 116, 169. 

Masaryk, President, 3, 52, 57, 

Mihai, Prince, 65, 72, 73, 74. 

Mikhailoff, General, 97, 121, 123. 

Minorities (see Bulgarian, Ger- 
man, etc.)> 
League Section of, 179. 

Mironescu, 72-73, 75, 182. 

Mixed Tribunals, 28-29, 168, 

Modus Vivendi, 50, 56. 

Moloff-Kaphandaris agreement, 

Mussolini, 36, 75, 113, 114. 


Nettuno Conventions, 


Optants Dispute (see Hungary), 
Otto, Archduke, 32, 33, 181, 182, 

Pangalos, 124. 
Pashich, 3, 85, 87, 88, 105. 
Peace Treaties (1919-1920), 
territorial dispositions, 3-4, 6- 

7, 46, 59, 80, 176-177, 
Pilsudski, 105. 
Pirot Agreements (1929), 121, 


relations with, 
Little Entente, 13, 14, 106, 


Rumania, 106-107, 109-110, 
Soviet Russia, 106, 107, 109. 



Pribichcvich, 87, 89, 92, 
Protogucroff, General, 96, 120, 

Radich, 85, 87, 89, 116. 
Railways, Strategic, 99, 111, 126, 

177, 178. 

Reparations Commission, 21, 
Eastern, 163-166, 166-170. 
Riga, Treaty of, 106. 
Rothemere, 36-37, 39, 177. 
Ruhr Occupation, 128, 143. 

Averescu regime, 63-65, 145, 
Dynastic problem, 71-76, 
Jewish position, 77-78, 
League Council member, 14, 
Liberal Party, 60, 62-64, 65-67, 

71, 73*74, 

minorities, 59, 76-78, 
National Peasant Party, 66-67, 

68-71, 72-73, 

Regency Council, 65, 66, 72, 73, 
Regat officials, 60, 
relations with, 

Soviet Russia, 106, 107-108, 

110, 142. 
Transylvania, 4, 27, 40, 63, 67, 

76, 77, 158, 177. 

Ruthenian minority (Czechoslo- 
vakia), 46, 56-57. 
Russia (see Soviet)* 

Saar Basin, 136. 

St. Gotthard Incident, 25-27. 

Salonika, Jugoslav Free Zone, 

123, 124, 126. 
Schober, 131, 173. 
Seipel, Mgr. t 131, 134, 156. 
Serbia, see Jugoslavia. 
Silesia, Upper, 107. 

Sinaia Conference (1924), 21, 

(1930), 158. 

Slovak minority (Hungary), 180. 
Slovakia (see Czechoslovakia). 
Slovene minority (Italy), 117, 


Smith, Jeremiah, 22. 
Sokols (Jugoslavia), 92, 94. 
Soviet Russia, 157, 
relations with Little Entente, 


Stambouliski regime, 119. 
Stresemann, 136. 
Succession Law (Rumania), 65, 

Svehla, 50-51, 52, 57. 

Tariffs, 131-132, 155, 156, 159, 


Tirana Treaty, 115, 116. 
Titulescu, 27, 29, 75, 169. 
Transylvania (see Rumania). 
Treaty of Neuilly, 10, 112, 147, 

Rapallo, 113, 

Riga, 106, 

St. Germain, 36, 112, 176, 

Trianon, 4, 10, 34, 37, 112, 147, 

Versailles, 37. 
Treaty Revision Campaign (see 

Hungary) . 
Taankoff, 119, 123. 


Udrzal, 52. 

United States of Europe, 153, 160, 
161, 188. 


Vass, Mgr., 182, 
Vatican, 50, 56. 

222 INDEX 

Venizelos, 105, 123, 124. Y 

Vilna, 148. Young Plan, 136, 160, 163, 165, 


Walko, 38. Zita, ex-Empress, 32, 34, 182. 

Warsaw Conference (1930), 159. Zivkovich, General, 91. 
Windischgraetz, Prince, 22. Zog, King, 114, 117, 172.